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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The Suspension of Disbelief: California City 1955 – 1972  
 
by 
 
Shannon R Starkey 
Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Sylvia Lavin, Chair 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between architectural production and real 
estate speculation in the mid-century desert development of California City north of Los 
Angeles. Contrary to the dominant discourse illustrating architecture’s shift from 
buildings to immaterial image worlds as a product of an indirect intersection with 
increasingly abstract capital, I argue, rather, that architecture was re-materialized as 
objects that continued to be produced, circulated, stored, and consumed. The 
financialization of architecture did not occur through building, but through design itself, 
in alternative formats including newspapers, deeds, bonds, specifications, construction 
guides, software code, budgets, memos, organization diagrams, correspondence, in 
addition to familiar modes like drawing, model, or photograph. A change in architectural 
production coincided with a change in architectural practice. It became a kind of media 
practice, not in the Modern sense that architecture was subject to mediation; rather, 
  iii 
architectural design actively mediated. Over a period is just fifteen years, the production 
of design became the production of paperwork; the development of buildings became 
the development of evidence; and the analysis of the built environment became the 
analysis of the corporation. Through a collection of architects and designers – Whitney 
Smith, Wayne Williams, Garrett Eckbo, Konrad Wachsmann, Deborah Sussman, Robert 
Venturi, and Denise Scott Brown – this dissertation reveals the ways in which 
architecture mediated the real and the speculative, the environment and real estate 
development, private investment and the social, research and the corporation, 
materiality and money.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In the summer of 1971, Konrad Wachsmann was perusing the latest issue of Design & 
Environment when he discovered a rendering of a proposed city hall for California City 
credited to Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners. He was understandably taken 
aback, as he was currently working with the developer of California City, Nathan 
Mendelsohn, on a city hall design himself, and had been for years. Mendelsohn founded 
California City in 1958 after amassing more than 80,000 acres of the Mojave Desert, 
with a vision of developing the next Los Angeles. At the time of publication, however, 
the development company, and all of its assets, had been acquired by a Colorado-
based conglomerate, Great Western United, creating a unique situation in which the 
president of the conglomerate and Mendelsohn, now director of a subsidiary company, 
each hired a different firm for the same project. After learning that Venturi was aware of 
the previous design and argued against Wachsmann’s so-called “desert ship,” 
Wachsmann attacked the developer, the city government, and the magazine.1  
 
This kind of jockeying for a commission is undoubtedly commonplace today; architects 
are regularly forced to compete. Although the city hall project at California City was not 
an open competition, this behavior could even be dismissed as the unfortunate result of 
                                               
1 Konrad Wachsmann to James A. Riley, August 25, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der 
Künste, Berlin. 
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competing corporate interests. However, the reason Wachsmann was upset illustrates a 
shift in the relationship between architecture and capital, between the architect and the 
developer. Revealed in correspondence with the mayor of California City, Wachsmann 
was primarily concerned with his design being displaced in popular print i.e. magazines 
and newspapers.2 What Wachsmann appears to have understood, or at least was 
attentive to, and what Venturi, Rauch, and Scott Brown inadvertently reinforced, was the 
divide between design/research and physical development, and the valuation of the 
former to the point that the latter was rendered unnecessary, redundant, and irrelevant.  
 
For Wachsmann – committed to the Modernist ideology, and specifically interested in 
the ways in which Modernism could be opened up to mass consumption – architectural 
service was in the production of representation for the purposes of physical building. To 
the extent that his architectural designs had also recently been publicized and circulated 
in print media was, for Wachsmann, to support funding efforts for building. Venturi and 
Scott Brown, on the other hand, were very much aware of emerging media theory. The 
separation of sign from shed, in fact, enabled the sign to move from billboard to 
magazine spread. However, they were blind to the way in which their attention to the 
medium produced in turn a change in architectural services. However much they 
remained committed to building, the same ideas that allowed them to quickly produce 
fantastical media content, foreclosed the possibility of building. California City, as such, 
is not so much a story about architecture, but about how architectural services changed 
                                               
2 The independent city council ultimately rejected funding for either design, both of which were budgeted 
for over a million dollars.  
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to become a mechanism connecting land development and speculation to forms of 
paperwork to generate wealth. 
 
Real Estate 
Mendelsohn did not start in real estate, but rather as an academic and scholar.3 
However, he left academia during World War II to work as an economist in the Office of 
Price Administration. After the war, he became treasurer for the General Panel 
Corporation.4 And while this would be his entry into development and the source of his 
relationship with Konrad Wachsmann, it was his background as a sociologist and 
economist that would play a larger role in his real estate career.5 In 1949, Mendelsohn 
                                               
3 Nathan K. Mendelsohn was born in Czechoslovakia in 1915. He emigrated with his family to New York 
City at the age of five, eventually receiving a Bachelor’s of Art in 1935 from City College of New York. He 
continued his studies at Columbia University, earning a Master’s in sociology two years later. At 
Columbia, Mendelsohn studied under renowned rural sociologist, Edmund Brunner. While at Columbia, 
Mendelsohn got involved with an offshoot of the Communist League of America, the League for a 
Revolutionary Party. Headed by B.J. Field (born Max Gould), the LRP had traction on the campus 
following Field’s expulsion from the CLA. After, Mendelsohn stayed at Columbia and taught classes on 
suburban and rural patterns of development. He was an Assistant of Social and Philosophical 
Foundations of Education. See, Alan Wald, New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-
Stalinist Left From the 1930s to the 1980s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 107. 
See also, Teachers College Bulletin, Announcement of Teachers College, Columbia University (New 
York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1941). 
 
4 Following the war, Mendelsohn became treasurer and controller of Cyclohm Motor Corporation, where 
he reconnected with Albert Wohlstetter, a peer at both City College of New York and Columbia University. 
Wohlstetter was also a member of the League for a Revolutionary Party alongside Mendelsohn. Although 
Wohlstetter primarily studied mathematics, he also worked as an assistant for Meyer Schapiro while at 
Columbia University. Through Schapiro, he became acquainted with Walter Gropius, Mies Van Der Rohe, 
and Le Corbusier. He even served as guide and driver for Le Corbusier during his first visit to New York in 
1935. Prior to the war, Wohlstetter worked at the National Bureau of Economic Research. During the war, 
while Mendelsohn worked for the OPA, Wohlstetter worked for the War Production Board and a small 
company founded by his brother, Atlas Aircraft Products. At AAP, Wohlstetter worked as an industrial 
quality control expert. Growing tired of his restricted work at AAP, management shifted him part-time to an 
affiliated company, the General Panel Corporation, where he was able to connect professionally with his 
friends Gropius and Konrad Wachsmann. After a stint as director for the National Housing Agency (1946-
1947), he returned to the AAP, which had changed its name to Cyclohm Motor Company.  
 
5 He also invested heavily in the company, becoming one of its main stockholders and securing a position 
on the board of directors. Jonathan Stevenson, Learning from the Cold War: Rebuilding America’s 
Strategic Vision in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin Books, 2008). Ethan Schrum, “Social Science 
over Agriculture: Reimagining the Land-Grant Mission at the University of California-Irvine in the 1960s,” 
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became executive vice-president and developer of Camp Anza, a recently 
decommissioned 1,200-acre military base near Riverside, California, purchased by a 
longtime friend, Charles Wohlstetter.6 With the help of Wachsmann, he proceeded to 
redevelop hundreds of barracks into single family houses, converting the base into a 
small bedroom community.7 In 1954, Mendelsohn entered into a second real estate 
                                               
in The Land-Grant Colleges and the Reshaping of American Higher Education, edited by Roger Geiger 
and Nathan Sorber (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2013). Jacob Heilbrunn, They 
Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (New York: Random House, 2008). Joe Flood, The 
Fires: How a Computer Formula Burned Down New York City - and Determined the Future of American 
Cities (New York: Riverhead Books, 2010). Steeve Sabatto, “From Keying to Wedging: The Optimized 
Workability of Constructional Systems Designed by Konrad Wachsmann During the Cold War Under the 
Supervision of the North American Governmental Agencies,” in Understanding and Conserving 
Industrialized and Prefabricated Architecture, edited by Franz Graf and Yvan Delemontey (Lausanne: 
Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes, 2012). 
 
6 In 1947, Charles Wohlstetter’s close friend, a society columnist Sis Willner, became enamored with a 
financier Phil Philbin. In 1948, the two were married, and Philbin appealed to Wohlstetter to become a 
financial backer for a new real estate venture. Camp Anza, located in Riverside, California, was first 
established as a military base during World War II by the Army. Activated toward the end of 1942, Camp 
Anza was approximately 1,240 acres located in the western portion of Riverside. While the land was 
acquired only six months earlier, the camp came online before the end of the year, serving as an 
embarkation camp for troops heading to the Pacific. More than 600,000 troops ended up filtering through 
the camp on their way to the war. The camp entailed a couple hundred barracks measuring twenty feet by 
100 feet, and some communal buildings including a laundry facility, an officers’ club, cafeteria, and open-
air auditorium. As the war progressed, the camp took on a secondary function, as housing for Italian 
POWs. When the war ended, the camp reversed its function, acting as a disembarkation camp for 
returning soldiers. The turnover was even higher in this capacity, with most returning soldiers staying just 
twenty-four hours before matriculating back into the country. Following the war, it was designated as 
surplus, and decommissioned in 1946. All the acreage and the near 500 buildings were put up for auction 
in 1947. In early 1949, the Anza Realty Company was born, and Mendelsohn served as its executive 
vice-president. Charlie Wohlstetter, The Right Time the Right Place (New York: Applause, 1997). Ron 
Robin, The Cold World They Made: The Strategic Legacy of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2016). Alex Abella, Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of 
the American Empire (Orlando: Harcourt, Inc., 2008). 
 
7 Wachsmann recalled the project in his unpublished autobiography, “Timebridge,” writing: “For a short 
while, I went to Riverside, California. Nathan Mendelsohn had asked me to transform a military camp, 
Camp Anza, into housing units for people, which I did. But this was far from what I wanted to be doing.” 
Wachsmann’s photographic documentation of the site shows an interest in the diminishing single point 
perspectives created from the seemingly endless march of barracks (fig. 2.44). The gabled roofs appear 
to merge, forming long continuous lines extending toward the horizon, disrupted only by clotheslines and 
electrical poles. Alongside the ground level photographs, Wachsmann shot a series of photographs from 
the height of the electrical poles, capturing the roofs below (fig. 2.45). The higher viewpoint diminished 
the exterior walls. The roof became the focus, forming an expansive, continuous ground cover. The tightly 
knit, identical barracks made it difficult to discern the breaks between them. They visually merged to form 
a large mat-building in the middle of an endless flat landscape. Only far off mountains disrupted the 
otherwise straight line of the horizon. The conversion plans show relatively minor changes to the 
barracks. The barracks were chopped in half to reduce the size to suit a single family. Inversing the 
  5 
operation, this time with prominent California land speculator and developer, M. Penn 
Phillips. Together, they purchased nearly the entire township of Hesperia, located in 
San Bernardino County between San Bernardino and Victorville approximately eighty 
miles east of Los Angeles.8 The thirty-six-square-mile property was largely undeveloped 
                                               
conventional relationship of architecture to real estate, whereby architecture constitutes an improvement 
on the land, Wachsmann’s design increased the value of the land through a process of removal, a literal 
reduction of the existing improvements on the land. Demolition was used to produce differentiation in the 
relationship of the units to the street. The previously strong, continuous roof and street lines were broken 
and modulated to create waves. At the level of the neighborhood, the waves created from blocks of units 
yielded circular pockets of communal space accumulated from the combination of back yards (fig. 2.46). 
Beyond the strategic demolition to create communal areas and visual difference along the street, 
Wachsmann designed a garage addition, mirrored unit-to-unit (fig. 2.47) with a trellis between. While the 
demolition broke up the endless monotony of the barracks, the garage and trellis created a single 
continuous roof out of two units. The pairing of garages yielded a small courtyard in between that 
functioned as an outdoor dining area (fig. 2.48). Many existing window openings were preserved. 
However, in between several windows, the exterior surface of the wall was covered with vertical wood 
planks. Painted black as well, the combination of window and vertical slats created the illusion of a long 
ribbon window across the front and down the side of the units (fig. 2.49). The design visually separated 
the roof from the wall, which appeared to float on top of a black band running around the stark white 
houses. Unlike the original plot plan, generated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Wachsmann 
generated a shadow-ground drawing (fig. 2.50). Poche was evacuated from architectural form, 
anticipating his design for California City. Additional houses were designed and built by Richard Neutra, 
Marcel Breuer, Gropius and Van der Rohe. The Anza Realty Company also built five General Panel 
Houses on the property. See, Gilbert Herbert, The Dream of the Factory-Made House: Walter Gropius 
and Konrad Wachsmann (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984). Galvin Preservation Associates, City of 
Riverside, Camp Anza/Arlanza, 2006-2007, Certified Local Government Grant, Historical Resources 
Inventory and Context Statement (Los Angeles: Galvin Preservation Associates, 2007). JM Research & 
Consulting, Home Front at Camp Anza: Camp Anza Officers Club (Riverside: JM Research & Consulting, 
2013). “Highest Bidder Offers $510,000 for Camp Anza,” Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1947. Charles 
Wohlstetter, The Right Time The Right Place (New York: Applause Books, 1997). Konrad Wachsmann, 
“Timebridge 1901-2001,” edited by Judith Wachsmann and Gloria Kaufman (unpublished manuscript, 
1981). Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
 
8 Phillips and Mendelsohn subdivided residential lots, laid preliminary roads and water lines, and built the 
Hesperia Desert Inn and the Hesperia Recreation Club. Phillips reportedly purchased the entire 
development for just over one million dollars. Beyond mere subdivision and provision of access and 
utilities though, Phillips built and sold a version of mass-produced housing he invented called the U-Finish 
Home. The U-Finish Home involved building and finishing the exterior of the house and leaving the 
interior to be finished by the buyer. From the outside, the residential neighborhoods at Hesperia appeared 
to be finished and inhabited, yet they were, for the most part, raw, exposed interiors. In the first six 
months of sales, Phillips “completed” a new home every thirty hours, an impressive sounding statement 
reported in the Los Angeles Times, but amounted to less than 150 homes. Phillips also developed a 
12,500 square foot hotel and 3,000 square foot recreation building, complete with restaurant, pool, game 
room, cocktail lounge, tennis courts, and playground. In 1956, the developer owned Hesperia Water 
Company was set up as a municipal water district, with Mendelsohn installed as its director. This strategy 
of creating public districts as a way to shift ownership over public lands and resources, and by extension, 
the provision of services along with it would later be taken to an extreme level in California City. Hesperia 
foreshadowed California City, though at a fraction of the scale. At the same time, Mendelsohn’s real 
estate trajectory reveals a shift away from development and toward speculation, and related to that, away 
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desert, with just thirty-five existing homes.9 Over the next two years, he would learn and 
aid in the execution of Phillips’ operation, described as: 
“Secure land, build homes on it, put in the minimal amount of 
infrastructure to make the homes inhabitable, bring in a population that 
creates the basis for a community that includes momentum for 
establishing some form of a jurisdictional governmental agency, sell all of 
the parcels acquired, take a profit and move on to the next development 
elsewhere.”10  
In 1955, Mendelsohn began acquiring desert land to create what would become 
California City, approximately 100 miles north of Los Angeles. Operating through 
several subsidiaries and dummy agents, he amassed 82,000 acres.11 More than 25,000 
acres were purchased from the state and the remaining came from a combination of 
speculators and farmers.12 California City differed from Mendelsohn’s two previous real 
                                               
from previously established and regulated locations to the undefined desert. “Rapid Growth of Project 
Told,” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 1955. “New Recreation Club Furthered,” Los Angeles Times, July 1, 
1956. See also, “Hesperia Water Supply Adequate, State Admits,” Los Angeles Times, June 23, 1960. 
 
9 “Rapid Growth of Project Told,” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 1955. 
 
10 Mark Gutglueck, “Hesperia Entrusting Next Phase of City Administration to Police Chief,” San 
Bernardino City Sentinel, January 9, 2016. 
 
11 “The dream began taking form in 1955 when Mendelsohn and some associated acquired 35,000 acres 
of land from Basque sheep herders in Antelope Valley. Bought in checkerboard strips, the blocks were 
filled in with the purchase of another 26,000 acres from the state of California. Another block of 15,000 
acres was bought from a Los Angeles group and further parcels were acquired from individual owners.” 
See, Al Johns, “Down to Earth: Former Teacher Plans New City,” Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1960. 
 
12 A lawsuit brought by a number of landowners against the California City Development Company in 
1969 alleged that 25,153 acres of state-owned land was sold to Mendelsohn for just $10. “Title was 
taken, the suit said, in the name of Jennings Land Co., which the complaint described as a dummy 
transfer agent. The acreage then was deeded to the Mohave Investment Co., which was identified as 
being made up of members of the Mendelsohn group. The suit charged that state officials did not have 
the legislative authority to effect the sale and were obligated by law to call for competitive bidding.” See, 
“Knight Named in Land Suit,” Los Angeles Times, April 19, 1969. 
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estate ventures. Unlike Camp Anza, or even Hesperia, California City did not have 
previously established boundaries, was not recognized as a township by the county or 
the state and was not identified on any published map.13 Although Mendelsohn named 
Arlanza Village, it was part of a rebranding strategy to aid in the conversion of the 
military base to a residential neighborhood. Despite Camp Anza’s brief life, both the 
existing barracks and a variation of the name persisted through the redevelopment and 
even its later absorption into the town of Riverside in 1961, for which it served as a 
bedroom community.14 Meanwhile, Hesperia had an even longer history, evidently 
strong enough to resist being renamed by Phillips and Mendelsohn.15 Mendelsohn’s 
development history reveals a shift away from improved to unimproved land.16  
 
Mendelsohn mobilized the desert metaphor to systematically empty the land of any 
defining feature or resource. The seemingly infinite expanse of the desert was 
highlighted and used as the basis for claims of isolation and an apparent lack of location 
itself. California City was imaged as a flat, undifferentiated surface, boundless and 
                                               
13 In fact, Mendelsohn would later celebrate the first instance of California City being recognized on a 
map. “But now, finally, California City has cropped up on the new official map of Kern County. We just 
know that other printers of maps, including the Richfield Oil Corp., will follow suit. We will be on all the 
maps because a map that leaves us off, or out, would be a remiss map. So we are on the map at last. 
Fred Beck, “In California City with Fred Beck,” Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1960. 
 
14 Galvin Preservation Associates, City of Riverside, Camp Anza/Arlanza, 2006-2007, Certified Local 
Government Grant, Historical Resources Inventory and Context Statement (Los Angeles: Galvin 
Preservation Associates, 2007). 
 
15 The town was originally laid out in the late 19th century by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway 
company. See, “City History,” City of Hesperia, California, accessed July 1, 2018, 
https://www.cityofhesperia.us/397/City-History. 
 
16 In Riverside, not only was there infrastructure, but a significant amount of architecture that was merely 
redeveloped. In Hesperia, a road network and infrastructure already existed, although there was scant 
architecture consolidated in a small area of the much larger town limits. 
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remote, setting the stage for an unprecedented level of total design and speculation.17 
The desert, an ”outlaw area”, invites visions, futures, speculations and fantasies.18 For 
Banham, the immeasurable desert was the quintessential environment for “Modern 
Man,” writing that “modern architecture, as in the works of Mies van der Rohe, is a 
rectangular partition of a regular but infinite space.”19 If, for Banham, the desert was the 
ultimate site for modernity, for Baudrillard, it was the ultimate site of post-modernity. In 
the desert all depth was removed; it was “a brilliant, mobile, superficial neutrality, a 
challenge to meaning and profundity, a challenge to nature and culture, an outer 
hyperspace, with no origin, no reference-points.”20  
 
Mendelsohn initially claimed California City as untouched land. Its previous history was 
suppressed, including the significant amount of land used for farming cotton and 
alfalfa.21 In marketing material for California City and articles for local newspapers, 
                                               
17 The American west is both a geographical region and a mythic concept, each constitutive of the other. 
The identification of the west as an explainer of American development began in the late 19th century 
with Frederick Jackson Turner’s “closing of the frontier.” However, subsequent criticism has revealed that 
Turner was a product of the myth, mythologizing a western experience that never unfolded as theorized. 
In fact, for Marc Reisner, even the idea of a conquered west is a myth. He recounts the history of 
disappearing or non-existent water and the massive efforts to control and divert virtually every river 
across the west, ultimately concluding the struggle to conquer to be futile. Importantly, these efforts were 
the product not of an administration or powerful individuals but of a fantasy-minded culture structured to 
conceal the harsh realities that would otherwise discourage development. See, Marc Reisner, Cadillac 
Desert: The American West and its Disappearing Water (New York: Penguin, 1993). 
 
18 Stewart Brand later identified the desert as one potential “outlaw area” where, according to 
Buckminster Fuller, social and technological development occurs. See, Felicity Scott, Outlaw Territories: 
Environments of Insecurity/ Architectures of Counterinsurgency (New York: Zone Books, 2016).  
 
19 Reyner Banham, Scenes from America Deserta (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). 
 
20 The emptiness in the desert corrupted vision itself, whereby objects ceased to be perceived. The desire 
for emptiness continued beyond the desert, creating emptiness all around as a watermark beneath the 
surrounding landscapes. See, Jean Baudrillard, America (New York: Verso, 2010). 
 
21 Eduardo Gruner encapsulates the colonial discourse of the 20th century American west as “largely a 
promotional discourse, ultimately designed to attract modern middle-class consumers.” Eduardo Gruner, 
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Mendelsohn’s critique of existing urban planning and development in Los Angeles 
served both to indict Los Angeles, his competition, and promote the image of California 
City as empty: “In the first place, most cities – whether large or small – have historically 
sprung up around some dominating influence such as a large industrial complex, or, 
perhaps, a strategic geographical location along an important river or waterway.”22 
California City, by implication, had no industry; nor beneficial geographic adjacency. 
Similarly, Mendelsohn suppressed the 19th century history involving Borax. Cutting 
diagonally through the property, from Mojave all the way to Death Valley, had been a 
prominent borax trail.23 California City was oriented along this southwest axis, making 
the trail a natural spine cutting through the entire development. The initial master plan 
conceived by CFP ignored this mineral history.24 
                                               
“The Intellectual’s Journey into the Desert: A Critique of the Postcolonial Notions of ‘Third Space’ and ‘In-
Between’” (paper presentation, CongressCATH 2002: Translating Class, Altering Hospitality, Leeds Town 
Hall, England, June 2002). 
 
22 “We’re Only 5 Years Old,” Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1963. 
 
23 Starting in the late 19th century, borax was mined in Death Valley and carried by twenty mule team 
wagons southwest to the railway in Mojave. Although the trail was in operation for only a few years, it 
persisted on the land as a trail and in popular culture well into the 20th century. On borax, see Romantic 
Heritage of Upper Mojave Desert: A Saga of Pioneer Discoveries and Modern Achievements (Victorville, 
CA.: California Interstate Telephone Company, 1961). See also, 20 Mule Team Borax (U.S. Borax & 
Chemical Corporation) even sponsored a television show about the area whose second host was Ronald 
Reagan. It was his last role before shifting to politics. Death Valley Days was created in 1930 as a radio 
program, and became a television program in 1952, and ran until 1970. Reagan hosted the season of 
1965-1966. Richard Lingenfelter, Death Valley and the Amargosa: Land of Illusion (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1986). See also, Robert Metzger, Reagan: American Icon (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: 
Center Gallery Publication, 1989). 
 
24 The urban plan proposed cutting across and replacing the historic, efficient and direct trail with curved 
and interwoven suburban roads, boulevards, and highways. Several years later, Mendelsohn reversed 
course. Community Facilities Planners would revise the master plan to harness the history of the borax 
trail as a 19th century landmark to encourage further land sales. Further, the local newspaper, the 
California City Press, later published the history of the borax trade through the town. “Here at California 
City, we felt this could best be accomplished by restoring to its original state this chapter in the life of the 
American west. 20 Mule Team Parkway, the modern multi-lane roadway, now runs parallel to its old west 
counterpart. In keeping with California City’s basic precepts of preservation, 3 parks have been created to 
intersect the Parkway at strategic points… thus creating a scenic and continuous route from Central Park 
to Galileo Hill Park.” “From Death Valley to Mojave Railhead,” California City Press 3, no. 31 (1966). 
  10 
 
Their denial of history and external forces even extended to the land’s natural 
resources. Seemingly counter-intuitively, Mendelsohn went so far as to claim a lack of 
natural resources: “Other cities have focused on… a single natural resource which in 
some cases dictates or limits the city form and the experience of living there.”25 The 
suppression of the land’s previous use as farmland led, by extension, to the 
suppression of its limited water availability. Mendelsohn attempted to overcome the 
most overt and pressing issue of developing the desert, the availability of water, by 
dismissing existing knowledge and measures that might serve as a reality check on his 
own forthcoming fantastical claims. 
 
The portrayal of the land as a tabula rasa was paralleled and reinforced by claims of 
detachment.26 Although Mendelsohn himself resided in Hollywood throughout his tenure 
in Southern California, his developments moved from a mere sixty miles from Los 
Angeles, easily accessible by numerous highways, to more than 100 miles from the city, 
several miles away from just one two-lane access road, US Route 6.27 Sufficiently 
distanced from Los Angeles, Mendelsohn turned back around to critique it. Los Angeles 
                                               
Nevertheless, initial plans and company rhetoric reveal efforts to suppress the role California City land 
played in the borax trade for exactly the reason that later plans show, an external force shaping the layout 
and organization of the city. 
 
25 “Land Investment is the Sure Road to Future Wealth” (Hollywood, California: California City 
Development Company, 1961). 
 
26 Mendelsohn’s development history reveals an increasing remoteness. The suburbs of Riverside County 
gave way to the outskirts of San Bernardino County, and finally to the rural desert expanses of Kern 
County. 
 
27 “Ribbon-Cutting to Cut Miles, Time,” California City Sun 6, no. 6 (1963). 
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became a stand-in for a broader indictment of existing cities and their planning and 
development strategies.28 Mendelsohn’s criticisms of the urban planning and growth 
patterns of existing cities, Los Angeles in particular, largely mirrored Charles Clark, an 
outspoken city planner who claimed cities were chaotic as a result of a lack of central 
planning.29 In 1941, he highlighted problems of traffic circulation, land crowding, and 
slums, which he laid at the feet of subdividers and developers.30 California City was 
framed as the solution to the perceived failures of piecemeal development and poor 
planning encapsulated in the early 20th century city of Los Angeles.31 In early 
advertising, to contrast with LA, emphasis was placed on the duration of planning; 
Mendelsohn proudly boasted that “Mr. Clark’s plan for California City has been on the 
drawing boards for over six years.”32 To Mendelsohn, California City would succeed 
where Los Angeles had failed because its plan was comprehensive and years in 
                                               
28 The plan that was applied to California City was conceived years before California City even existed. In 
1956, Mendelsohn hired Charles Clark in conjunction with Community Facilities Planners, a design 
collective the architects Whitney Smith and Wayne Williams, the landscape architect Garrett Eckbo, and 
the urban designer Simon Eisner. Since the early 20th century, Charles Clark, a prominent city planner, 
had worked primarily at the city, state, and federal level. As a city planner for Los Angeles in the 1930s, 
and later consultant for FHA projects in the West, Clark was publicly critical of developers and 
subdividers. 
 
29 Clark had also worked previously with large-scale developers Henry Laiser and William Zeckendorf. 
See, Jeremiah B.C. Axelrod, Inventing Autopia: Dreams and Visions of the Modern Metropolis in Jazz 
Age Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 21. 
 
30 Charles D. Clark, “Land Subdivision,” in Los Angeles: Preface to a Master Plan, edited by George W. 
Robbins and L. Deming Tilton (Los Angeles: Pacific Southwest Academy, 1941), 160. 
 
31 “As we look down on today’s city we see a patchwork of construction, automobiles, expansive asphalt 
parking lots, and a few parks sprinkled about. As we see the city from eye level it becomes a mirage of 
material exhibition. Billboards rise above used car lots. Eating establishments rub elbows with service 
stations. Flickering signs compete for your awareness. What does all this mania add up to? Zero. It 
becomes nothing more than a blurred image or no image at all.” Smith and Williams, Architects and 
Engineers, “California City: A Planning Approach,” (Pasadena: Smith and Williams, 1968). 
 
32 California City: Largest Community in U.S. Launched in Boron Valley.” Independent (Long Beach, 
California), March 29, 1958. 
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development. Clark’s abstract urban plan required and aligned with Mendelsohn’s 
abstract site. In the pages of the Los Angeles Examiner, he lamented Los Angeles while 
expressing the promise of California City: “What would Los Angeles be like if we could 
sweep away everything and start from scratch – a new plan with all new buildings, 
utilities and streets?”33 California City was positioned as a blank canvas capable of 
realizing the dream that Los Angeles failed to deliver.  
 
In 1958, California City was officially opened to the public. A photograph documents the 
flurry of buyers and salesmen on that first day (fig. 1.04). In an otherwise nondescript 
location in the Mojave Desert, with mountains faintly visible in the distance, the 
California City Development Company erected makeshift sales offices. Marking the 
desert floor with nothing more than foot prints and tire tracks, the offices consisted of 
scattered parked cars, large A-frame signs, beach umbrellas, and trailers. In the photo, 
people mingle among blue and gold flags while salesmen push tract maps and 
contracts across folding tables to potential buyers ready to secure their very own piece 
of the next Los Angeles.  
 
Speculation 
The divide between design and building has historically mapped onto another divide 
between architecture as a cultural practice, and architecture as a capitalist improvement 
on the land. The implication, largely upheld by architectural history even today, is 
twofold: the acknowledgement and understanding that architecture, through building, is 
                                               
33 “A Plan for the City of Tomorrow,” Los Angeles Examiner, January 22, 1961. 
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subject to and interdependent with the pressures and demands of capital i.e. return on 
investment; and the suspension of capitalist influence in a special realm of unbuilt 
architectural speculation. The 18th century saw the emergence of two oppositional forms 
of architectural speculation: the first comprising architecture designed and built for a 
market; the second comprising architecture free to speculate a potential but unknown 
future and the disciplinary implications.34 This 18th-century internal division in 
speculative architecture is largely maintained even today, the former perceived as 
driven by capital and the latter freed from it.  
 
It becomes increasingly difficult to maintain two opposing modalities of speculation in 
architectural production in the shift to late, financial, or speculative capitalism.35 But 
despite David Harvey elaboration of Marx’s undertheorized notion of ground rent, 
Martin’s focus on land, and Jameson’s cultural turn, the building remains the primary 
medium of architecture.36 As a result, the so-deemed immaterial image production 
                                               
34 Speculate, from the Latin speculāt-, is historically a visual term involving the close examination and 
observation of distant or otherwise difficult to perceive things. The term was expanded in the 18th century 
to become a potential but unknown future existence, moving into both economic and cultural realms. 
Jonathan Levy articulates a history of capitalism in the United States through the notion of risk. The 
hedging against loss forms the flipside to speculating for potential gain. Starting in the late 18th century, 
and intensifying through the 19th century, a tension emerged between the vision of freedom that linked 
the liberal ideal of self-ownership (landed ownership) to the personal assumption of risk, and efforts to 
financially manage that risk. The pairing of personhood with risk, and by extension speculation - first 
articulated by Alexander de Tocqueville who tied risk with the notion of independence through westward 
expansion - opened up the future and the West, establishing it as a realm of uncertainty to be managed 
and exploited, illustrated in the development of the futures market in the mid-19th century. See, Jonathan 
Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2014). 
 
35 Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (New York: Verso Books, 1999). 
 
36 David Harvey examines the capitalist system and its spatial form and function, keying into its underlying 
contradictions, its tendencies toward crisis and its irrationality. See, David Harvey, The Limits to Capital 
(New York: Verso Books, 2007). Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992). Fredric Jameson, “The Brick and the Balloon: 
Architecture, Idealism and Land Speculation,” New Left Review 1, no. 228 (1998): 25-46. Reinhold 
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characterizing postmodern architecture remains relatively untouched.37 Martin suggests 
that “under late capitalism virtually all architecture is, in effect, corporate architecture,” 
but also that the building is the best measure of “architecture’s many, ongoing 
entanglements with capitalism.”38 Nevertheless, Deamer articulates the broader position 
of architectural scholarship that architecture maintains some level of autonomy to 
“speak and develop its own language in its own history relatively independent of world 
events,” so capital can “do its work without its effects being scrutinized.” The implication 
is that there are only “indirect” relationships between the building “participating 
energetically in the economic engine that is the base” and design “operat[ing] in the 
realm of culture.”39 
 
                                               
Martin, “Fundamental #13,” Places journal, May 2014. Accessed 10 Jan 2019. 
https://doi.org/10.22269/140512. 
 
37 Both Martin and Stevens, investigating the postwar period, compellingly argue for the disciplinary 
inclusion of figures more sympathetic to an economic analysis, including corporate firms like SOM, and 
more disciplinarily central figures like Mies van der Rohe and I.M. Pei. Martin, in his research and interest 
in the ways architecture connects to capital, broadened the category of the architect to include a number 
of corporate firms, including SOM. Setting aside, for a moment, the extent to which a firm such as SOM 
was truly ignored or outside the discipline, Martin continues to maintain a distinction, however slight, 
between corporate firms and the likes of Mies van der Rohe, despite going to great lengths to show how 
the former is not unlike the latter. While Martin argues for a disciplinary consideration of corporate 
architecture, he keeps it at somewhat arm’s length. Sara Stevens in her research and interest in the ways 
architecture connects to capital, broadened beyond the architectural figure to consider the real estate 
developer as an integral and influential force on the built environment. If Martin investigates architects 
that overtly engage capitalist forces, then Stevens investigates architects more central to the discipline, 
like Mies van der Rohe and I.M. Pei, but only that work done for real estate developers. Rather than make 
a case for the consideration of corporate architects, Stevens compellingly argues that even those most 
disciplinarily center were not distinct or exempt from the forces of capital by revealing their connections to 
and reliance on the real estate industry to realize physical development. See, Sara Stevens, Developing 
Expertise: Architecture and Real Estate in Metropolitan America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2016). 
 
38 Reinhold Martin, Utopia’s Ghost: Architecture and Postmodernism, Again (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010). 
 
39 Peggy Deamer, “Introduction,” in Architecture and Capitalism: 1845 to the Present (New York: 
Routledge, 2013).  
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I argue, in California City, architecture intersected directly with capital not so much 
through building, but through design itself, in alternative material forms.40 From the late 
1950s to the early 1970s, three major architectural figures produced designs for 
Mendelsohn, almost none of which were built: Whitney Smith and Wayne Williams, 
Konrad Wachsmann, and Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. The speculative 
operation at California City was not just financial, but discursive. Both floated over the 
surface of the land in various print media, some familiar to architectural history like 
drawings, photographs, and models, and others not so familiar, like bonds, newspapers, 
and deeds. Despite the near absence of building, the small-scale economies of 
architectural design practice were funded by, and in turn supported, a large-scale land 
speculation operation. Architects otherwise funded through their academic 
appointments were supported by real estate speculation while their design output 
generated millions of dollars in land sales. But further, in the relationship between 
architecture and “corporate capitalism” articulated by Martin, architecture did not so 
much enter through the back door of financial speculation; rather, it was fundamentally 
integral. Architectural design was commissioned, purchased, packaged with land, and 
sold to an international investment community. The small-scale transactions of capital 
for design between the developer and the architect aligned with, reinforced, and served 
as a model for one of the largest land speculation operations in the 20th century in the 
United States.41  
                                               
40 Contrary to the widely-held understanding in scholarship that post-modern architecture entailed a 
“sullen withdrawal from engagement, or the preemptive, exuberant embrace of the status quo” – both 
largely considered to be generated through immaterial image worlds – I argue, in California City, that 
neither did architects retreat, nor was their production immaterial. Reinhold Martin, Utopia’s Ghost: 
Architecture and Postmodernism, Again (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
 
41 “California City: Huge Bunko Operation,” Los Angeles Underground 1, no. 13 (1969). 
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Media  
This dissertation is less about architecture, as building, than the alternative media forms 
through which architecture was produced, circulated, and consumed. With little physical 
development on the ground in California City, the archival collections of photographs, 
drawings, models, deeds, contracts, newspapers, correspondence, budgets, memos, 
diagrams, and specifications are the primary means through which the history of the city 
can be accessed, unpacked, and processed. The “job” of these media forms, Lisa 
Gitelman asserts, is representation.42 Since the rise of postmodernism, architectural 
practice, and architecture history along with it, have been preoccupied with media for 
what they represent.43 That is to say, architects and historians have, for the most part, 
focused on the content of the medium, the result of its “job”, overlooking how media 
construct and control representation as such.44 This leads to the understanding of 
postmodern architectural production as image-based, having lost the building as the 
output, and its material properties along with it. Even in the recent revisiting of 
postmodern architecture, Martin continues to make a distinction between “immaterial 
                                               
42 Lisa Gitelman, Always Already New: Media, History, and the Data of Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2006). 
 
43 As Lisa Gitelman articulates, “media are themselves denizens of the past” but also “functionally integral 
to a sense of pastness.” I also use Gitelman’s definition of media as “socially realized structures of 
communication, where structures include both technological forms and their associated protocols, and 
where communication is a cultural practice, a ritualized collocation of different people on the same mental 
map, sharing or engaged with popular ontologies of representation.” Lisa Gitelman, Always Already New: 
Media, History, and the Data of Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006). 
 
44 Architecture continues to be understood, particularly since the postmodern moment, primarily through 
the paradigm of dematerialization characterized by Marxist scholars. Specifically, they assert that post-
industrial labor “results in no material or durable good.” As a result, they claim a postmodern era 
characterized by the immaterial nexus of language, communication, and the symbolic.” See, Antonio 
Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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language-based economies” and “tangible economies organized around material 
production” like buildings.45 And while Martin argues for a relationship where the latter 
support the former, the distinction reinforces postmodern architecture as immaterial. 
Rather than reinforce the notion that postmodern architecture ignored real world 
conditions to build imaginary worlds, this dissertation recognizes that architecture 
continued to be produced, circulated, consumed, and stored, as media. And while this 
collection of media represents California City and the numerous ways in which 
speculative architecture was laid over it, this dissertation investigates the media forms 
themselves, and the way they were created, transmitted, and how they allow or delimit 
representation. As an historiographical method, media theory is leveraged to investigate 
the relationship between speculative architecture and speculative capital and the 
change in the nature of architectural services in the run up to postmodernism. The 
financialization of architecture at California City shifted architecture from Modernist 
forms of production like buildings to Postmodernist forms like images. However, the shift 
registered in California City is less a change in the forms of media, and rather a change 
in the approach to and mobilization of those forms. That shift coincides with a shift in the 
dissertation from historiography to history as media theory was picked up and focused 
on by Venturi and Scott Brown, among others, producing a kind of epistemological 
disconnect between architects subscribed to the modernist ideology, and an emerging 
generation of postmodern architects that was more attune to the notion that speculative 
capital demanded images, not buildings. However, their success in producing content 
                                               
45 Reinhold Martin, Utopia’s Ghost: Architecture and Postmodernism, Again (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010). 
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for the medium foreclosed the possibility of building. Beginning with Smith and Williams, 
the shift in architectural services was already in motion, but because the production of 
documents was mixed with the production of select buildings, the architects remained 
blind to the change from media as representation of forthcoming building to media as 
architecture itself. With Konrad Wachsmann, the possibility of building faded away 
entirely; in its stead, Wachsmann engaged in the production of media as evidence still 
in the service of building. He became acutely aware of the shift when he was replaced 
with Venturi and Scott Brown whose theory of architecture separating sign from shed, 
derived in part from media theory, well positioned them to produce compelling mediatic 
content. However, as Gitelman writes, “… the success of all media depends at some 
level on inattention or ‘blindness’ to the media technologies themselves in favor of 
attention to the phenomena, the ‘content,’ that they represent for users’ edification or 
enjoyment.”46 Despite the ultimate ambition to build, the success in the medium 
foreclosed the possibility of building. If, according to McLuhan, the content of a medium 
is always another medium, then this dissertation tracks the shift from architecture as the 
content of media to media as the content of architecture.47 
 
Chapter one focuses on the documents through which architecture was constructed and 
circulated, and how, despite some physical development, the architectural practice at 
California City can be understood as something more akin to a media practice. In 1956, 
                                               
46 Lisa Gitelman, Always Already New: Media, History, and the Data of Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2006). 
 
47 H. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). 
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Community Facilities Planners (CFP) was hired by the California City Development 
Company (CCDC) to conceive a master plan for California City. The Pasadena-based 
CFP consisted of the architecture firm of Whitney Smith and Wayne Williams, 
landscape architect Garrett Eckbo, and urban planner Simon Eisner.48 Over the next 
two years, the team engaged in the total design of the city, articulating and designing 
everything from signs and architecture to infrastructure, even the environment. Rather 
than being directly executed as physical development, however, the documents 
generated were mobilized to sell general obligation bonds through the formation of a 
community services district. And while the district financed and developed most of the 
facilities and infrastructure, the insertion of the bond between design and building not 
only shifted development goals, but, because bonds are secured by taxes, and not 
assets, the resulting buildings were rendered redundant.  
 
Flipping the conventional development logic of the period, CFP and CCDC prioritized 
the provision of community recreation and congregation spaces over housing or 
industry.49 CFP’s master plan represents a continued modernist experiment “seek[ing] 
                                               
48 The three firms all occupied the same office building designed by Smith and Williams at 1414 Fair Oaks 
Avenue in Pasadena, CA. John Chase, “Coda: 1414 Fair Oaks Avenue,” arcCA 05, no. 3 (2005): 116. 
 
49 Justified by the CCDC as a necessary precursor to both inhabitation and industry, the communal 
fantasy and the fantasy of community through “good recreational facilities” steered the priorities of 
development. “Industry requires labor and labor requires good family living conditions and good 
recreational facilities.” Fred Beck, “In California City with Fred Beck,” Los Angeles Times, February 12, 
1960. Rather, Mendelsohn claimed that California City was uniquely situated to benefit from nearby 
industrial areas. Community Facilities Planners, “California City Story: Three Short Years of Dynamic 
Growth,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961). “An Offering: Southern California Land,” (Los 
Angeles: California City Development Company, 1964). Nathan Mendelsohn, “Looking Forward,” 
California City Sun 6, no. 5 (1963). Nathan Mendelsohn, “Looking Forward,” California City Sun 5, no. 8 
(1962). Stanford L. Optner and Associates, “The Following Information was Prepared for the Use of 
California City Development Company” (Los Angeles: Stanford L. Optner and Associates, 1960). 
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social change through community planning.”50 In the absence of housing, however, the 
primary function of the large-scale community developments was staging for 
promotional photographs circulated in marketing material and the local, developer-run, 
newspaper, the California City Sun. Architecture as a physical building was 
transubstantiated into paper that was produced, distributed, stored, and consumed by 
investors and across the country and around the world. In the absence of the design 
and construction of houses and housing, Smith and Williams generated comprehensive 
guidelines for future development, executed through deed restrictions and covenants, a 
proto-landowners’ association.51 Architectural design was wedded to real property, 
rather than coming after; and because the company financed most sales, architectural 
imagery and drawings were circulated and consumed prior to and in the service of a 
deed. Architecture, as image and aesthetic guidelines, no longer operated within 
property systems as a projection of a building that would fulfill the rights to land with 
inhabitation. Rather, architecture, materialized as a deed, served to convert land into 
property. Building, as a result, was rendered unnecessary to architecture’s materiality 
as paper.  
 
The flurry of large-scale development was largely stopped by the end of 1961, just four 
years after the city’s founding, but continued to generate millions of dollars in revenue 
                                               
50 California City represents both the ceding of control to the community, but also, due to the lack of an 
actually present community, the leveraging of community planning rhetoric for capitalist ends. See, Peter 
Allen, “The End of Modernism? People’s Park, Urban Renewal, and Community Design,” Journal of the 
Society of Architectural Historians 70, no. 3 (2011): 354-374. 
 
51 California City would eventually incorporate in 1965. “Pre-Planned for 1 Million: California City 
Incorporates,” Independent Star News (Pasadena, CA.), November 21, 1965. 
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through the 1960s. California City became not so much a thriving community but a 
compelling proxy for it, with few residents. California City was not only consumed, but 
produced, through bonds, deeds, and newsprint. The design of buildings became the 
design of paper documents overlaying and concealing the land with seemingly limitless 
financial and physical growth. Physical building wound down, revealing architecture to 
be primarily about the production of a sea of documents.  
 
Chapter two examines a new relationship between architectural research and real 
estate development and speculation. Corporate sponsorship and the increasing 
impossibility of physical development prompted architectural output to shift from 
projective image to material evidence. The project can be understood as a media 
system, incorporating the transmission, processing, and storage of information. In 1966, 
Konrad Wachsmann began to research and design a new city hall for California City. To 
celebrate the incorporation of the town and fulfill the functional needs of the newly 
established city government, the city council, on behalf of the development company, 
commissioned Wachsmann. Wachsmann had just recently returned to Los Angeles to 
take up a position at the University of Southern California where he re-established the 
Institute for Building Research. The commission became a substantial project for the 
Institute, on which a number of faculty and graduate students focused their efforts. A 
year into the project, Wachsmann presented his preliminary design to the developer, 
mayor, and city council. Under an expansive suspended cable roof, the combination of 
a broadcast tower, stage set and television studio, and tape storage, yielded a building 
as media system. A feedback loop was to be created between the residents in the town 
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and the newly-established government. Unlike the dominant architectural response, and 
subsequent discourse, to transformations in communication technologies by 
postmodern architects – to produce images that circulate within the new information 
universe – Wachsmann proposed architecture itself as the processor, repository, and 
transmitter of information.  
 
While the developer and city council lauded the project, a bond measure to fund the 
construction of the building failed to pass. Undeterred, Wachsmann, with the support of 
the developer, continued to research and refine the design over the next five years; 
however, with no construction funding, the building commission morphed into corporate-
sponsorship. In fact, most of the funds went straight to the lab, rather than to 
Wachsmann, to support research efforts and graduate students. Following repeated 
financial setbacks, the project became less and less likely to be realized. However, the 
components and demonstration became more and more real. Small-scale simulations 
and speculative representations were followed by full-scale mock-ups, custom computer 
software, machined prototypes, and fabrication specifications. Architectural production 
became material evidence of a building yet realized. The project instead existed and 
circulated in print media including magazines, newspapers, promotional materials, and 
exhibitions, accumulating cultural and financial value. While contributing to the land 
sales operation, it became a signature project in Wachsmann’s oeuvre. Wachsmann’s 
city hall design became an economic loss leader, for which both Mendelsohn and 
Wachsmann sacrificed time and money. The terms of success and failure in real estate 
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and architecture alike were rejiggered, whereby it was precisely the lack of physical 
building that increased the success of the project in both cultural and financial circles.  
 
Chapter three examines the apparent ethical breach aforementioned, and reveals a 
change in the nature of architectural competition that prioritized advertising and the 
corporatization of data over modernist forms of production i.e. buildings. The idea of 
architectural production as research evident in Learning from Las Vegas intersected 
and aligned with the corporation. The methodological potential of the photographic 
image as a means of researching, analyzing, and representing the city, translated not 
so much to sign-based architecture but sign-based images.52 In short, imaging the city 
as research led to images of the city as design. While the architect was absorbed into 
the corporate structure, the architectural exhibition became a corporate-sponsored 
advertisement. In 1969, the California City Development Company, and California City 
with it, was acquired by a national conglomerate, Great Western United. Purchased as 
part of a diversification strategy, the development company was renamed Great 
Western Cities, Inc. The CEO, William White, Jr., retained Mendelsohn as head of the 
new division. However, he proceeded to hire Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and 
John Rauch. In the span of a year, from the fall of 1970 to the fall of 1971, VRSB 
conceived a new master plan and designs for several buildings, none of which were 
                                               
52 Martino Stierli eschews the relationship between theory and practice in Venturi and Scott Brown’s work, 
and the substantial discourse of sign-based architecture along with it, to discuss Learning from Las Vegas 
as representing a new method for documenting and understanding the city. Martino Stierli, Las Vegas in 
the Rearview Mirror: The City in Theory, Photography, and Film (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 
2013). 
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built, including a shopping center, a post office, a cemetery, a new company 
headquarters, a series of billboards, and a new civic center.53  
 
Their first commission following their trip to Las Vegas – where they described what 
they perceived to be a false distinction between theory and practice, research and 
design, the university and the corporation, and ultimately, ideas and money – California 
City seemed to offer ideal conditions for reconciliation: a largely blank desert site, a 
young, amenable developer, and a mandate to reconceive the design of the city from 
urban planning to graphic design. Rather than collapse academic theory and 
commercial development, not only were VRSB subject to it, they reinforced it. The 
separation of sign from shed, and preoccupation with photographic documentation, 
produced the creation of, and engagement in, an image world that aligned with a 
speculative market floating above the desert surface. In that environment, VRSB 
designed everything from garden cities and modernist monuments to billboards. Their 
schematic designs, represented in similar modes of elevation and eye-level perspective, 
circulated with their photographs of California City. The deferral of design in the Las 
Vegas studio should thus be understood not as the rejection of design for research but 
rather, as theorized by Sylvia Lavin, the emergence of a new kind of creative production 
based on the “sifting, combining, constructing, expunging, correcting, [and] testing” of 
images.54   
                                               
53 Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour, Learning from Las Vegas (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1972). 
 
54 Martino Stierli, Las Vegas in the Rearview Mirror: The City in Theory, Photography, and Film (Los 
Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2013). See also, Sylvia Lavin, “Oh My Aching Antenna: The Fall and 
Rise of Postmodern Creativity,” Log, no. 37 (2016). 
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In under a year, the pair were absorbed into the corporation as de facto employees. 
What began as a “learning from” project on California City ended in the creation of a 
new department of planning and design operating directly under the CEO. It allowed 
VRSB to expand their purview beyond the development subsidiary to the corporation as 
a whole. As VRSB moved further inside the corporation, the possibility of physical 
development diminished. In its place, architectural output consisted of published articles 
and two, apparently distinct, exhibitions. In a bid by the corporation to win support from 
the city council for their proposed projects, they funded an installation of VRSB’s work in 
the lobby of the local Holiday Inn at California City. The display of their work for 
California City, themselves, and their previous work, became the first exhibition iteration 
that was then redesigned and installed months later at the Whitney Museum of 
American Art. Funded in part by the corporation, the retrospective exhibition prominently 
featured the California City projects. The two exhibitions, despite their differing locales, 
reveal the false distinction between corporate advertising and cultural production, both 
in content and funding. The wide circulation of the work, and the attention it received, 
prompted largely negative reactions from Wachsmann, Smith and Williams, Garrett 
Eckbo, and even Deborah Sussman – briefly employed just prior to VRSB. A change in 
the nature of practice and output led to competition not so much over physical buildings 
on the ground, but design circulating on paper.  
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1: COMMUNITY FACILITIES PLANNERS: ARCHITECTURE AS DEED 
 
 
 
Extensive master planning and design combined with alternative print media including 
bonds, deeds, and newspapers, to shift architecture away from physical building and 
instead toward the production of paper and its circulation. Conventional modes of 
architectural representation – drawings, models, and renderings – were mobilized to 
generate bond revenue to support the construction of recreation and community 
facilities that subsequently served primarily as visual content distributed by the local 
newspaper to generate further revenue. Meanwhile, architectural design was 
incorporated into the deed as guidelines and covenants, controlling but deferring 
physical building and inhabitation in the proposed new city. As a result, architectural 
design preceded ‘site’ and participated in its conversion from land. Master planning and 
design at California City, understood as a media practice, shifted from creating 
community to serving as a compelling proxy for it, purchased by thousands of investors 
spread across the world. 
 
In 1956, Community Facilities Planners (CFP) was hired by the California City 
Development Company (CCDC) to conceive a master plan for California City. The 
Pasadena-based CFP consisted of the architecture firm of Whitney Smith and Wayne 
Williams, landscape architect Garrett Eckbo, and urban planner Simon Eisner.55 Over 
                                               
55 The three firms all occupied the same office building designed by Smith and Williams at 1414 Fair Oaks 
Avenue in Pasadena, CA. John Chase, “Coda: 1414 Fair Oaks Avenue,” arcCA 05, no. 3 (2005): 116. 
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the next two years, the team engaged in the total design of the city, articulating and 
designing everything from signs and architecture to infrastructure, even the 
environment. The largely dry, desolate desert was to be radically transformed into a 
lush greenscape for a new metropolis.56 The plan eschewed the endless, homogeneous 
tract subdivision that had already started to consume the Southern California 
landscape; instead, CFP proposed six programmatically distinct and interdependent 
towns anchored by a large downtown (fig. 1.01). Within the confines of each town, 
alongside commercial, civic, and recreation facilities, several housing types were 
designed and zoned, including single-family houses, multi-family townhouses, and even 
low- and mid-rise apartment blocks. Meanwhile, a nebulous zone between towns was 
reserved for easy access and enjoyment of a new ‘natural’ environment. Downtown 
California City was designed around a centerpiece public park with numerous amenities 
(fig. 1.02).57 Extensive master planning and design were mobilized to sell general 
obligation bonds. The conventional relationship between the public sector and private 
development was turned on its head with regard to financing and governance. Individual 
private land owners and investors were configured into a quasi-public body through the 
formation of a community services district, a form of local government for 
unincorporated territories. The CCCSD (California City Community Services District) 
enabled the development company to shift the provision of services like water, lighting, 
trash collection, policing and fire protection, libraries, and parks and recreation, to 
                                               
56 Responding in part to the loss of open green space in the greater Los Angeles area. Mike Davis, “How 
Eden Lost its Garden,” Perspecta 30, (1999): 64-75. 
 
57 “You can eat in the park, enjoy a lecture, get visual relief and all within walking distance of your home.” 
Williams quoted in “A Plan for the City of Tomorrow,” Los Angeles Examiner, January 22, 1961. 
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landowners. The district issued general obligation bonds to finance the purchase of 
company-owned land, including the park, and develop most of the recreational facilities. 
The public was structured by shared financial debt and mobilized by the developer – 
who employed most of the town’s residents – to provide services conventionally 
provided by private development. But more than that, the insertion of the bond between 
design and building not only shifted development goals, but, because bonds are 
secured by taxes, and not assets, the resulting buildings were rendered redundant.  
 
Flipping the conventional development logic of the period, CFP and CCDC prioritized 
the provision of community recreation and congregation spaces over housing or 
industry.58 After building an extensive road network, and planting thousands of trees, 
physical development was consolidated in a few communal set pieces within and 
around an eighty-acre public park: an artificial lake, recreation center, congregational 
church, small commercial strip, golf course, clubhouse, event pavilion, sports center, 
and two pools (fig. 1.03).59 Roads and expansive roofs maintained a light touch atop the 
                                               
58 Justified by the CCDC as a necessary precursor to both inhabitation and industry, the communal 
fantasy and the fantasy of community through “good recreational facilities” steered the priorities of 
development. “Industry requires labor and labor requires good family living conditions and good 
recreational facilities.” Fred Beck, “In California City with Fred Beck,” Los Angeles Times, February 12, 
1960. Rather, Mendelsohn claimed that California City was uniquely situated to benefit from nearby 
industrial areas. Community Facilities Planners, “California City Story: Three Short Years of Dynamic 
Growth,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961). “An Offering: Southern California Land,” (Los 
Angeles: California City Development Company, 1964). Nathan Mendelsohn, “Looking Forward,” 
California City Sun 6, no. 5 (1963). Nathan Mendelsohn, “Looking Forward,” California City Sun 5, no. 8 
(1962). Stanford L. Optner and Associates, “The Following Information was Prepared for the Use of 
California City Development Company” (Los Angeles: Stanford L. Optner and Associates, 1960?). 
 
59 Undoubtedly, the master plan for California City represents what Dana Cuff articulates as the 
reformulation of public, as defined by Habermas, to community; “… there would be a rec-center, a church 
or two, and an elementary school. These formed the new collectivity, with local audiences that were far 
more homogeneous than the term ‘public’ implied with its liberating anonymity coupled to civic 
responsibility.” At the same time, although the public sphere in California City was neither public, nor 
entirely centralized (as evidenced in the breakdown of the city into several small towns), there were 
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desert surface independent of property lines beneath. The distinction between public 
and private was elided by intermixing private commerce into the park and blurring the 
line between the park and surrounding private residential lots. In so doing, architecture 
was repositioned as an illusory commons floating above and sliding across real property 
boundaries on the land.60 In the absence of housing, however, the primary function of 
the large-scale community developments was staging for promotional photographs 
circulated in marketing material and the local, developer-run, newspaper, the California 
City Sun. In the physical absence of a community, architecture as physical building was 
transubstantiated into paper that was produced, distributed, stored, and consumed by 
investors across the country and around the world. The newspaper was the primary way 
California City was sold to potential buyers, and the primary way California City was 
materialized and consumed by landowners, a majority of which would never set foot 
within city limits. 
 
In the absence of the design and construction of houses and housing, Smith and 
Williams generated comprehensive guidelines for future development, executed through 
deed restrictions and covenants as a proto-landowners’ association.61 The team 
produced designs and guidelines for a number of single-family houses, two-family 
houses, and multi-family apartment blocks. The details of the deed demarcated not just 
                                               
moves to maintain the collective identity that Cuff claims was sacrificed in the fragmentation of the public. 
See, Dana Cuff, “Collective Form: The Status of Public Architecture,” Thresholds, no. 40 (2012): 55-66. 
 
60 Even the twenty-acre artificial lake was separated from the earth by a thin layer of plastic. 
 
61 California City would eventually incorporate in 1965. “Pre-Planned for 1 Million: California City 
Incorporates,” Independent Star News (Pasadena, CA.), November 21, 1965. 
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the property limits overlaying the land, they also specified architectural design in the 
form of covenants and restrictions. Typically, architecture, as a design practice, occurs 
after the conversion of land into property, and operates as an instructive illustration in 
the service of a future building. At California City, architectural design was wedded to 
real property; and because the company financed most sales, architectural imagery and 
drawings were circulated and consumed prior to and in the service of a deed. 
Architecture, as image and aesthetic guidelines, no longer operated within property 
systems as a projection of a building that would fulfill the rights to land with inhabitation. 
Rather, architecture, materialized as a deed, served to convert land into property. If 
property value is typically generated from the outside by architecture as a physical 
building on the land, in California City it was generated from within, by the reconfiguring 
of architecture from projected design into operative document. Building, as a result, was 
rendered unnecessary to architecture’s materiality as paper. Further, the combination of 
paperwork – bond, newspaper, and deed – produced a new kind of community whose 
dispersed inhabitants shared not physical space, or even a common worldview, but 
financial liability.62  
                                               
62 Benedict Anderson theorized that all communities larger than “primordial villages” were imagined. The 
consumption of a common worldview through the distribution of paper media, newspapers and novels, 
creates a “confidence of community in anonymity.” For Anderson, the newspaper emerged as an effective 
means of representing and distributing the community imaginary. “Each communicant is well aware that 
the ceremony [of reading the newspaper] he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands of 
others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion.” Despite 
sharing space, larger communities commune indirectly and abstractly. Like the fragmented nationals 
described by Anderson, the dispersed landowners of California City were aware of each other only 
abstractly. With little residential development, California City became not so much a thriving community 
but a compelling proxy for it. However, California City is not the kind of imagined community theorized by 
Anderon; rather, it is an investment community that nevertheless, like imagined communities, coalesced 
around the circulation of paper. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2016). On follow-up countercultural communities, see, Felicity 
Scott, Architecture or Techno-utopia: Politics After Modernism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007). However, 
while Scott elucidates how 1970s communes were a reaction against the ideological individualism of 
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The flurry of large-scale development was largely stopped by the end of 1961, just four 
years after the city’s founding. The folding tables and A-frame signs from opening day 
became a small green recreational zone with a bustling sales office that, by the end of 
the 1960s, generated over 100 million dollars in revenue from nearly 50,000 landowners 
(fig. 1.04). However, California City became not so much a thriving community but a 
compelling proxy for it. Communal areas and recreational facilities were largely empty 
save for scant potential buyers that visited through a vacation program. Instead, a 
majority of the tens of thousands of individual landowners and potential buyers were 
spread across Southern California and around the world, without ever stepping foot in 
the city limits. California City was consumed and produced through bonds, deeds, and 
newsprint. California City did not exist so much in the Mojave Desert as it did in the 
documents that circulated around the world, and indeed continue to circulate, never 
quite coming to rest.63 As paper documents, architectural design can be understood as 
a practice of mediating the precarious and valueless land with stability, permanence and 
seemingly limitless financial and physical growth. Architecture shifted away from 
physical building to the production of documents. And while the discourse of 
architecture as media is well-established, by focusing specifically on the material forms 
and their circulation, a new relationship between architecture and capital emerges, one 
where design is valued on paper more than in physical development. 
                                               
industrial society, California City represents an earlier, and different kind of reaction, whereby post-
industrial financialization appears to re-establish the “feeling for community and affect.” 
 
63 Recently retired city manager, Tom Weil, reported that people continue periodically to arrive in town in 
search of a plot of land that they inherited or were willed by an original buyer. Mike Anton, “A Desert City 
That Didn’t Fan Out,” Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2010. 
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The Bond 
Even prior to the sale of land, CFP master planned California City for nearly two years. 
The plan was explicitly comprehensive: “The plan calls for virtually total design 
control.”64 While total design was claimed by the developer and architects as a way to 
avoid the pitfalls of incremental design, as outlined and decried by Charles Clark, a 
former city planner hired by Mendelsohn to assist Community Facilities Planners; it 
enabled the development company to eschew the design of housing and industrial 
architecture in favor of community, recreational, and public facilities and infrastructure.65 
The master plan’s focus on the latter was mobilized to sell general obligation bonds 
issued by a community services district. Formed soon after the founding of California 
City, at the urging of the developer, the California City Community Services District 
issued bonds both to fund new public facilities and infrastructure and purchase 
developments already funded and built by the developer. The public bond was inserted 
into the private development process resulting in shifted development goals and new 
financial structures. The master plan was no longer in the service of building or even 
selling land; rather, the master plan was in the service of selling bonds. Restricted from 
                                               
64 “Unified ownership of large holdings permit complete long-rang planning of entire property with power 
to enforce the plan.” “California City Story: Three Short Years of Dynamic Growth,” (Pasadena: 
Community Facilities Planners, 1961). 
 
65 The distinction drawn between subdividers and CFP (with Charles Clark) reflected the rhetoric 
espoused by Frederic Stevenson and Carl Feiss just a few years earlier. They contend that the distinction 
is not between a speculative and non-speculative development practices. “In a sense there is no 
distinction, since the settlement of North America was a speculative venture to begin with, and the layout 
of most communities, when premeditated, was performed with the basic purpose of the sale of land.” 
However, they maintain a distinction between laying a grid indiscriminately over the land and operations 
where “the business of selling lots does not take precedence over the responsibility for the design of an 
attractive, well ordered and well rounded community in which business of all types besides that of real 
estate is intended to flourish.” See, Frederic R. Stevenson and Carl Feiss, “The Planned Community: A 
North American Heritage,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 8, no. 3/4 (1949): 17-26. 
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funding private enterprise architecture, i.e. the provision of housing or industry, general 
obligation bonds funded the development of public facilities. But more than that, the 
bonds issued by the community services district were secured by taxes, not 
architectural assets. The design of community and recreational facilities, rather than 
their development, generated millions in revenue, while physical development was 
rendered unnecessary. The issued bond distributed architectural design across the 
country; it was stored by individuals and corporations alike, prompting the requisite 
taxation of individual residential landowners.  
 
As initially released, the plan projected a population upwards of 400,000.66 The plan 
eschewed a single large city in favor of a downtown city with six smaller, interdependent 
towns (fig. 1.05). Downtown California City was located in the southwestern corner of 
the property, closest to Los Angeles. As such, it served as receptacle for most visitors 
and potential buyers. With an initial projected population of 80,000-100,000, the area 
was planned as the core for the entirety of California City. Adjacent to the downtown 
core were six smaller cities with projected populations of up to 50,000 each. With 
curved edges, the cities fit together like puzzle pieces, filling out the entirety of 
Mendelsohn’s property. Each town floated within a series of larger subdivisions created 
by new proposed major highways. Towns were isolated one from the other also by large 
desert expanses with development restrictions. The urban organization was referred to 
                                               
66 By 1966, that projection was raised to one million by the turn of the century. See, “In California City with 
Fred Beck,” Los Angeles Times, December 3, 1959. “A Plan for the City of Tomorrow,” Los Angeles 
Examiner, January 22, 1961. Manuel Jimenez, “The California City Plan: A Cure for Urbanitis?” Los 
Angeles Herald-Examiner, December 11, 1966. “An Important Break-Through in Community Recreation,” 
Building Design, (March, 1967): 24.  
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by the architects and developer as a combination of “inter- and intra-communities” (fig. 
1.06). Against the perceived sprawl of Los Angeles, CFP leveraged the empty desert as 
an inter-community zone that would provide a visual and recreational reprieve as well 
as promote density.67  
 
The spatial separation between towns, floating in the continuous inter-community zone, 
reflected the relative independence of each town. Each “nucleated” town included 
residential areas, “personality centers” and “interest centers”. Each was designed to 
include all the functions necessary to operate independently, including all economic, 
educational, and recreational responsibilities. Taking principles from park design, 
Williams conceived each town as a “planned interweaving of relaxing; healthful; 
recreational; and educational elements.”68 In addition to serving the broader needs of 
the community, “interest centers” provided a unique function to each town, serving to 
create a specific identity but also an interdependent relationship between the towns.69  
 
                                               
67 “The feeling of open space has been accentuated by contrasting loose densities and weaving open 
spaces with tight densities and rigidly controlled fences. Open space can be increased optically by 
emphasizing these contrasts.” “California City Story: Three Short Years of Dynamic Growth,” (Pasadena: 
Community Facilities Planners, 1961).  
 
68 Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 
1961).  
 
69 Possible centers included: “landscape centers, transportation center, shopping center, garment trades 
center, financial center, building center, resort and sports centers, automotive centers, wholesale produce 
centers, communications centers, amusement center, activity centers, cultural center, decorator’s center, 
governmental, quasi public, educational, medical, international.” Community Facilities Planners, 
“California City 1980,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961).   
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The inter-community zone also penetrated the periphery of each town to ease 
accessibility even from the center of town.70 Reimagined as a greenscape with 
thousands of trees, the new “natural” landscape was designed to serve as a connective 
tissue weaving throughout the entirety of California City, promoting leisure and 
recreation (fig. 1.07).71 Williams conceded the extant desert “ha[d] heroic scale, color, 
and stimulating climate. In close-up detail… the land ha[d] little to offer.” Trees were 
proposed as the new “primary landscape resource,” chosen for their visual stimulation, 
assistance in climate control, and provision of shade and shelter. Further, greenery was 
leveraged to counteract the perception of isolated blocks of development “afloat in a sea 
of streets in which cars are king… (italics added)”72 Williams argued that the problem 
with urban sprawl was the loss of proximity to “nature”, prompting frequent mass exodus 
that clogged the highways. For Clark, the inadequacy of highways to accommodate the 
kind of volume described by Williams, was the fault of developers and subdividers. As 
the “backbone” of the built environment more broadly, major and secondary highways 
were frequently neglected by piecemeal developers.73 
 
                                               
70 “To begin with the cities don’t empty themselves. Only those who can afford it leave town. The majority 
have to stick it out where they are… Our dream is that no one will ever have to go more than a few blocks 
to enjoy a wide variety of outdoor sports.” Mendelsohn quoted in, Frederick Belden, “Recreation is a City: 
City Builder Recalls When Park Trip an Event,” California City Sun 1, no. 3 (September 1967): 3, 10. 
 
71 Mendelsohn also referred to the desert landscape that would remain in between the towns as an 
“estuarine environment.” See, Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, “California City: A Planning 
Approach,” (Pasadena: Smith and Williams, 1968). 
 
72 Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 
1961). 
 
73 Charles D. Clark, “Subdivision Plotting and Map Filing,” in Subdivision Principles and Practices, edited 
by Harrison R. Baker (Los Angeles: California Real Estate Association, 1936). 
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A highly ordered and hierarchical transportation system proposed two new crisscrossing 
freeways woven through the inter-community zone (fig. 1.08).74 Designed to move 
people through the city, new major highways would then deposit visitors into the 
individual towns of California City. Secondary highways, collector streets, and finally 
local streets rounded out the transportation system within each town and downtown. 
The organization of the road system reflected the different development conditions 
between the towns and the desert expanse between them. In order to accommodate 
efficient development in town, the roads adhered to a rigid grid system. Meanwhile, 
between the communities, where development was highly restricted either to open 
parkland or other large scale uses, the road system broke free of the grid (fig. 1.09). 
According to CFP, the roads deliberately curve and weave to create a more pleasurable 
and recreational experience: “The movement of people… help create an energetic, 
stimulating place to be – either as a viewer or a doer. The separation of fun as pleasure 
transportation from every day necessity transportation will be consciously avoided in 
California City.”75 Transportation was theorized as an ecology later by Banham.76 
                                               
74 Even beyond the road system, the architects aspired to design the vehicles also. “Though it would be 
fun to assume that we have control over the total design of the vehicle, it is more realistic to assume that 
the public transportation system would make use of existing bus type vehicles.” CFP resigned themselves 
to the design of graphic and color schemes for vehicles. The color scheme in particular, was tied to bus 
signs, bus stations, bus schedule posters, etc., to project a visually cohesive and consistent 
transportation system. Further, the hierarchy of the roads paralleled a hierarchy of vehicles. Individual 
automobiles were to be restricted from penetrating the core of the cities, where they might create 
unnecessary congestion. Rather, parking lots on the periphery of downtown areas would be located for 
cars to park and transition to public buses or “electrically powered tricycle cars”. See, Community 
Facilities Planners, “California City 1980,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961). 
 
75 “The area has great scenic charm and has the characteristic large scale vista of high desert country.” 
Community Facilities Planners, “California City Story: Three Short Years of Dynamic Growth,” (Pasadena: 
Community Facilities Planners, 1961). See also, Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980,” 
(Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961). 
 
76 Reyner Banham, Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies (Berkeley: University of California 
Publishers, 2009). 
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However, where Banham analyzed the freeway primarily from behind the windshield, 
CFP also noted the possible effects of transit activity on the surroundings.77 Between 
the urban scale of the transportation system and individual houses – the interstitial 
pedestrian zone – the master plan exercised significant design control.78 A combination 
of street furniture, graphic signs, public fountains, and lighting was designed to 
encourage recreation and “the feeling of living within a large park rather than in blocks 
of houses.”79 The built environment, unlike the infrastructure of the road system, was 
not as thoroughly designed. Specifically, housing and industrial architecture were 
outlined, but only recreational and congregational facilities were designed.  
 
The master plan, as a bound document, was leveraged by the development company 
alongside the creation of a community services district, to issue and sell bonds for 
California City (fig. 1.10). Just six months after California City was opened to the public, 
Mendelsohn pushed the first residents to establish a community services district.80 “The 
                                               
77 Further, Williams did not restrict transportation to the automobile. Rather, the architects expanded the 
definition of transportation to include walking, horse-riding, cycling, boating, and even swimming. A 
diversity of transportation modes, occurring at different speeds, was leveraged to activate the otherwise 
still desert, even in the absence of development – a flurry of movement of cars and people kicking up the 
desert that concealed the lack of static, permanent development. 
 
78 “At present, the architecture stops at the sidewalk line and “Detroit” auto design stops at the curb line. 
The space in between, which ironically is for the pedestrian who observes things in far more detail than 
the motorist, usually becomes a clutter which neither complements the architecture nor the automobiles.” 
Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961). 
 
79 Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 
1961). 
 
80 “As originally enacted in 1951 the Community Services District Law had been intended to provide an 
organizational framework for a district which would supply municipal type services to relatively urbanized 
areas which did not yet need the full services of an incorporated city. Consistent with the assumption that 
such districts would be formed by householders in relatively urbanized areas, the law provided that a 
petition to initiate formation of a district would be signed by registered voters residing within the proposed 
district. In 1961 bond counsel quietly sponsored “non controversial” legislation which replaced the 
requirement for petition by voters with a requirement for petition by landowners. Absentee landowners 
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fundamental principle undergirding all of these statutes is that when general purpose 
governments cannot provide a necessary service to an area, it is appropriate to form a 
specialized agency to do the job. Whatever capital expenditures may be necessary are 
financed by the issuance of district bonds, which enjoy the general tax-exempt status 
and market advantages of ‘municipal securities.’”81 In fact, just nine residents petitioned 
the county to create the special district. It was unanimously approved.82 The “civic 
government”, as it was referred to by the development company, had eight enumerated 
powers: “to supply the inhabitants of the district with water for domestic use, irrigation, 
sanitation, industrial use, fire protection, and recreation; the collection, treatment or 
disposal of sewage, waste and storm water of the district and its inhabitants; the 
collection or disposal of garbage or refuse matter; protection against fire; public 
recreation by means of parks, playgrounds, swimming pools or recreation buildings; 
street lighting; the equipment and maintenance of a police department or other police 
protection to protect and safeguard life and property; to acquire sites for, construct, and 
                                               
were thus empowered to create community services districts on remote tracts of raw land. The district in 
turn could finance recreation facilities, utility services, and other improvements which would induce land 
sales.” Thomas Willoughby, “The Quiet Alliance,” Southern California Law Review 38, no. 1 (1965): 72-
79. 
 
81 Thomas Willoughby, “The Quiet Alliance,” Southern California Law Review 38, no. 1 (1965): 72-79. “A 
favorite device for providing a developing community with necessary services is creation of a community 
services district. The district, in order to pay for such things as water distribution and sewage disposal, is 
empowered to tax and issue general obligation bonds. In general, it assumes the service functions of a 
municipal government and is overseen by a board of directors. It also serves as a means of providing for 
some of the things that a developer can’t afford.” See, Howard Gingold, “Terms Made Easy to Attract 
Desert Development Buyers,” Los Angeles Times, June 12, 1961. 
 
82 “The adaptability of special district procedures to land promotions has not been accidental. For the 
most part it has come about through a quiet alliance between promoters and bond counsel of this state.” 
Thomas Willoughby, “The Quiet Alliance,” Southern California Law Review 38, no. 1 (1965): 72-79. 
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maintain library buildings, and to cooperate with other governmental agencies for library 
service.”83 Its boundary matched the property limits of the development company.  
 
The special district took over many of the responsibilities that would otherwise be 
provided by the developer.84 One of the first acts of the California City Community 
Services District was to purchase the water system and rights from the development 
company. The board arranged to take ownership for the price of $1,350,000 with 
payments deferred for the first ten years. After taking ownership over the water system, 
the district proceeded to vote on and approve a bond issue for $1,000,000 to build the 
central park and recreation facilities, as well as more public roads, as outlined in the 
master plan.85 As an unincorporated town, California City was restricted from receiving 
a share of the tax revenue from the county and state. However, with the formation of the 
special district, and its ability to issue bonds, the development company was relieved of 
the financial burden of providing public services for the town.86 And while theoretically 
the special district operates independently of the developer, the company employed 
most of the residents and new board members of the special district. As such, 
                                               
83 “Land Investment is the Sure Road to Future Wealth (Hollywood, California: California City 
Development Company, 1961). 
 
84 “The California speculator has recently discovered that he can employ special districts and other public 
agencies to provide him with a significant credit subsidy.”  
 
85 Ronald Campbell, “Like its Layout, California City Politics is Confusing,” Bakersfield Californian, March 
5, 1984.  
 
86 “Another example is the California City Community Services District… It has also created a multitude of 
special assessment districts to finance specific street and road improvements in various subdivision units. 
Because most of the land sales have emphasized the speculative value of the lots, few homes have been 
built. From its inception the district has failed to generate sufficient revenues to pay its operating 
expenses and has avoided operating at a deficit only because of an annual subsidy from the developer.” 
Thomas Willoughby, “The Quiet Alliance,” Southern California Law Review 38, no. 1 (1965): 72-79. 
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Mendelsohn continued to wield control from the outside, 100 miles south in Hollywood. 
Bonds were essentially issued at the behest of the development company.87 This kind of 
legal, financial, and governmental exploitation pioneered by Mendelsohn, came under 
scrutiny within just a few years:  
“Although the use of special district to finance development projects is 
obviously advantageous to potential developers, as a matter of public 
policy it bristles with danger. In the first place, the use of a public agency 
to perform an essentially private and proprietary service provides no 
guarantee that any lasting “public interest” is served thereby. Subsequent 
land owners have no real voice in such a shadow agency. It will have 
incurred its major indebtedness and concluded its principal activities prior 
to their residence in the district. Yet these homeowners, not the original 
developer, become responsible for repayment of district indebtedness.”88  
 
Bank of America was an early investor in California City. In 1960, the bank purchased 
$400,000 of the bond.89 However, a significant distinction exists between general 
obligation bonds, as issued by the special district, and a conventional building loan as 
might otherwise be issued by a bank. Where a loan is secured by the developer with the 
                                               
87 “An Open Letter From Your Community Services District,” California City Sun 6, no. 6 (1963). 
 
88 Thomas Willoughby, “The Quiet Alliance,” Southern California Law Review 38, no. 1 (1965): 72-79. 
Mendelsohn employed this tactic of raising capital to fund developments to such an extent that by 1965, 
when the town was incorporated, it assumed more than $7 million dollars in debt from the community 
services district. See, “California City: Huge Bunko Operation,” Los Angeles Underground 1, no. 13 
(1969). 
 
89 “B of A Buys California City Bonds,” Los Angeles Herald & Express, September 15, 1960. “$400,000 of 
New Recreational Developments,” California City Sun 1, no. 7 (1965). 
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resulting building serving as collateral, municipal bonds are secured by the residents 
and landowners of the issuing district and repaid through taxation. Not only do bonds 
shift the financial burden of development from the developer onto the 
residents/landowners themselves, physical development need not ever materialize for a 
return on investment. The special district enabled the possibility of investment and profit 
in development without the need for physical development. Regardless of the provision 
or lack of physical development, the residents and landowners were taxed to cover the 
principal and interest of the bond issued through the use of architectural design. 
Architecture and urban planning documents generated private investment while 
rendering physical development unnecessary; its repayment was thrust upon a public 
tax base; in the severing of investment from development, the bond itself distributed and 
stored architectural design. 
 
That’s not to say that some physical development didn’t ultimately emerge. A park and 
some recreational and commercial facilities were built, funded almost entirely by the 
town’s residents and individual landowners.90 But not only was it irrelevant to the 
investment dollars that design and planning were instrumental in securing, development 
operated primarily through another form of print media, the local newspaper, the 
California City Sun.  
 
The Newspaper 
                                               
90 Even the church, though promoted by the development company and its newspaper, was funded 
through fundraising efforts by the residents of the town. See, “Church Fund Drive, Just Begun, Already 
Nears its $20,000 goal,” California City Sun 5, no. 4 (June 1962): 2. 
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Total design enabled the development company to skirt past the incremental provision 
of housing or industry and jump straight to the provision of public, communal, and 
recreational facilities. Conventional development logic of the period, as evident in 
numerous tract home developments already sprawling across Southern California and 
the country, would engage in the provision of these kinds of leisure and public spaces 
based on pressure from an extant community, after living and labor were satisfied. 
Mendelsohn focused first on communal, public, and recreational facilities, which he 
claimed were necessary precursors. A company spokesperson said as much, as early 
as 1960: “Industry requires labor and labor requires good family living conditions and 
good recreational facilities.”91 Put another way, before work, before workers, comes 
recreation. Development centered on a public road system, congregational church, 
recreation and community center, public parks, pools, golf course, and perhaps the 
largest physical transformation of the desert, a twenty-six-acre artificial lake.92 However, 
in the absence of residents, public and recreational developments operated primarily as 
images and stories documented by the local newspaper, the California City Sun. More 
interesting than the way in which architecture was mediated by the photograph is the 
way in which the photograph was deployed, alongside narrative, in the material practice 
of the newspaper. The newspaper was not merely a collection of immaterial re-
presentations of material architecture – images, drawings, descriptions – but an 
alternative material form of physical development that was produced, distributed, stored, 
                                               
91 Fred Beck, “In California City with Fred Beck,” Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1960. 
 
92 Even with all the physical development that occurred, it paled in comparison to the grand projections. 
“Phillips estimated that $35,000,000 is to be spent on streets, water and engineering. Over the years, 
Phillips said, investment in the project could reach $150,000,000.”  
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and consumed by individuals across the country and around the world. The California 
City Sun did not refract the events of the world to the local community so much as 
document the city and project it across the world.93 A pseudo free press operated by 
employees of the development company, the newspaper concealed speculative 
advertisement as news that did not merely represent buildings of value, but generated 
value itself through building documentation. The newspaper manifested a new 
relationship between architecture and capital that was not about the production of 
building but the production of newsprint. 
 
Several pieces of architecture were designed by CFP and developed by the company, 
including a community center, a congregational church, and a small commercial strip. 
The first building, a community center, was built in 1959, just a year after California City 
was opened to the public (fig. 1.11). The small, one-story building included three linear 
segments joined end to end that turned the corner from 82nd street onto the main 
boulevard running through downtown, Randsburg-Mojave Road.94 Located at the far 
west edge of the downtown loop, along with the small commercial strip, it was the first 
development to be seen from visitors arriving from the Los Angeles area. In fact, 
Randsburg-Mojave Road was the primary and only substantial access from the west. 
Running East/West, it ran directly into US Route 6, which was used to carry potential 
investors from Los Angeles, over the Santa Monica Mountains, and ultimately beyond 
                                               
93 In this way, the newspaper operated in an almost inverse way to the newspaper as theorized by 
Benedict Anderson. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, (New York: Verso, 1983).  
 
94 It was later renamed California City Boulevard. 
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the existing town of Mojave at the intersection of US Route 6 and US Route 466, to the 
exit for California City (fig. 1.12). The low-slung, flat roofed, California City Recreation 
Club included a continuous trellis along the rear that provided shade for an exterior 
concrete pad that included a pool, two shuffleboard courts, and several planters. The 
straight geometry of the architecture, informed by the grid system of the road network, 
broke free along the rear edge of the concrete pad which formed a curved edge through 
the desert beyond. Although the building appeared quite large, both from the street, and 
from overhead, only half of the roofed area was enclosed space. A significant portion of 
the building was simply a roof elevated on wood posts, with a wall on the street side 
giving the illusion of enclosed space (fig. 1.13). Behind the wall, open patios were filled 
with picnic tables and chairs that spilled out onto the rear concrete pool deck. The aerial 
photographs of the building, used for marketing purposes, gave the illusion of a large 
footprint. Only the location of the HVAC equipment, and lack of it, gives away the 
portion of the roof that is but a surface floating over an exterior patio (fig. 1.11). 
 
Coincident with the construction of the community center was the construction of a 
speculative commercial strip, anchored by two office buildings for the development 
company (fig. 1.14). Although headquarters for the California City Development 
Company began and remained in Los Angeles, a sales office building and 
“administration” building were built to facilitate the sales and management of the city 
locally (fig. 1.15). The sales office, a low-slung single-story building, featured a low 
gable, stucco walls, and few openings. As the first stop for potential investors visiting 
California City, the sales office turned inward, focusing investors’ attention on various 
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representations of the city – architectural renderings, charts, staged photographs – 
rather than the city itself. And while potential investors – the small percentage that 
actually visited prior to purchasing a lot – were frequently chauffeured around town by 
salesmen and invited to take advantage of the recreation facilities at the community 
center or within the large public park, it was within the sales office where most sales 
were finalized.95 As such, the satellite office of the California City Development 
Company was the first and last stop for investors. A two-story administration building 
was located next door, and included several offices for employees of the company 
along with a large “General Work Area,” employee break room, machine room, and 
vault (fig. 1.16).  
 
The location of the buildings reveals the grand scale envisioned for California City and 
the result of a development strategy that eschewed slow growth for spontaneous and 
instantaneous development.96 Not only was Randsburg-Mojave Road conceived as a 
four-lane boulevard with center divider, a multi-lane surface parking lot separated the 
street sidewalk from a secondary sidewalk in front of the office building (fig. 1.17). As a 
result, the street façade of the commercial strip was almost 200 feet from the curb of the 
boulevard. While the sales office contained no shading apparatus over the sidewalk, the 
walkway in front of the administration building and the remaining buildings in the strip 
                                               
95 Sometimes potential investors did not even set foot on the ground in California City. “At least one 
promoter has been known to fly his prospects over the land in a chartered plane, with air-to-ground radio-
telephone equipment handy to close the deal without the buyer’s ever setting foot on the subdivision.” 
See, Howard Gingold, “Terms Made Easy by Developers in Desert,” Los Angeles Times, June 12, 1961.  
 
96 “From the air, people say, California City makes sense. On the ground, however, it resembles an 
immense a jigsaw puzzle with most of the pieces missing. There are houses with no neighbors, 
boulevards with no cars, streets that end abruptly and reappear blocks or miles away.” Ronald Campbell, 
“Like its Layout, California City Politics is Confusing,” Bakersfield Californian, March 5, 1984.  
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included a trellis. A horizontal stucco band facing the street, attached to the outside of 
the post and lintel trellis, was designed as a sign board to keep the simple architectural 
surfaces clear of graphics and decoration, like a free-standing advertising fascia (fig. 
1.18). The administration building included a secondary floating surface that tied 
similarly through wood beams into the building. The trellis system functioned not only to 
provide some shading to the sidewalk, but allowed for signs to disconnect from the 
buildings, as outlined in the master plan.  
 
The remaining commercial strip, three independent buildings with “vacant” lots between, 
copied the same style of the administration building: clean, undecorated, stucco boxes 
set behind trellises (fig. 1.17). And while the development company frequently referred 
to the strip as the first phase of a “shopping center,” the initial plans by CFP reveal that 
the primary item on sale was the city itself.97 Beyond a small supermarket and variety 
store, most of the proposed storefronts were either commercial entities related to the 
development company or communal and public facilities: local realty offices, the 
community California City Club, a design center, local post office, library, and nursery. 
Like the community center, the nursery also featured a floating roof, giving the illusion of 
a much larger building. The roof extended not just to the edge of the exterior yard, but 
across the larger vacant lot next door (fig. 1.19). 
 
                                               
97 Local businesses never took off, and were largely supported by the development company. 
Nevertheless, the attempt to generate alternative retail and commercial businesses to the real estate 
operation align with the planned community ideas of Stevenson and Feiss, and ambitions beyond the 
“desire to promote, to sell, and to get out.” See, Frederic R. Stevenson and Carl Feiss, “The Planned 
Community: A North American Heritage,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 8, no. 3/4 
(1949): 17-26. 
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Driving into the city, beyond the small commercial strip, most of which was occupied by 
the development company, one quickly entered into the jewel of the entire city, 
California City Central Park. Named by Mendelsohn after its New York counterpart, 
Central Park constituted 160 acres of public and semi-public land, a congregational 
church, recreational facilities, and a twenty-six-acre artificial lake (fig. 1.02). The park 
was made up of sixty public acres, with an additional 100 acres of privately-owned land 
surrounding the park. Without a spatial boundary, the park extended well beyond its 
limits, giving the illusion of a public park more than twice its actual size. CFP relished in 
their design of the park and the ability to visually expand its size:  
“The park makes use of many new concepts in park planning. Its size is 
increased visually by the inclusion of private and semi-private uses 
together with the public park area. A commercially operated golf course is 
leased to an operator, boat rental and docking facilities are leased, some 
areas are sold off for housing with performance specifications included in 
the restrictions. Private clubs have been organized for the residents of 
adjoining subdivisions with private beaches, docking facilities and game 
courts. The resulting park appears as 160 acres in extent rather than the 
60 acres which it is in fact, and the resulting multiple use gives a festive 
atmosphere to the park at all times.”98  
Not only was the spatial organization conceived in such a way that the park appeared to 
permeate the private land uses, but private functions were restricted to those with a 
public face, like the golf course. And further, the inclusion of private functions facilitated 
                                               
98 Community Facilities Planners, “California City Story: Three Short Years of Dynamic Growth,” 
(Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961). 
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a greater flurry of activity, not unlike CFP’s broad approach to circulation, less about the 
efficient movement of people and things and more about generating more visual activity, 
endless circulation concealing a relative lack of permanence.  
 
Unlike much of California City, significant resources were expended on the creation and 
maintenance of the park. Much of the park, including the golf course, was radically 
transformed from dry desert into a lush greenscape with an abundance of trees and 
other greenery (fig. 1.20). The natural canopy was supplemented by several public 
pavilions and buildings for communal gathering and public use. The first building, 
located just outside the entrance of the park, was a congregational church (fig. 1.21). 
Sitting at the corner of Randsburg-Mojave Road and Conklin Boulevard, just down the 
road from the commercial strip at the edge of downtown, the church was two structures: 
a sanctuary and a classroom. The sanctuary was a bi-laterally symmetric square with 
filleted corners. At just over 2,000 square feet, the church was undoubtedly modest. The 
open plan included a pulpit at one end opposite the main entrance, and moveable pews 
(fig. 1.22). While the building was enclosed, the walls and the roof were visually, and 
structurally, distinct and legible independent of one another (fig. 1.23). Slanted stucco 
walls, with no openings other than the entrances, appear to stand independently of the 
roof. The roof, a series of upside-down clamshells, rise from within and extend beyond 
the walls of the church. The roof appears to float just above the walls. Each section of 
the modular roof was built out of a set of eight plywood fins cantilevered from a single 
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six-inch steel column.99 The top half of the fins were then covered with bent plywood, 
leaving the fins exposed from underneath. Spanning more than twenty feet square, four 
clamshells provided cover for the interior, with an additional three clamshells forming an 
exterior canopy. The same modular roof system was used in a pavilion located at the 
end of a long pier in the lake, and later as a logo for the development company (fig. 
1.24).100  
 
The floating pergola was complemented with two other pavilions located in a small 
island in the middle of the lake. Loosely defined, they served mostly to provide shade 
for a variety of possible activities. Taking simple geometric forms, one comprised a 
large pyramidal roof atop columns (fig. 1.25); the other included a dome atop a nearly 
continuous wall (fig. 1.26). Roofs abound throughout the downtown area. In fact, they 
appear to float more often over empty desert than enclosed space. Together with the 
thousands of trees planted as part of a program to transform the natural environment of 
California City, the numerous canopies served to provide respite from the sun.101 From 
the ground, and especially from the air, the roofs gave the illusion of architecture that in 
                                               
99 “Plywood: New Shapes Yield New Strength,” Architectural Forum, (April 1964): 126-127. See also, 
American Plywood Association, Advertisement, Journal of the American Institute of Architects 41, (1964): 
21.  
 
100 Here, again, a set of four clamshells yield a small floating roof. Isolated at the end of the pier, 
surrounded by water that produced a mirror image from almost any position, the roof appeared to float 
atop the water. 
 
101 10,000 trees were planted within the first two years of the development, part of a ten-year program 
calling for 100,000 trees. Community Facilities Planners, “California City Story: Three Short Years of 
Dynamic Growth,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961). See also, Marion Deaver, “First 
Years of California City’s Growth Outlined,” Mojave Desert News, August 14, 1980. 
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reality was merely elevated surfaces attached to the ground only by the most delicate of 
points. 
 
Focus on recreation extended even to the road network, where the CCDC quickly 
abandoned roads for residential development in favor of a new recreational parkway. 
With no apparent destination, the parkway recuperated the 19th century Borax trail that 
had previously been eliminated by the master plan. In 1962, just a few years after 
California City was opened for public consumption, the master plan was altered to 
accommodate the creation of a multi-valent boulevard parallel and adjacent to the 
existing wagon trail (fig. 1.27).102 The proposed parkway was 150 feet wide, and 
included paths for cars, bicycles, and horses, in addition to parks and picnic areas (fig. 
1.28).103 The parkway was framed by the development company as a pre-emptive move 
to preserve land for future public need, despite the still near absence of development, 
particularly outside the downtown loop. In 1963, the parkway opened to much fanfare, 
despite being reduced to a two-lane automobile road, with none of the accompanying 
pathways, wagon trail, or parks. 
 
                                               
102 Mendelsohn presented the proposal to the Kern County Board of Supervisors at the end of 1962. The 
20 Mule Team Parkway was discussed primarily as a communal zone for recreation more than a primary 
access road cutting through the development. The original plan for the parkway accommodated multiple 
kinds of transportation and recreation uses within a 300-acre strip. The Bakersfield Californian reported 
that the parkway was set aside as “history property”, and the preservation of “permanent community open 
space.” See, “East Kern Unit Moves to Preserve Part of Twenty Mules Team Road,” Bakersfield 
Californian, September 8, 1962. See also, “He Didn’t Exactly Enjoy the Walk but the Muleshoe was Worth 
it,” California City Sun 5, no. 11 (January 1963): 5.  
 
103 “We’re Stubborn About Saving 20-Mule Road,” California City Sun 5, no. 5 (1962). “Looking Forward,” 
California City Sun 5, no. 5 (1962). Adjusted to just 60 feet wide. “20-Mule Road Plan Set for County 
Action,” California City Sun 5, no. 8 (1962). 
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Perhaps the largest transformation of the desert at California City was the creation of an 
artificial lake.104 Produced through the removal of more than 20,000 cubic yards of 
desert, the lake was designed as the jewel of the entire development. It featured 
prominently in marketing material and was celebrated by Mendelsohn as a crowning 
achievement (fig. 1.29).105 Containing approximately thirty million gallons of water, the 
lake was the first step in realizing Mendelsohn’s dream of transforming the dry desert 
into a lush greenscape. The lake was large enough to attract Reyner Banham to 
California City as part of his research for Four Ecologies: The Architecture of Los 
Angeles. He remarked that “in the newer and remoted instances, an artificial body of 
water is almost mandatory… California City’s central lake seems, in its improbable 
desert setting, both ludicrous enough to be a joke, and welcome enough to be a blessed 
miracle.”106 And while the lake appears to adhere in a far more permanent way to the 
earth than either the shifting roads on the surface or the delicate floating roofs above 
the surface, the lake itself was lined in plastic, maintaining a barrier even between 
arguably the most intrusive intervention in the desert.107  
                                               
104 While many of the early construction projects at California City align with Cuff’s idea of the 
manifestation of the public shifting from courthouses to infrastructure, the lake, as a piece of infrastructure 
itself, complicates this identity crisis. The lake recuperated, at least in part, the loss of the “Habermasian 
public”. Dana Cuff, “Collective Form: The Status of Public Architecture,” Thresholds, no. 40 (2012): 55-66.  
 
105 “Artificial Lake at Desert Development Being Filled,” Los Angeles Times, April 9, 1961. 
 
106 Reyner Banham, Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies (Berkeley: UC Press, 2009),142. 
 
107 A soil investigation revealed that water loss without a protective barrier would be as many as 180,000 
gallons a day, enough to empty the lake in a matter of months. Converse Foundation Engineering 
Company, “Soil Investigation: Proposed Artificial Lake and Auxiliary Structures, California City, California,”  
(Los Angeles: Converse Foundation Engineering Company, 1959). As a result, large sheets of plastic, 
forty feet by 100 feet, were heat-sealed together to produce a continuous vapor barrier between the earth 
and the water. See, “Artificial Lake at Desert Development Being Filled,” Los Angeles Times, April 9, 
1961. See also, Tom Cameron, “Desert City Planned for Southland Growth,” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 
1962.  
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Banham learned perhaps of the existence of California City, with its “ludicrous” artificial 
lake, through the California City Sun, the local newspaper produced by two employees 
of the development company. The newspaper published its first issue even prior to the 
public sale of lots in the city.108 The newspaper was established coincident with the 
design of the master plan as a document through which California City was represented 
and mediated, and prior to any physical development or desert transformations.109 With 
a recurring column by Mendelsohn, the newspaper did little to hide its cozy and intimate 
relationship with the development company. In fact, present happenings in the city were 
combined with the company’s future plans; the California City Sun served as a 
personalized and narrativized advertisement masquerading, however indiscreetly, as an 
independent free press. As a marketing strategy, the distribution and coverage of the 
newspaper were reversed in California City. As implied by the conception of the 
newspaper before a single investor or resident, the newspaper was nearly boundless 
geographically, while largely limiting its coverage to California City and the nearby 
towns of Mojave, Randsburg, and Boron. Even as the city began to accumulate 
residents, however scant, the audience for the newspaper remained primarily absentee 
                                               
108 I have been unable to track down the earliest issues of the newspaper. The first issue I found, March 
1960, is in the archives of Konrad Wachsmann. In Mendelsohn’s monthly column, titled “Looking 
Forward”, he applauded the publishing of the newspaper even prior to the sale of land: “Margaret and 
Tom actually made their decision to publish the Sun during the early planning stages of California City 
and actually issued Volume 1 Number 1 of the paper before the actual start of our property selling 
program.” See, Nathan Mendelsohn, “Looking Forward,” California City Sun 3, no. 1 (1960). 
 
109 Further, the newspaper represented the new site of collective identity, no longer achieved through built 
form, but rather through a paper equivalent. See, Dana Cuff, “Collective Form: The Status of Public 
Architecture,” Thresholds, no. 40 (2012): 55-66. 
 
  53 
and potential landowners scattered across the world.110 The circulation of the 
newspaper, as a result, extended well beyond the limits of the town, to landowners and 
potential investors across the country and ultimately around the world. In the pages of 
the California City Sun, investors were apprised of the progress and future of the 
development; stories created the appearance of a town thriving in their absence.  
 
The content of the newspaper, and most of the promotional materials, was dominated 
by a combination of representations of the physical developments in the city and the 
speculative projects designed by Smith and Williams. Aforementioned, a majority of the 
developments in California City were communal in nature, centering on public 
recreation, and in most cases, publicly owned. The park and its corresponding facilities 
– the biggest capital outlay by the development company – was later transferred to the 
city, just like the water system.111 Williams even mentioned how his plans for the city 
were guided by public recreation: “We want to design the business center for fun as well 
as commercial enterprise so that downtown will be a place where people want to go, 
even if they have no shopping to do – a place where they can congregate and enjoy 
themselves.”112 However, in the absence of housing and industry – both of which were 
designed but left to landowners to provide – the extravagant and abundant communal 
                                               
110 And, as early as 1961, Konrad Wachsmann, who was updated monthly by Mendelsohn through the 
newspaper, anticipating their eventual, but unrealized, collaboration.  
 
111 “$400,000 of New Recreational Developments,” California City Sun 1, no. 7 (1965). 
 
112 Wayne Williams quoted in “Architects Plan Future ‘Metropolis’ in Desert,” The Bakersfield Californian, 
September 9, 1960. Where Cuff points to Levittown’s community center, and Westchester’s commercial 
strip, California City proposed a third kind of collectivity centered on recreation. Those who can recreate 
together, live together. See, Dana Cuff, “Collective Form: The Status of Public Architecture,” Thresholds, 
no. 40 (2012): 55-66. 
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facilities like the park, community club, and congregational church, remained unused. In 
fact, the spaces were almost exclusively used by potential investors visiting the town.113 
Physical development was not geared toward residents, however few, but toward the 
wider investment-seeking public.114  
 
The lake specifically, as the proclaimed jewel of the city, was leveraged less as an 
actual space with water in the ground and more as an image, representation, and 
illusion of water implying a thriving and resource-rich city. Just months after the first lots 
were released to the public for sale, Mendelsohn publicized the existence of “a vast 
underground lake under the sands of the Mojave Desert…”115 Mendelsohn identified 
nine existing wells within city limits as the access points for his newly discovered 
underground lake capable of providing 20,000,000 gallons of water per day.116 In 1956, 
Mendelsohn hired self-trained engineer, Stephen Riess, and driller, James Scott, to 
                                               
113 A formal vacation/selling program was not formalized until the late 1960s. However, from the 
beginning, potential buyers were brought in by bus and plane to visit and purchase.  
 
114 Williams’ focus on recreation and public engagement went beyond the design of space to the design of 
the community, however imaginary. With Mendelsohn, they created a “Social Advisory Committee.” Its 
purpose was to “act as a resource facility to obtain Educational-Cultural-Social program material for the 
community club and to offer guidance and stimulation for planning future social programs.” Housed with 
the community club house adjacent to Central Park, the committee organized “socials, dances, ‘town hall’ 
meetings, community improvement projects,” movies, “visiting lecturers from UCLA, [and] art exhibits.” 
The social environment and built environment were aligned through their ability to both be designed by 
the Community Facilities Planners. According to Williams, design alone was insufficient for a subdivision 
to become a community. That’s all to say, both physical and organizational structures were designed to 
facilitate community, but with nearly no residents. Community Facilities Planners, “California City Story: 
Three Short Years of Dynamic Growth,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961). 
 
115 “Underground Lake Reported,” Redlands Daily Facts, January 23, 1959. 
 
116 “California City: Largest Community in U.S. Launched in Boron Valley.” Independent (Long Beach, 
California), March 29, 1958. See also, Community Facilities Planners, “California City Story: Three Short 
Years of Dynamic Growth,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 1961). “An Offering: Southern 
California Land,” (Los Angeles: California City Development Company, 1964).  
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investigate the presence of water in California City, at a reported cost of $250,000.117 
Riess, whose professional reputation was more diviner than engineer, had developed a 
theory of “primary water” after years of drilling wells across the California desert.118 
“Primary water” was claimed to be a distinct form of groundwater that was in constant 
production deep within the earth, before finding its way to the surface. As opposed to 
underground aquifers, which were finite and could only be replenished by river flow, 
Riess claimed that “primary water” was inexhaustible, and further, because it was 
freshly created, it was the purest water in existence.119 Together, Mendelsohn, Riess, 
and Scott reported the existence of an underground lake fed by “primary water” thereby 
claiming the possibility of nearly unlimited development and the radical transformation of 
the dry desert.120 The Lockhart Fault, which runs through California City, and in which 
the underground lake was claimed to exist, was renamed in marketing material the 
Mendelsohn Lockhart Fault.121 Outside the company’s own promotional material, the 
supposed discovery of primary water at California City was not widely reported. 
                                               
117 “Scott Develops Water for California City,” California City Sun 11, no 7 (1968). See also, Bob Geggie, 
“Giant Underground Lake in Desert Fed by Snow Pack, Engineer Reports,” San Bernardino County Sun, 
January 24, 1959. 
 
118 It was claimed that Riess had traveled more than 47,000 miles across the West before “discovering” 
the lake conveniently located in “the triangular area formed by the towns of Mojave, Randsburg and 
Boron in which California City has 80,000 acres under development.” Warren Walters, “Water for All 
Beneath Desert, Says Engineer,” Independent Press Telegram, March 8, 1959. 
 
119 Riess’ theory of “primary water” was documented in a book that has since become prominent in 
conspiracy circles that persists even today in the fringes of the Internet. See, Michael Salzman, New 
Water for a Thirsty World (Los Angeles: Science Foundation Press, 1960).  
 
120 “Water Water Everywhere, Report Reveals,” Mojave Desert News, January 29, 1959. 
 
121 “Mojave Desert Covers Vast Lake,” Water Well Journal, (May 1959): 10, 32. 
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However, one sympathetic article mentioned the discovery and the magnitude of its 
implications:  
“[I]t is now estimated that more than one million acre feet of water a year, 
flowing at depths of 1,500 to 3,000 feet, runs south out of the Sierra 
Nevada Mountains into the Mojave valley through an underground 
network of shattered rock fissures… A million acre feet is a staggering 
amount of water. It is enough to meet the annual needs of five million 
people. It is three times as much as the Los Angeles Metropolitan Water 
District gets from the Owens River, which for nearly half a century has 
been the city’s main source of water supply… The find could change the 
whole character of the western quest for water.”122  
Despite numerous claims, the California Department of Water Resources, the Long 
Beach United States Geological Survey Office, and the California Association of 
Engineering Geologist almost immediately debunked the existence of the lake.123 In 
                                               
122 John C. Waugh, “California Stirred: Water in Mojave?” Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1959. 
 
123 “It is the opinion of the Department of Water Resources that there is no factual basis for suppositions 
and implications to the effect that ‘primary water’ is a potential source of water supply. To our knowledge 
there is no scientific evidence that would support such suppositions. On the contrary, there is a 
convincing body of scientific knowledge which contradicts the contentions of proponents of ‘primary 
water,’ ‘deep-seated rock fissure aquifers’ and related postulations that these constitute major sources of 
water supply… Dr. Charles Richter of Caltech commented that Angelillo’s connecting fault theory which 
would permit transmission of ground water over very large distances “… is bound to appear to any 
disinterested man with scientific training as utterly fantastic nonsense.”” California Department of Water 
Resources, Report (Sacramento, CA.: DWR, 1960). “But Fred Kunkel, chief of the Long Beach United 
States Geological Survey Office, rendered this opinion: ‘Our findings do not substantial the claims of huge 
supplies of water flowing through channels under the Mojave Desert.’ A similar expression was registered 
by Lucian J. Meyers, principal hydraulic engineer with the State Department of Water Resources in Los 
Angeles… John Foster, chairman of the organization’s public relations committee, reflected the views of 
the CAEG (California Association of Engineering Geologists) in this manner: ‘In our opinion the 
statements that have been made by real estate people in the California City area have not been based on 
sound ground water geology and hydrology. The possibility that the public is being misled by premature 
claims of abundant water is a concern of the association.’” Warren Walters, “Desert Water Claim 
Contested,” Independent Press Telegram, March 22, 1959. 
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1961, the DWR admitted that “California City [was] certainly in no danger of running out 
of water soon… [b]ut… the original claims of having water in perpetuity were ‘absolutely 
fraudulent’.”124 Further, despite the high level of interest and curiosity of “primary water”, 
geologists and groundwater engineers would ultimately debunk the entire theory.125 And 
yet, the Department of Water Resources report encompassing California City rendered 
expert opinions and a lack of evidence, rather than evidence to the contrary; local and 
state agencies did not have the resources to survey California City and disprove the 
specific claim.126 As such, the developer maintained that water was so abundant it could 
be “squandered” or “burned.”127 The lake operated as both a symbol of the supposed 
underground lake and proof of the abundance of water, so much so that it could be 
wasted on a recreational lake. Additionally, the lake was prioritized over the extension of 
water lines to individual houses, a more communal way of visualizing the supposed lake 
beneath the surface, not to mention a compelling mirroring.128 Water began filling the 
                                               
124 Howard Gingold, “Desert Promoters’ Claims Produce Varied Reactions,” Los Angeles Times, June 9, 
1961. 
 
125 Primary water continues today as part of a larger set of environmental conspiracy theories. See, “The 
Primary Water Cycle,” The Primary Water Institute, accessed June 27, 2018, 
http://www.primarywaterinstitute.org. “There is No Shortage,” Primary Water, accessed June 27, 2018, 
http://www.primarywater.org.  
 
126 “There are many cases of wells and artesian holes far above the flow of the Mojave River. Where this 
water comes from is an often asked question in the Mojave. So far, technical data does not answer the 
questioner. Mojave Water Agency is attempting to launch a matching fund program with the state for a 
water survey of the entire agency area. The study will cost approximately $100,000.” See, “Mojave 
Underground Water Source Questioned by State,” San Bernardino County Sun, January 28, 1961. 
 
127 “In California City with Fred Beck,” Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1960. “In California City with Fred 
Beck,” Los Angeles Times, May 31, 1960. 
 
128 Despite frequent articulation of specifics with regards to population, miles of paved roads, and houses 
built, the number of miles of water lines was mentioned only once in the hundreds of newspaper articles 
and advertisements about California City. See, “East Kern Unit Moves to Preserve Part of Twenty Mules 
Team Road,” Bakersfield Californian, September 8, 1962. 
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enormous lake in 1961 and took several months. When it was completed, it stood as 
powerful evidence countering the DWR report.129 The lake was christened on the fourth 
birthday of California City with buckets of water claimed to be from the lake in Central 
Park in New York City, spectacularly dropped by Mendelsohn from a helicopter hovering 
overhead (fig. 1.30).130 In a sense, although the lake was real water on the ground, it 
served more as a performance of water, not unlike this strange, almost silly, staged 
photograph published later. The photograph features Mendelsohn and Scott carefully 
studying the back of a site plan that overtly exclaims “WATER” (fig. 1.31).131 And 
perhaps the most fantastical claim implying the abundance of water occurred when 
Mendelsohn floated the idea of developing a ski resort on the slopes of Galileo Hill.132 
                                               
129 “Early promotional advertising for California City played up the contention that the development 
overlies what was described as an inexhaustible source of water… The Department of Water Resources 
jumped on Mendelsohn for these claims and forced him to withdraw them form his advertising. State 
water official say there is no evidence to support any theory of limitless water… a state official here said 
the original claims of having water in perpetuity were “absolutely fraudulent.” See, Howard Gingold, 
“Desert Promoters’ Claims Produce Varied Reactions,” Los Angeles Times, June 9, 1961. 
 
130 “Parties Improve With Age,” California City Sun 5, no. 4 (1962). 
 
131 "Water, Water, Everywhere! - And Plenty to Drink." California City Sun 1, no. 8 (1965): 1. The photo 
was taken in 1959 along with a less promotional, companion photo that was published in Water Well 
Journal where Mendelsohn and Scott are looking at the front of the drawing. “Mojave Desert Covers Vast 
Lake,” Water Well Journal, (May 1959): 10, 32. 
 
132 Expanding even beyond the landscape itself, design was applied to the past as well. While the master 
plan addressed spatial and formal and environmental conditions, CFP conceived an origin myth for the 
town. A Hollywood illustrator, Stan Repp, was hired to represent California City in a way that collapsed 
past, present, and future. A series of drawings reveal California City simultaneously in the past and the 
future. Rampant development and a transformed greenscape coexist with horse-drawn wagons, all under 
the watch eye of cowboys and ranchers on horseback. Early versions even include animal skulls 
scattered across the trails that run alongside paved freeways. The images reveal not only future 
projections, but a fabricated past as well, one that persists and intermingles with the modern city. The 
images depict a city seemingly outside of time, not unlike the approach to planning and development as a 
spontaneous manifestation that does not grow or adapt over time. Produced in 1961, when the city was 
still almost entirely desert, the images illustrate a fully developed city inhabited by both modern and 19th 
century frontier populations. The incorporation of Native-American imagery illustrates how indigenous 
peoples were simultaneously eliminated from modern maps and leveraged to lure tourists and investors 
as a kind of cultural preservation project. See, Gwendolyn Wright, “Building Global Modernisms,” Grey 
Room, no. 7 (2002): 124-134. Further, there were plans to produce a social documentary of California 
City. “The group of architects et al comprising Community Facilities Planners decided to initiate a motion 
picture, a sort of social-documentary showing the need for long-range planning for the development of 
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The newspaper controlled the representation, transmission, and storage of California 
City. In the pages of the newspaper, photographs of buildings were surrounded by 
columns narrating real and imagined everyday events activating and inflating the 
growing city. In contrast to advertisements and the typical function of images – 
drawings, renderings, photographs – the newspaper went beyond the mere promotion 
of physical building. For a largely absentee community of landowners and investors 
spread across the world, the newspaper transubstantiated physical development into a 
paper document. Architecture was primarily accessed through its distribution on paper. 
As a document, architecture was produced, distributed, stored, and consumed by a 
population of which only a very small percentage ever set foot in California City, and an 
even smaller percentage became residents.  
 
Lisa Gitelman contends that the document materializes and is defined by a “know-show 
function.”133 As an epistemic practice, the document generates knowledge of the world 
by registering it, and vice versa. In California City, the know and the show were aligned 
but separated. The deed, discussed next, registered and defined real property, but as a 
                                               
recreational facilities, defining the problems of development, and depicting the best extant examples of 
parks, marinas, and other such installations. Production of the film was placed in the capable hands of 
Four Corners Productions. And my Pal Big Sam has been singled out as the director and 
cinematographer. So Big Sam began the planning of the film. He traveled up and down the line consulting 
with experts and surveying the best present examples of recreational planning. Guess what! Nearly every 
place he went Sam was told that the outstanding plan for recreational facility development was the Nat 
Mendelsohn – Al Coke plan for a 60-acre park in California City, a park complete with a 26-acre lake with 
a marina… there’s water to spare and plenty to squander on a lake.” See, “In California City with Fred 
Beck,” Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1960. See also, Nathan Mendelsohn, “Looking Forward,” California 
City Sun 6, no. 2 (April 1963): 6.  
 
133 Lisa Gitelman, Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents (Sign, Storage, 
Transmission) (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014). 
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kind of “no show” document, stored but rarely transmitted.134 Meanwhile, the 
corresponding architectural document, the newspaper, was circulated widely, conceived 
to show evidence of the present and future inscribed in the deed. The shift from 
projective illustration to document is explicit in the primary medium through which the 
development was marketed and sold, the California City Sun. Architecture ceased to be 
a projection of forthcoming building in an advertisement located within a newspaper; 
rather architecture was collapsed with the newspaper as a collection of documents. In 
short, the newspaper became the distributed and collected investment document, 
materializing California City as newsprint for the purposes of distribution and collection 
by investors during the term of the loan, prior to the issuance of a deed.  
 
The Deed 
The production and circulation of paper in the form of bonds and newsprint was 
ultimately in the service of the production and circulation of another paper medium, the 
deed. Even while the master plan outlined California City as a forthcoming large-scale 
city with varying densities and a population of several hundred thousand residents, most 
land sales consisted of residential lots sized and zoned for single-family home, 
suburban-style development. The lack of interest, or lack of pursuit of investors for 
larger blocks of development, necessitated the production of an inordinate number of 
roads weaving through the empty desert (fig. 1.32). The development company boasted 
the grading of forty miles in the first year, the primary reason being that a lot must be 
                                               
134 As the development company financed most land sales, a deed was only released to the investor upon 
completion of the terms of the loan. Lisa Gitelman, Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of 
Documents (Sign, Storage, Transmission) (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014). 
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accessible to be sold, according to California law.135 As roads stretched across the 
empty desert, parcels were released to the public for sale. Most roads, however, were 
no more than an inch thick, laid gently atop the desert surface. They were even largely 
made of sand from the desert through which they ran, mixed with bitumen.136 They 
began to deteriorate almost immediately.137 Nevertheless, once graded and established, 
parcels were sold with the understanding that few if any investors would actually set foot 
in California City.138 Most investors did not receive architecture, or even land, for their 
investment, but a deed. The details of the deed demarcated not just the property limits 
overlaying the land, it also specified architectural design in the form of covenants and 
restrictions. The usual separation between property systems and design that occurs 
after and within property, was collapsed into the deed. Design on paper ceased to be a 
representation of forthcoming physical buildings; rather design was absorbed into the 
deed, in the service of producing and selling property through the articulation of a 
possible architectural future.  
 
                                               
135 “In California, before a subdivider can even sell a lot, a map of the tract in which the lot is located must 
be recorded with the county, which will not permit recordation until it is satisfied that the lot is in fact 
suitable for use as a home site. This means that streets and water lines must be contracted for and 
protected by surety bonds, that water supply is sufficient and that it meets proper health standards, that 
fire protection is available, etc.” “You and Your Money,” California City Sun 4, no. 3 (1961): 4. 
 
136 Mendelsohn even revealed as much that the quality of the roads was poor. “California City has 150 
miles of paved (desert mix) streets and roads…” See, “East Kern Unit Moves to Preserve Part of Twenty 
Mules Team Road,” Bakersfield Californian, September 8, 1962. 
 
137 Many roads were graded and never paved, differentiated only from the surrounding property for sale 
by the occasional street sign or disappearing tire ruts. An investigative report revealed that just a decade 
after roads were built, they required immense repair. See, “California City: Huge Bunko Operation,” Los 
Angeles Underground 1, no. 13 (1969). 
 
138 In fact, many investors, or children of investors, continue to show up at the California City town hall to 
show their deed and ask to be shown their lot. Mike Anton, “A Desert City That Didn’t Fan Out,” Los 
Angeles Times, August 14, 2010. 
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On opening day, in 1958, all of the initial plots of land sold, totaling half a million dollars 
in revenue. Land that had been acquired, in some cases, for pennies an acre, was 
released to the public as small residential lots starting at $990.139 A lot could be 
acquired for a 10% down payment with the balance paid over five years.140 In most 
cases, salesmen sold lots to themselves with the company financing the sale. In the 
event of default on the contract, the development company retained the cash and the 
land. The closed loop of financing combined with the creation of a closed land market 
that followed the town’s limits, enabled by the city’s relative isolation from surrounding 
developments, its monumental size, and monopolistic ownership. Max Derbes 
encapsulated the kind of market created by Mendelsohn: “Created markets occur where 
the individual promoter attempts the marketing of speculative lands, usually as a ‘paper 
subdivision.’ High pressure salesmanship promotions, low down payments, and even 
misrepresentation may cause values and activity to rise beyond reason in particular 
areas while similar properties remain at a low level.”141 Without competition, 
Mendelsohn unilaterally controlled the California City land market. As land sales 
increased, so too did the price of land, which had the dual effect of generating more 
income for the company, but also propping up an illusion of value appreciation to all 
                                               
139 “California City: 2nd Unit Launched After $500,000 1st Unit Sell-Out.” Valley News (Van Nuys, 
California), April 27, 1958. 
 
140 Land sales translated to significantly less cash on hand for the development company. Just as the 
dominant architecture feature, the scallop-shaped roof, appeared to float above the surface of the desert, 
the total land sales boasted by the company floated well above the actual cash collected. 
 
141 Max Derbes, “Use, Development, or Speculation of Real Estate,” The Appraisal Journal 32, no. 2 
(1964): 219-229. 
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those already invested.142 The closed market was reinforced and revealed in a few rare 
cases where an investor tried to profit on his investment by selling his lot. Agents 
operating from outside the umbrella of the corporation recall the actual value of the land 
on the open market as a fraction of the amount claimed by Mendelsohn. In some cases, 
the company repurchased the land at the inflated value to eliminate an outside market 
reality check on the value of the land and sustain its artificial inflation.143 The closed 
world-ing of California City was the product of efforts on multiple fronts: the physical 
isolation of the land from extant developments, the one-stop shopping set up by the 
corporation, and singular ownership.144  
 
Total sales surpassed twelve million dollars by the end of 1959, and by the start of 
1963, total sales after cancellations and repossessions reached nearly thirty million 
dollars.145 As sales increased, so too did the company’s operations. What began as a 
                                               
142 “California City’s land prices are controlled by the developer who unilaterally can change the sales 
price to be charged by his sales force…” Robert Fellmeth, Politics of Land: Ralph Nader’s Study Group 
Report on Land Use in California (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973). 
 
143 “… a check of the property records involved indicates that these “resales” were not transfers from the 
original owners who deeded to a new investor. Instead they were sales by the company of lots the 
company reacquired at the company’s rigged market price.” Robert Fellmeth, Politics of Land: Ralph 
Nader’s Study Group Report on Land Use in California (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973). 
 
144 The level of control, and its remote desert location, position California City as a combination “outlaw 
area” and “place”. California City both “bend[ed] reality off into unimaginable directions with no restrictions 
save the harsh ones of nature” while becoming an economic and political experiment owned and 
managed by a private governing body. While Brand defined these terms in relation to possible 
countercultural communities, California City was, in effect, the other side of the same coin. While semi-
utopian “open ends” of social experimentation were barely on the horizon, California City was already 
proliferating, with its own global aspirations. See, Felicity Scott, Outlaw Territories: Environments of 
Insecurity/ Architectures of Counterinsurgency (New York: Zone Books, 2016). 
 
145 “Property Sales Top $8 Million,” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1960. Community Facilities Planners, 
“California City Story: Three Short Years of Dynamic Growth,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 
1961). Paul Weeks, “Take a Good Look Before You Buy Piece of Desert Tract,” Los Angeles Times, April 
29, 1963. 
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small corporate headquarters in Hollywood and a sales office in California City, spread 
across California, the West, and ultimately internationally.146 Branch sales offices 
opened in San Diego, Oakland, San Francisco, Honolulu, and Wichita.147 Simultaneous 
with bussing and flying potential investors to California City, the company traveled to 
fairs and conventions across the country (fig. 1.33).148 The operation reached such an 
expansive scale that an annual awards dinner held in 1968 for the Northern California 
region alone attracted 2,000 employees and their families.149 And even before the 
proliferation of offices, California City attracted international buyers, prompting 
international sales trips.150 An early Dutch investor resulted in a company tour of 
Europe, east and south-east Asia. As early as 1960, plans for offices in Kuala Lumpur, 
Bombay, Madras, and Antwerp, were explored, to the extent that Fred Beck remarked 
cheekily that “Mosques, minarets and pagodas may some day (sic) outnumber plain 
houses in California City.”151 Cheeky perhaps primarily because at the time of Beck’s 
                                               
146 “There are twenty-four such sales offices primarily serving, and located in, the States of California, 
Colorado, Illinois, Texas and Washington. During the fiscal year ended July 31, 1968, these offices 
accounted for approximately 96% of total sales. The Companies also have other selling arrangements 
with sales representatives located in Hawaii, Germany, Mexico and the Philippines and with independent 
real estate brokers and agents.” Robert Fellmeth, Politics of Land: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on 
Land Use in California (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973). 
 
147 “East is East, West is West, Twin to Meet,” California City Sun 5, no. 3 (1962). And by the end of the 
1960s, the Pacific Northwest had been reached as well. See, “First Seattle Day,” California City Sun 11, 
no. 10 (1968).  
 
148 “Fly Free!” Van Nuys News, July 26, 1959. “During the past year almost eight million Americans have 
heard about California City at fairs and shows where the California City Development Co. has had 
exhibits.” See, “Growing Vacation Program Boosting Population Here,” California City Sun 11, no. 10 
(1968): 4. 
 
149 “2000 Attend Cal City Awards Meeting,” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1968. 
 
150 “Calif. City Lures Philippine Business Interests,” California City Sun 1, no. 8 (1965). 
 
151 “In California City with Fred Beck,” Los Angeles Times, March 21, 1960. 
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article, California City could boast only a handful of houses. By the start of 1969, it was 
reported that the California City Development Company had collected over $100 
million.152  
 
As the company expanded geographically, it expanded its numbers as well. While 
Mendelsohn maintained a relatively small corporate division of the company, 
headquartered in Hollywood, salesmen were recruited by the hundreds. The 
development company collapsed the distinction between seller and investor. 
Advertisements for salesmen rivaled advertisements for investors. In fact, sales were 
generated primarily from employees, rather than by them. New recruits were heavily 
pressured to purchase a plot of land, and further encouraged to reside in the town to 
show their commitment to the company. Salesmen even more than the public at large 
was the first pool of potential investors. Although few moved to California City, many of 
the city’s residents were directly or indirectly tied to the development company.153 At the 
start of 1963, the company reported more than 14,000 individual investors, but only 203 
“registered voters”.154   
 
                                               
152 Robert Fellmeth, Politics of Land: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on Land Use in California (New 
York: Grossman Publishers, 1973). 
 
153 A survey completed by Nader’s group found that of 238 employed residents in California City, nearly 
60% worked directly for the development company or its related local businesses. See, Robert Fellmeth, 
Politics of Land: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on Land Use in California (New York: Grossman 
Publishers, 1973). 
 
154 Frank Lee Donoghue, “Former Professor Designs Community Master Plan,” Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner, November 29, 1963. 
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Despite millions of dollars flowing into California City, a majority of the tens of thousands 
of landowners invested only financially; scant few proceeded to move to California City, 
build a house, and take up residence. And while designs for public, communal, and 
recreational facilities were conceived, and some even built, designs for houses were 
more frequently conceived as written guidelines rather than drawings. Few residential 
types were designed beyond a spattering of single-family homes and a schematic for a 
low-rise housing block (fig. 1.34-1.35).155 Reacting against homogeneous tract 
developments, CFP proposed zoning a diversity of housing densities to create more 
heterogeneous communities in terms of “interests and abilities, of races and religions, of 
varying family compositions and living patterns.”156 As a result, conventional planning 
logic was flipped as CFP proposed the inclusion of low-density houses in the core, and 
high density housing blocks on the periphery. Even though schematic designs were 
produced to describe the various housing options, most projects were designed on a 
case-by-case basis. Accommodating the lack of design of most of the architecture of the 
city, the master plan called for the creation of an architectural review board. Operating 
                                               
155 CFP designed four single-family houses: “atrium” homes, “patio-town” houses, park-oriented houses, 
and neighbor-oriented houses. Atrium houses consisted of L- and U-shapes enclosing small gardens. 
Although each sat independently within the landscape, the atrium houses turned inward on their own 
private realm of greenspace. Private greenspace similarly infiltrated the townhouses with shared party 
walls. The park-oriented houses, on the other hand, reached out to engage the greenspace in which they 
were placed. Although sometimes a driveway was shared, each home was surrounded entirely by a 
natural landscape. Instead of being oriented to each other or to the street, each home was positioned to 
take advantage of the park and minimize the view of other residences. Finally, neighbor-oriented houses 
most closely reflected the postwar suburban tract. Each house was oriented to the street with a front and 
back yard and fences demarcating the property lines. While the types specified were all low-rise, the 
master plan also specified the potential of higher-rise residential blocks. Set atop piloti, they allowed 
unobstructed views aforementioned from town to town. The types outlined were meant to be shuffled 
together to “discourage the large-scale massing of persons of similar age, marital status, and economic 
levels.” See, Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities 
Planners, 1961). 
 
156 Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 
1961). 
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at the city level, and under the direction of the development company, the board would 
create design criteria and limits.157 Specifications were to be implemented concerning 
building envelope and setbacks. “In addition to the building itself, design control also 
extend[ed] to exterior colors, materials, textures and major landscaping. (Every tree has 
its place) Standards would be set far in advance…” Additionally, it would act as an 
architectural clearing house for all proposed developments in the city.158 These design 
restrictions were, in the absence of incorporation, implemented through deeds and 
covenants. California City operated as a proto-landowners’ association.159 
 
In the deed, architecture was relocated inside the document. Max Derbes assertion that 
California City represented a “paper subdivision,” it turns out, was more accurate than 
even Derbes meant.160 The implication, for Derbes, was that California City was an 
imaginary, or immaterial, gambit; rather, through a combination of bonds, newsprint, 
                                               
157 Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980,” (Pasadena: Community Facilities Planners, 
1961). 
 
158 “A Plan for the City of Tomorrow,” Los Angeles Examiner, January 22, 1961. 
 
159 The presumption that housing would be designed as needed, and primarily on the initiative of 
individual buyers, collided with the overall implication of CFP’s design for California City: widespread 
instantaneous transformation of the desert. Referencing the road system specifically, Smith and Williams 
articulated the problem with incremental growth: “Traffic in the typical urban landscape generally flows 
along section lines. Major streets become a reality only by their heavy use. Secondary streets, if they are 
continuous for several miles, may become major streets when the traffic load becomes great enough. 
Collector and local streets, because of their continuence (sic) across major and secondary street (sic), 
become thoroughfares. When this happens a resident is subjected to noise and danger at his front 
doorstep.” The combination of company-developed roads with buyer-led house building produced the 
surreal image of California City today. Dispersed homes dot the landscape. Roads weave through the 
empty desert. The downtown commercial strip is a multi-lane boulevard with landscaped dividers. See, 
Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, “California City: A Planning Approach,” (Pasadena: Smith 
and Williams, 1968). 
 
160 Max Derbes, “Use, Development, or Speculation of Real Estate,” The Appraisal Journal 32, no. 2 
(1964): 219-229. 
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and deeds, California City was literally produced on paper. But where the newspaper 
operated as a record, the deed constitutes a document. According to Cornelia Vismann, 
the distinction between records and documents is in the method of authentication. 
Namely, records used for administrative use are authenticated by the institution within 
which they are stored and circulated. The newspaper, then, can be understood as a 
kind of record. Architecture was authenticated by its photographic reproduction in an 
apparent free press; and, by extension, physical development authenticated California 
City. Documents, on the other hand, authenticate themselves.161 The institution is 
relocated inside the document as a combination of seals, formats, and signatures, that 
serve to authenticate the document in the absence of an outside institutional authority. 
Analogously, architecture typically inflates the value of the deed from outside, as a 
building on the land. In California City, architecture was relocated inside the deed, 
inflating its value from within, rendering building on the land unnecessary and 
redundant. If the deed authenticates itself, the deed in California City also valued itself, 
and inflated its own value, through the inclusion of design restrictions and covenants. 
The developer and architects even acknowledged as much, remarking that the inclusion 
of restrictions and covenants in the deed facilitated sales by providing the illusion of 
choice, and I would argue further, architecture, despite the absence of building.162  
 
                                               
161 Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
 
162 “Curiously, the restrictions proved to be a help to the sales staff rather than a liability, since for the first 
time it was possible for a prospect to choose the type of building site best suited to his way of life.” 
Community Facilities Planners, “California City Story: Three Short Years of Dynamic Growth,” (Pasadena: 
Community Facilities Planners, 1961). 
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According to Catherine Ingraham, architectural design, a form of intellectual property, 
occurs after and is designed within real property i.e. bound land, but before physical 
development, Marx’s so-called improvement on the land.163 If architecture is largely 
considered to be suspended between the image and the building, for Ingraham, through 
the framework of property, architecture is suspended between concept and realization, 
or put another way, between ideas and real property. The house and housing operation 
at California City, however, upend this logic and its order. Architecture, in the case of 
the provision of housing, was not a means to building, and was not enabled by the 
conversion of land into property. Rather, architecture operated between land and 
property. Design stabilized and inflated the value of land prior to its conversion into 
property through the deed. Sales were generated through the circulation and 
consumption of architectural images, not only before a deed was issued, but often times 
without a deed ever being issued. As the company financed most sales, a deed was not 
issued until full payment was made, meaning that while architecture and dollars 
circulated, deeds stacked up in company headquarters. Architecture ceased to be a 
projective illustration of a forthcoming building, and became instead a document, one 
among many comprising California City. 
 
And what was delivered ultimately, at the end of the financed contract, was not 
architecture, but the deed. If, for Ingraham, the destiny of architectural design is building 
on real property, I argue in the case of California City that the destiny of architectural 
                                               
163 Catherine Ingraham, “The Pursuit of Property” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, October 
26, 2010). 
  70 
design was real property.164 Outlined in the deed, architecture was not so much 
deferred, but rather transubstantiated into paper files. “Quod non est in actis, non est in 
mundo.” What is not in the file is not in the world.165 In California City, the logic of 
architecture was flipped on its head; relocated into the deed as a set of guidelines and 
restrictions, architecture was brought into existence, without the need for building. As 
such, while architecture’s function may always consist in “delayed transfer,” building 
was no longer the goal; rather, architecture performed its function when a deed was 
issued.166 Master planning and architectural design at California City contributed value 
to real property through the production and circulation of documents, rather than 
through improvements on the land.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
164 Catherine Ingraham, “The Pursuit of Property” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, October 
26, 2010). 
 
165 Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
 
166 Catherine Ingraham, “The Pursuit of Property” (lecture, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, October 
26, 2010). 
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2: KONRAD WACHSMANN: ARCHITECTURE AS MEDIA SYSTEM 
 
 
 
The commission of a public building to mark the transition from private to public 
authority coincided with the redefinition of physical space as a media system actively 
transmitting, processing, and storing information. Incorporating new communication 
technologies, architecture spatialized the logic of cybernetics to become the center of a 
new, mediating feedback loop between “governors and the governed”. Architecture was 
both the broadcast mechanism and the televisual signal streamed to an expanding 
periphery of residents, landowners, and the public at large. Beyond the design itself, a 
new relationship between architectural research and real estate development emerged 
that resulted both in the increasing impossibility of built architecture and the conversion 
of representation to material evidence. The mock-up and machined parts displaced 
drawings and models; the terms of success and failure were flipped, where the lack of 
physical development increased the cultural and financial success of the project.  
 
In 1966, Konrad Wachsmann began to research and design a new city hall for the 
desert town of California City. To celebrate the incorporation of the town and fulfill the 
functional needs of the newly established city government, the city council 
commissioned Wachsmann, a longtime friend and former colleague of Mendelsohn at 
the General Panel Corporation of California. Wachsmann had just recently returned to 
Los Angeles to take up a position at the University of Southern California where he re-
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established the Institute for Building Research. The commission became a primary 
project for the Institute, on which a number of faculty and graduate students focused 
their efforts. A year into the project, Wachsmann presented his preliminary design to the 
developer, mayor, and city council (fig. 2.01). An expansive suspended cable roof 
hovered over a media system that stored, processed, and transmitted information, 
creating a feedback loop between the residents and the newly-established town 
government. While the developer and city council lauded the project, a bond measure to 
fund the construction of the building failed to pass. Undeterred, Wachsmann, with the 
support of the developer, continued to research and refine the design over the next five 
years; however, with no construction funding, the building commission morphed into 
corporate-sponsored research. Over time, the design became more and more materially 
slight, and following repeated financial setbacks, less and less likely to be built. 
However, the components and demonstration became more and more real. Small-scale 
simulations and speculative representations were followed with full-scale mock-ups, 
custom computer software, machined prototypes, and fabrication specifications. 
Nevertheless, the project remained unrealized, and existed primarily as an image 
heavily circulated through magazines, newspapers, promotional materials, and 
exhibitions, accumulating cultural and financial value in the form of architectural 
prominence and increased land sales. The designs produced by Wachsmann became 
an economic loss leader, for which both Mendelsohn and Wachsmann sacrificed time 
and money in order to profit in other ways. The terms of success and failure in real 
estate and architecture alike were rejiggered, whereby it was precisely the lack of 
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physical building that increased the success of the project in both cultural and financial 
circles.  
 
Media System 
Wachsmann’s design centered on an expansive flat roof that appeared to hover just 
above the desert floor. A delicate cable system, with floor-to-ceiling glass enclosures 
was, in turn, supported by a massively scaled, but underground, structural system 
anchored at each end of the building. The suspended roof looms large both physically 
and metaphorically in the proposed city hall. However, hidden underneath the roof, 
mostly absent from the heavily-circulated photographic representation, lay a highly 
specific program and set of technologies. Encased in floor-to-ceiling glass panels, a 
gallery featuring future architectural developments and the mayor’s office were to be 
located. Across a narrow open-air corridor, also encased in glass, was a double-height 
council chamber, open to below. Stadium seats descended to a stage on the lower level 
on which the council would sit, deliberate, and pronounce. Video cameras between the 
citizen-audience and the city council recorded the happenings, sending the signal first to 
the adjacent transmission-control room before being broadcast out to the town through 
a 200-foot tall television tower. Rounding out the building program was a data vault for 
storing televised messages received from the residents via the same television tower. 
Governance was to be accomplished through a televisual feedback loop set up by the 
building. Wachsmann’s design recast architecture as an informational signal switching 
system hidden under an impressive suspended roof. I argue it became a media system 
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controlling the storage, processing, and transmission of information regarding the past, 
present, and future development of the town.  
 
Over the course of six years, the project served as an opportunity for Wachsmann to 
investigate the principles of cybernetics, specifically the production and circulation of 
information between the developer, his employees, the residents of California City, and 
the investors scattered across the world. The resulting design can be understood as a 
media system, defined by Kittler as the “network of technologies and institutions that 
allow a given culture to select, store, and process relevant data.”167 As an analogical 
network, information storehouse, stage, and broadcast center, Wachsmann’s city hall 
operated as the epistemological mechanism of knowledge formation. The incorporation 
of emerging telecommunication technologies was, in turn, grounded and supported by 
massive physical infrastructure subscribed to an aesthetics of dematerialization. 
However, ultimately unrealized, the project itself existed as a heavily circulated 
mediation, accumulating financial and cultural value as it flowed.  
 
In the mid-1960s, while figures like Venturi and Scott Brown were reframing architecture 
away from supposedly functionally-driven Modernist tenets to a Post-Modernist play of 
signs, Wachsmann incorporated principles of cybernetics to produce a new kind of 
architecture that was not simply a passive medium of communication, but an active 
                                               
167 Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, translated by Michael Metteer (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1990).  
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media system.168 A combination of formal, spatial, and technological apparatuses 
produced a framework through which information flowed while being transformed from 
the private personal vision of the developer to democratic plans, policies, regulations, 
etc.169 Retracing evolving technologies throughout history, Kittler developed the concept 
of the “discourse network.”170 He pointed to the emergence of inscription as the moment 
social interaction was decoupled from communication. Information could now be 
communicated without the corresponding social interaction. The receiver of information 
does not know or see the source, only the medium through which it is transmitted.171 
Kittler continues, pointing to the invention of the telegraph as signaling the decoupling of 
communication from information. Unlike the book, where information is physically 
inscribed on the page, the telegraph is a communication system through which 
information may or may not travel, at any time, to any place. But further, in order for 
information to be communicated, it must be transformed into an alternative format 
                                               
168 Or machine, as articulated by Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault. Wachsmann engaged in the quest 
for universal communication that caused Deleuze to shudder. See Gilles Deleuze “Control and 
Becoming,” in Negotiations 1972-1990, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995). 
 
169 While figures like Roche were turning away from design to the process of design through the 
conception of organizational systems, this project spatialized that system, setting up feedback loops, 
created goals, and managed risk. See, Eeva-Liisa Pelkonen, “Architect as Organizer or the Way the 
World Works,” Perspecta 45, (2012): 7-16. This statement about Roche might more accurately describe 
Wachsmann’s design for California City: “Architecture, that is, was seen as a mediating device between 
governors and governed, a technology to incorporate occupants into systems of organization and 
management designed by the few as they sought to institute techniques of power.” See, Felicity Scott, 
Outlaw Territories: Environments of Insecurity/ Architectures of Counterinsurgency (New York: Zone 
Books, 2016). 
 
170 Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, translated by Michael Metteer (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1990). 
 
171 In a sense, this is what Venturi and Scott Brown would propose later with the concept of architecture 
as a sign. The billboard, like the book, decoupled communication from interaction. The source of the 
information may be unknown; nevertheless, information is communicated. 
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required by the telegraph. Then, “an electronic signal that is not perceived by any 
sensory organ must first be transformed back into a form that to some degree 
accommodates the physiology of our eyes.”172 Just as the alphabet controls the data 
that can be inscribed on the page, the telegraph controls the signal of information from 
the noise of data. In effect, according to Kittler, the telegraph, as a media system, 
determines the formation of information as such. The Wachsmann design – a set of 
communication technologies and public institutions made spatial – operated similarly. 
 
The collision of emerging digital technologies with form and space is most explicit in the 
inclusion of a television tower in Wachsmann’s design.173 Located directly behind the 
building, at 200 feet tall, the tower would have been the highest structure for miles in 
every direction. Wachsmann discussed the television tower very little, instead focusing 
primarily on the roof. However, his rhetoric concerning the roof perhaps more accurately 
describes the television tower and its broadcast network more than an object hovering 
above the surface. Wachsmann stated: “It should be a space as open as the enormous 
landscape, as open as the whole plan for the future city, as open as the future scope of 
this community.”174 The building itself had a footprint of just 20,000 square feet. It barely 
registered on a map for a city encompassing nearly 200 square miles. Wachsmann 
                                               
172 Friedrich Kittler, Optical Media: Berlin Lectures 1999, translated by Anthony Enns (Malden, Mass.: 
Polity Press, 2010). 
 
173 Unlike Guild House, where a piece of architecture was topped with a symbolic antenna, Wachsmann’s 
design constituted something closer to an antenna grounded with symbolic architecture. See, Sylvia 
Lavin, “Oh My Aching Antenna: The Fall and Rise of Postmodern Creativity,” Log, no. 37 (2016). 
 
174 Wachsmann quoted in, Frank Davis, “A City Hall Becomes Famous Even Before It Is Built,” California 
City Sun 1, no. 5 (1967). 
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continued, exaggerating the scale of the project through its conflation with the almost 
unlimited expansion of the city through time and space. The delicate and imperceptible 
cable structure, for Wachsmann, gave the “effect of a gigantic floating roof over the city 
buildings beneath.” In an early lecture at USC, Wachsmann discussed the project and 
the idea of a large roof floating over a “sunken garden.” Despite the small footprint, 
Wachsmann claimed: “This sunken garden would in actuality cover considerable 
acreage.”175 These statements reveal the fantasy of a floating structure that would 
encompass the entire development, providing a “space under which people can 
congregate, shielded against the sun or unfavorable natural elements.”176 A proposed 
building the size of a medium supermarket was perceived by Wachsmann as a city-
scaled techno-utopia.177 But rather than view these statements as exaggeration, either 
to the architectural community to inflate the importance of the project or to the developer 
and city to align with the grand vision of California City, these statements accurately 
describe the radio waves emanating from the television tower. While the cable structure 
suspending the roof was designed “not to be seen by the naked eye, giving the effect of 
a gigantic floating roof over the city buildings beneath,” the projected television tower 
was effectively the cable structure without the corresponding highly visible roof 
panels.178 In a photo of the model, the television tower registers not so much as an 
                                               
175 “Civic Center to Have ‘Floating Roof’,” California City Sun 1, no. 12 (1966). 
 
176 Konrad Wachsmann, “Mayor Riley Shares Letter With Readers of California City Sun,” California City 
Sun 1, no. 5 (1967). 
 
177 Robert Venturi to Tim Wirth. 13, September 1971. Venturi, Scott Brown Collection, Architectural 
Archives, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
 
178 “Civic Center to Have ‘Floating Roof’,” California City Sun 1, no. 12 (1966). 
 
  78 
object in the frame, but a scratch on the image. The television tower produced a 
“floating roof” over the development, in the form of radio waves.  
 
Rising more than 200 feet into the air, it towered not only over the low slung city hall, 
which floated just ten feet above the surface of the desert, but every structure for miles 
in any direction. In fact, only Galileo Hill rose above the proposed tower. However, while 
the tower itself may not have risen higher than the highest point in California City, the 
radio waves emanating from it easily floated over the entire development. The regional 
plan demonstrates how the radio waves extend not only to the furthest edges of 
California City, but across Southern California, even reaching as far as San Francisco, 
Las Vegas, and Tijuana.179 The map eschewed information about the surface of the 
earth in exchange for information on a new floating radio signal slipping between the 
gaps in existing broadcast channels. The plan highlighted the existing television 
channels emanating from big cities across Southern California, for the purposes of 
finding a common unused frequency that could extend into different geographic and 
radio markets uninterrupted. California City, for Wachsmann, was situated not so much 
in the context of the desert on the ground, i.e. geographically, but in the signals flowing 
through the air above the high desert. The reach of the broadcast paralleled the 
expanding range of landowners in California City. While only a few hundred investors 
lived in California City, tens of thousands lived across the United States and beyond. 
The extension of radio waves signaled an attempt to potentially involve not just the 
                                               
179 Architecture, as a “system esthetic”, was preoccupied with the “problem of boundary concepts” rather 
than contrived confines and material limits. See, Jack Burnham, “Systems Esthetics,” in Great Western 
Salt Works: Essays on the Meaning of Post-Formalist Art (New York: George Braziller, 1974). 
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residents of the town, but the whole body of landowners dispersed across the country 
and the globe.  
 
The television tower, however, was not merely a means to distribute information out to 
the town and beyond, from a centralized government center. By the mid-1960s, the 
California City Development Company was a multi-tiered, multi-locational parent 
company with numerous real estate, development, and building companies within the 
city limits, and across Southern California, the United States, even overseas.180 The 
development company had an extensive and sophisticated distribution network of 
bodies, images, and text flowing through offices, magazines, and newspapers. 
Wachsmann saw the opportunity for the city hall to receive signals from the citizens in 
the town. Writing in his unpublished autobiography, Timebridge: “A lifeline of 
communication should be created which permits the participation of all citizens in the 
future development of their own environment.” For Wachsmann, who was engaged in 
the larger cultural imaginary of cybernetics, it provided the opportunity to create a real-
time feedback loop between the citizenry and the government that would ensure 
sustained participation in the democratic process and the future development of the 
town. Jack Burnham articulated the shift in art from object-oriented culture to systems-
oriented culture. Recognizing a transposition of military culture, he pointed to recent 
interest in J.K. Gilbraith’s ideas about the technocracy, “its decision-making autonomy, 
                                               
180 The company targeted the German and Philippines real estate markets specifically. A 1968 awards 
meeting held in San Francisco gathered over 2000 employees. Significantly, the meeting was not even 
company-wide; it was only a meeting of the California City companies located just in Northern California. 
“Calif. City Lures Phillipine Business Interests,” California City Sun 1, no. 8 (1965). “2000 Attend Cal City 
Awards Meeting,” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1968.  
 
  80 
how it handles the central storage of information, and the techniques used for smoothly 
implementing social change.” Wachsmann’s design evokes this kind of thinking, where 
architecture becomes the spatial aesthetic facilitating the “ever-expanding grasp of 
human needs and limitations.”181 While other design disciplines at the same time were 
mobilizing the principles of cybernetics to engineer social organization, Wachsmann’s 
design constitutes the explicit, and emphatically structural, incorporation of aesthetics 
into a project of social regulation. Rather than beautify or tidy up technology, 
architecture becomes integral to the technocracy. Wachsmann elaborated: “The spoken 
word at the council meeting, the accompanying gestures of the speaking person 
expressing his thoughts, shall, through the new medium of communication, be heard 
and seen in every house of the community at the moment in which this word is said.” 
The tower was to have the effect of bringing every resident, most of whom were 
dispersed across the expansive development, right into the building’s spectator gallery 
to witness governing in action. Not just in word, but in gesture, the mayor and city 
council were put under the watchful eye of the citizenry. At the same time, equipped 
with receiving equipment, the tower was designed to accept signals from the residents, 
providing an open and instant stream of feedback from the residents of California City. 
Wachsmann continues: “Telephone recordings and tapes shall be resources of instant 
information on which the City Council can formulate their own reactions and decisions to 
develop a new kind of leadership and guidance inspired and supported by all.”182  
                                               
181 Jack Burnham, “Systems Esthetics,” in Great Western Salt Works: Essays on the Meaning of Post-
Formalist Art (New York: George Braziller, 1974). 
 
182 Konrad Wachsmann, “Mayor Riley Shares Letter With Readers of California City Sun,” California City 
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The broadcast network was analogized in the design of the building, to signal the 
conversion of private authority to public authority.183 The city hall design constitutes the 
fantasy of what Wigley calls the “single planetary scaled dwelling.”184 Against the logic 
and discourse of the network as facilitating the control of the many by the few, 
Wachsmann, and even Mendelsohn, understood the potential of the network for the 
many to speak to the few, indeed to choose and inform the few. Ultimately, however, 
this seemingly simple and direct input-output belied the complicated storage and 
processing that occurred within the building, greatly affecting not just the form but the 
content of the information. The building was not merely a relay between the citizenry 
and the newly elected officials; it also encompassed the development company, 
employees, landowners not living in the town, and potential investors. The city hall 
proposal performed as a system/environment through which information was stored, 
processed, and transmitted.185 The “Space Relation” diagram reveals “how content 
                                               
183 Wachsmann believed in the “democratic belief in equal rights for all,” as he later recalled in his 
autobiography. This paralleled his design for the city hall, which was based on a two-foot square module. 
This module is evident in Wachsmann’s own diagram of the project. The roof, the enclosed spaces below, 
and the lower level, all conform to and are accumulations of the conceptual module. Konrad Wachsmann, 
“Timebridge 1901-2001,” edited by Judith Wachsmann and Gloria Kaufman (unpublished manuscript, 
1981). Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
 
184 Mark Wigley, “Network Fever,” Grey Room, no. 4 (2001): 82-122. 
 
185 Architecture as a media transformer is evident in the model as it was documented disassembled. 
While the model may have been a combination simulation and representation of the architecture, it was 
also something akin to a large circuit board that processed incoming signals for the purpose of 
broadcasting to the town and beyond. The design of the city hall blurs the line between architecture and 
electronics: the cable suspension roof transmitting the signal; spring tensioners converting it; and counter-
weights grounding the current. In this way, according to Sylvia Lavin, the design simultaneously harkened 
back to Mies van der Rohe’s unbuilt Chicago Convention Center and the emerging culture of personal 
computing. Sylvia Lavin, “Studs, Snapshots, and Gizmos: Los Angeles Dearchitectured,” in Everything 
Loose Will Land: 1970s Art and Architecture in Los Angeles (New York: D.A.P., 2013). 
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moved through the design and how this movement affected the content’s form.”186 The 
layers of architectural grids recall Deleuze’s idea of modulation, “the self-transmuting 
molding continually changing from one moment to the next… like a sieve whose mesh 
varies from one point to another.187 Transmission was not possible without the physical 
broadcast tower designed and placed in the Northwest corner of the site behind the city 
hall, operated by the “TV Monitor Secretary” housed in the basement level. And it is 
precisely at the hinge point, between the mayor’s desk and the city council chamber, 
where incoming information was processed, transformed into city plans, policies, rules, 
and regulations.188 Mendelsohn’s mandates were relayed through a performance acted 
out on screen by the city council. The gallery on the ground floor preserved and 
displayed future architectural and urban plans for the development beyond the current 
Wachsmann design. Meanwhile, a vault in the basement housed recordings of council 
meetings and residents’ video input. Information came into the mayor’s and city council 
offices for processing, was stored in the basement, transformed into gesture and word 
on the recording stage, and broadcast out across the desert. As Kittler explains, “what 
one sees in the end is therefore only the outer onion of an entire series of conjuring 
tricks that must first be invented, calculated, and optimized.”189 Architecture, here, was 
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not merely a medium transmitting information; rather, as a media system that was 
simultaneously government office, broadcast tower, recording studio, gallery and vault, 
the city hall design can be understood as the epistemological mechanism of knowledge 
formation. 
 
Although designed to bring about the emergence of public authority, the broadcast 
tower converted the corporate structure from a vertical hierarchy to a horizontal 
network. Further, operating as an illusion, it disguised the continued control by 
Mendelsohn and the corporation. The project did not solely decentralize, nor did it solely 
“sustain the myth of dynamic deregulation, corporate benevolence, and dispersed 
interactivity.”190 While it may have disguised a private entity with a public one, it did so 
while allowing Mendelsohn to begin extricating his bodily presence.191 As most of the 
residents and the new local government were employees of the company, power and 
control were dispersed, but not necessarily redirected away from Mendelsohn’s plans. 
The town’s residents were tied not just by their investment but by their employment. In a 
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sense, the network proposed in Wachsmann’s design of the building and the broadcast 
tower eliminated the semblance of private authority, while reinforcing it.192  
 
Transparent Box  
The broadcast tower, and the rhetoric espoused by Wachsmann that it would bring 
about a new kind of democratic rule, signaled an understanding that architecture as 
physical form and space has little capacity to effect social and political change. In its 
stead, Wachsmann harnessed and employed emerging communication technologies. 
The physical architecture appeared itself to dematerialize, reflecting the shift in focus 
from physical building to television and radio waves. The minimal visual presence 
accomplished with a lattice of steel wires and glass panels, however, was only made 
possible by a massive concrete structure on either side and extending across the entire 
building just below the surface of the desert. Under the guise of “universal space” and 
panoramic views, the project engaged in an aesthetics of dematerialization and the 
simultaneous performance of transparency. Floor-to-ceiling glass facades served to 
expose the inner-workings of the government, to reveal governance in action, 
paralleling the apparent transparency of governance achieved through television 
broadcast. In the vein of Latour’s black box, architecture in Wachsmann’s design 
became a transparent box.193 Rather than conceal private control and operations, it 
acted as a framework and interface that transformed private authority into public 
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authority. The transparent box, as such, did not reveal otherwise internal operations so 
much as materialize them in glass that one looked through to a staged performance of 
democracy. 
 
Wachsmann recalled his first visit to California City in 1966, stating: “… I could see that 
there was space - open space in this wide valley that should never be lost sight of. I 
wanted simply to put an umbrella over part of it.”194 An early concept model illustrates 
the concept of an architectural umbrella over the surface of the desert. A large steel 
plate represents an expansive, flat, thin roof. It was supported by a set of four double 
columns, also in steel, on each end, with diagonal bracing. The roof, while thin, was 
similar to the diameter of the columns, yielding a uniform thickness across the vertical 
and horizontal structural members. The edge of the roof extended beyond the outer 
columns, where a glass curtain wall was draped, uninterrupted, around all four sides.   
 
As the “ultimate space” continued to be refined in terms of providing a space that was 
both infinitely flexible and infinitely expandable, the columns disappeared, and even 
most of the walls.195 The heavy, monolithic roof became instead a light lattice of tension 
cables with cross bracing on which delicate roof panels rested. The cable structure 
accomplished roof cover without drawing attention: “These cables would suspend the 
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roof, but would not be seen by the naked eye…”196 The thin perimeter columns were 
replaced with large, external, steel-reinforced concrete buttresses connected through 
the sunken floor structure, like a bow. The cabling was stretched between and over the 
buttresses, extending seventy feet into the earth, anchored by large concrete footings. 
While Wachsmann focused on the perceived immateriality of the roof floating above the 
surface of the desert, it was facilitated by an exponential increase in structure.197 In 
order to produce a minimal visual presence, the structure expanded significantly. 
Supporting a lattice of wires was a monumental concrete buttress system that remained 
largely under the surface of the desert, piercing the surface only at the ends. The thin 
umbrella covering the desert with its extension via radio waves and massive physical 
infrastructure are two sides of the same coin.  
 
The design vaunted transparency in a number of ways.198 For Wachsmann, 
transparency became a way for the architecture to further visualize the publicness of its 
function as the newly established local government. The roof was made to appear 
floating all the more as walls were freed from providing structural support, changed into 
floor-to-ceiling glass panels, and pushed in from the edge of the roof, allowing the roof 
to cantilever on all sides. In fact, the refinement from the early concept model to the final 
design shows how the amount of enclosed space on the ground floor was evacuated to 
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a basement level. A large open plan was scuttled in favor of two functionally specific 
enclosures. In one space, a public gallery was to be installed “to display plans, charts, 
and statistics, related to the city development, available to be seen and to be studied by 
the citizens at all times.”199 The mayor’s office was to sit adjacent to the gallery. In this 
way, the future of the development and the embodiment of city government were put on 
display, behind glass, in full view of the public. There was no plan for the provision of 
screens or blinds, and potentially obstructing furniture was pulled away from the glass, 
allowing an unencumbered view of objects and bodies.  
 
On the other side of an external, but covered, hall, the same glass panel system 
enclosed a theater that extended down to a basement level. The space allowed for 
public access to stadium seating from the ground level. The basement level stage was 
meant to serve as the site of city council meetings and deliberations. In addition to 
council meetings occurring not behind closed doors in a conference room, but in a 
public theater, behind glass, between the stage and the seating were to be video 
cameras capturing every moment. As a result, when not viewed in person, or through 
the glass, council meetings were on full view through the glass of each resident’s 
television screen. Wachsmann often talked about the project as heralding of a new kind 
of leadership that more fully realized the democratic ideal. This was meant to be 
achieved through the multiple kinds of transparency, ensuring accountability and access 
between the citizenry and publicly elected officials. The project seemed to operate in 
stark contrast to the headquarters of the California City Development Company. The 
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corporate office was not only off limits to California City residents and investors but 
located nearly 100 miles away in Hollywood.  
 
But for all the visual exposure, the extensive use of glass as enclosure and lens, 
Wachsmann’s project more accurately performed transparency. The proposed building 
that was in multiple ways designed to be invisible and immaterial, operated as a 
transparent box that institutionalized Mendelsohn’s unilateral control and transformed 
his private authority into public authority. The fact that most of the city’s residents, along 
with the mayor and half the city council, were employees of the development company, 
ensured that Mendelsohn’s plans and vision for the city were maintained, only now 
funneled through a democratic process in architectural form.  
 
Unlike the black box of authority that was the private offices of the California City 
Development Company in Hollywood, or the black box of design through which 
Wachsmann pursued his research into universal systems – discussed in the next 
section – the proposed city hall was a literal glass box that placed its inner-workings on 
full view. Glass in the forms of architectural storefront and camera lens was recast as a 
transparent screen that allowed vision to penetrate previously hidden operations. The 
management of the development, and its future plans, was reflected and changed by 
the transparent building and the incorporation of the city. Authority was indeed 
transposed from the private corporation to the residents of California City. While 
governance may have occurred on a literal stage, watched through the television screen 
or by the live studio audience, it was not staged.  
  89 
 
The architecture that professed to be immaterial and transparent institutionalized 
Mendelsohn’s control over the development and its future, a technocracy reinforcing his 
autonomy over decision-making.200 The architecture constituted the last private 
operation conceived of and supported by the development company that produced a 
framework ensuring the continued control by the developer that played out through 
citizens and elected officials, all employees. The multiple levels of transparency had 
little effect on Mendelsohn’s control. In fact, it was specifically the transparency of the 
architecture that ensured his control, by focusing attention on the governmental 
functions occurring within. All the while, the architecture itself operated as a transparent 
box – the complex operation that institutionalized private control and transformed 
private authority into public authority – unseen by a public looking through the glass, 
rather than at the frame.201 
 
Ultimately, California City lacked the infrastructure to support the project as it was 
intended. California City had barely enough public infrastructure to transport people, 
cars, and water, never mind radio signals. By 1970, Mendelsohn boasted only 400 miles 
of paved roads spread thinly across nearly 200 square miles. Similarly, the town 
struggled to provide telephone service to the very few residents, let alone a television 
signal. By employing the mayor and a majority of the city council, Mendelsohn was able 
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input his governance and planning, where it was laundered of its association with his 
company, and output as apparent democratic decision-making. The multiple types of 
transparency designed by Wachsmann, both material and immaterial, concealed the 
continued control of the development company over the future of California City.  
 
From Image to Evidence 
Wachsmann, operating from within the Institute for Building Research at USC, facilitated 
architecture’s shift from building commission between an architect and a client into 
“basic research” between a corporate sponsor and a university research lab. The 
specificities of the project and the site were quickly eschewed for an investigation and 
development of a generic structural system with wider application. In this way, the 
project was approached in the same way Wachsmann previously approached house 
design and hangar design alike, through universal systems. Models and mock-ups were 
the primary output, serving as simulation more than representation.202 The model may 
have served as an image for promotional purposes, but it also demonstrated, or 
attempted to demonstrate, at small scale, the feasibility of full-scale architecture. The 
evolution of the design as a product of successful testing no longer required a 
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suspension of disbelief as speculative architecture historically required. Rather, the 
design process reveals an attempt to prove the viability of a project. Over time, it 
became increasingly clear that the project would not be realized, following repeated 
failures to raise the necessary capital. And perhaps as compensation, the scale model 
was replaced by a series of full-scale mock-ups of different sections of the proposed 
design. The mock-up demonstrated with even more reliability that the otherwise 
fantastical design was possible. In the context of a project without funding, the mock-up 
was taken to its logical conclusion, becoming a substitute for the building itself.203 As a 
research project, rather than building commission, the product that came out of 
Wachmann’s lab became a proof-of-concept yielding “reality effects” that rendered 
physical development redundant and unnecessary. As the scale blew up, it facilitated a 
focus on the detail of the mechanism that, for Wachsmann, was the key to creating 
universal building systems. Supplemental objects like machined parts, specifications, 
erection plans, and computer analysis constituted further evidence of the turn toward 
the real. Wachsmann’s project at California City illustrates that the spectrum from 
architectural fantasy to architectural reality is not linear, but circular.  
 
Basic Research 
In his unpublished autobiography, Wachsmann recalled that early in the project, “… 
involvement in basic research became by far the greatest part of the work.”204 
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Wachsmann made a distinction between design and research, understanding his work 
to be the latter, researching a building system more than designing a particular building. 
While a loose design concept was produced within the first couple months, the Institute 
for Building Research worked on the design for more than a year before it was first 
presented to Mendelsohn and the city council of California City.205 With little specificity 
in the design brief, Wachsmann focused on structural design. At the size of a worktable, 
Wachsmann and his team of colleagues and graduate students designed and tested a 
roof system that encapsulated the design concept of a giant billowing sail providing 
shade and shelter from the harsh desert environment.206  
 
Simulating real conditions at a small scale, Wachsmann used steel wires to test the 
configuration and tension of the cable roof structure. Inside a black box, a longitudinal 
section of the cable structure was tensioned and tested. The black box was constructed 
by attaching vertical steel plates to a worktable with steel eyelets and bars around which 
steel wire was attached. Wires were stretched across in different configurations, pulled 
through stabilizing steel sections. Initial tests included a single bay of the roof structure, 
with wires pulled straight across, woven vertically, or woven horizontally. Steel plate 
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was then placed on top in the center of the section, and weights were added to measure 
the sag.207 The final configuration was a two-layer straight wire section. It was 
reproduced for testing in the black box as a larger section of the roof, with more 
elaborate hardware on each end to test the connection of the roof structure to the 
ground. The relatively crude steel bar connector was supplemented with a steel plate 
placed in front with three holes through which the wires of the roof were pinched to 
become three individual bays that then connected to the buttress system. Large spring 
tensioners allowed for the steel plate to slide closer and farther from the yet-designed 
buttress system. 
 
In his last text, Reyner Banham described the discipline of architecture as a black box. 
The existence and boundaries of the black box could be “recognized by its output 
though unknown in its contents.”208 The Institute for Building Research created a literal 
black box nearly twenty years before Banham theorized it. It operated as a closed 
environment that not only concealed the design process but also eliminated all external 
variables except gravity. It reveals the dual process of the black box, the latter of which 
Banham neglected to mention, which is the provision of a controlled environment for 
testing. In the design process, the black box was not so much a “secret value system” 
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as a testing ground. The extensive photographic documentation reveals that the black 
box was not meant to conceal at all. Photographs pierced the veil of the black box. The 
photograph was the medium by which design exited the black box into the world.  
 
The final configuration was then used to produce a complete scale model. The black 
steel plates attached to the ends of a work table were replaced with a steel structural 
system that consisted of two-inch tube steel forming the outer frame of the project, on 
which eight steel buttresses were welded on each end. The steel roof wires were 
stretched between and wrapped over the edge of the buttresses. The wires extended 
down to the top of the structural framework where they attached to a large steel bolt. 
The bolt extended through the steel tube and a spring tensioner that allowed for the 
wires to be tensioned as necessary. Placed into a wooden site and adorned with 
miniature cars, scale figures, and fake grass, the model was transformed from 
simulation into representation through its photographic documentation.209 
 
The end product presented to the town constituted only the last moment in a long and 
complicated process and feedback loop between material simulation and photographic 
representation. The image on the presentation board effectively reduced and concealed 
the extensive testing that yielded the final design. Following approval from the city, 
Wachsmann and his team returned to their design process of material testing, but 
moved beyond the confines of the black box as a mock-up in the lab.  
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Evidence 
The relatively small-scale simulation model was paralleled and surpassed with the 
production of several mock-ups of different pieces of the design. There were two 
outputs from the black box: photographs for promotional purposes, and full-scale mock-
ups for testing. Following the successful presentation of the preliminary design to 
Mendelsohn and the town, a public bond measure was brought to vote by the city 
council to attempt to raise the capital for construction. In the context of the failed funding 
attempt, the mock-up was less a means to building and more a substitute for it. The 
mock-up built on what the small-scale simulation model was, at least in part, trying to 
accomplish: a proof-of-concept that would render physical building unnecessary. The 
mock-ups shifted speculative architecture from image to evidence. Unlike the model, the 
mock-up yields materiality and reality effects.210 The mock-up is evidence, an artifact of 
a possible but unreal future.  
 
While the small-scale model tested the overall system, the mock-ups of different pieces 
of the project facilitated the testing of individual mechanisms and parts.211 The first 
mock-up captured a critical moment in the otherwise long length of cable. While the 
cables stretched more than 200 feet between buttresses to form the suspended roof, 
they also wrapped over and down more than seventy feet below ground, where they 
were anchored to large counter-weights. The mock-up sliced the cables to focus on this 
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crucial connection, allowing Wachsmann and his team to test the efficacy of individual 
parts. It became a break point in the cabling, complicating the otherwise simple rolled 
edge over which cables could wrap. Hardware options were tested to allow the cabling 
to exist as three separate sections, but remain structurally continuous.212  
 
A second mock-up of the glass panel enclosure was built to test the unique accordion-
style roof connection. The steady uplift of the roof that was revealed during wind tunnel 
tests posed a problem for the environmental seal of enclosed spaces underneath. The 
preliminary design presented to Mendelsohn and the city council featured an accordion-
style connector that extended from the top of the glass panel, through the lower level of 
the cabling and tied to the roof panels. At full-scale, this connection was redesigned to 
become a separate glass panel located between the bottom and top layers of the 
cabling system, along with a second panel designed to slip over the glass wall, forming 
an adjustable cap that maintained enclosure. Finally, and perhaps the most poignant 
example of the mock-up as a substitute for physical building, Wachsmann machined 
prototypes of hardware at full scale. In order to stabilize the numerous cables stretched 
across the buttresses, Wachsmann designed a cross-brace that would also provide a 
connection onto which the roof panels would attach. Depicted as simple steel plates in 
the scale model, the full-scale version was machined in the Institute for Building 
Research, not a representation or even simulation, but the real part.  
                                               
212 While the testing of the overall cable system could be accomplished at small scale through the model, 
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The mock-up historically served to bridge the divide between representation and reality. 
The mock-ups for California City constitute their collapse. The mock-up, complete with 
machined parts, rendered physical building unnecessary. Speculative architecture 
changed not in degree, but in kind. Architectural speculation typically requires a 
suspension of disbelief; it is offered as an illusion, under which “one must first ignore or 
overlook [reality] in order to fall.”213 The implausible and unrealizable fantasy of 
California City as the next Los Angeles, as framed by Smith and Williams with 
Mendelsohn, was represented architecturally as scenography. However, the 
architectural objects produced by Wachsmann in the Institute for Building Research 
recast speculative architecture not as an implausible fantasy, but as an entirely feasible 
design. It required not a suspension of disbelief, but a belief in suspension. Rather than 
“systematically edit out the hidden suspension wires” that prop up architectural illusion, 
Wachsmann edited out everything else.214 “Tricks applied with intelligence to make 
visible that which is supernatural, invented, or unreal,” in which Smith and Williams 
engaged by strategically cropping photographs of development or green-washing 
renderings of the city, were eschewed to deliver the “immediate bodily real.”215 The 
mock-ups reveal an attempt to move beyond “approximations, conventions, or pure 
chance,” to demonstrate the possibility of the project and the efficacy of the 
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mechanisms developed in the Institute.216 The mock-up provided “materiality-effect,” 
“the end result of the process whereby you’re convinced of the materiality of 
something.”217 As such, the materiality of architecture was not lost in the absence of 
physical building, but rather transposed to the mock-up installed in the lab and later the 
gallery. Contrary to Reinhold Martin’s assessment that architecture, as a result of its 
interpenetration with late capital, loses its physicality and is “superseded by a set of 
representations,” this project suggests that architecture as a physical building was 
superseded by a set of dislodged pieces of evidence.218 Financed by the developer for 
an ultimately unrealized building as a promotional tool for a global investment 
community to research the details of a generic structural system and installed in the 
gallery for public cultural consumption, the mock-up reveals a new collusion between 
finance, research, and the public. 
 
Feasibility 
The architectural production in relation to the financing situation reveals that over time, 
as the project became less and less likely to be built, Wachsmann’s production became 
more and more real. The project suffered repeated failures to secure funding. While the 
residents of California City refused to go further into debt in order to support the project, 
both Mendelsohn and Wachsmann sacrificed to support the research and design of the 
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project for almost six years. Wachsmann eschewed his professional fee, writing later 
that he donated his “life’s professional experience, [his] working capability, [his] skill, 
and [his] whole office apparatus as a kind of contribution to the client, whom [he] saw as 
an enthusiastic partner who was willing to make every possible sacrifice to build [the] 
building.”219 Meanwhile, while Mendelsohn avoided funding the construction of the 
project, he did fund the research and design of the project, issuing checks directly to the 
Institute for Building Research.220. But more than that, I argue that in response to the 
realization that the project was destined to remain unbuilt, the architectural production 
focused not on wild speculation, but on demonstrating the feasibility of the project.221 
Speculative architecture, historically understood to be exempt from the conditions of 
reality to either engage disciplinary concerns and/or lend image to fantasy, was recast 
as a performance of the real.  
 
While the mock-up may have operated as a substitute for physical building, a stand-in 
for an unbuilt building, the continued research and design indicated that the project was 
possible physically and structurally, if not financially. Just months after Wachsmann was 
commissioned by Mendelsohn and the city council, the conceptual design was 
published in the local developer-run newspaper, the California City Sun. Quoting 
                                               
219 Konrad Wachsmann to File, December 16, 1968. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, 
Berlin. 
 
220 Over the course of five years, Mendelsohn gave more than $75,000 to fund the research of 
Wachsmann’s graduate students, USC faculty, and the production of models and mock-ups. In a letter to 
Nat Mendelsohn in 1971, Wachsmann included a year-by-year breakdown of the payments to the 
Institute. See, Konrad Wachsmann to N.K. Mendelsohn, April 12, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, 
Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
 
221 In the beginning, when all parties were convinced of physical building, the design offered was 
described as a literal floating roof. However, as it became increasingly clear that financing would never 
arrive, the production attempted to perform realizability. 
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Wachsmann, the article described a building with a “floating roof.”222 An early model 
exhibited a roof that was not quite floating, but close. A thin steel plate was lifted off the 
ground on slim columns located only on the short sides of the building. During this 
conceptual phase, Wachsmann was assured by Mendelsohn that funding for 
construction was already secured. A year later, Wachsmann presented the preliminary 
design to Mendelsohn and the city council. The design was detailed, and mock-ups 
were produced to demonstrate the possibility of construction. It was at this moment that 
Wachsmann learned that funding did not in fact exist, and that instead, physical building 
was contingent on the successful bond measure by the city council. When it failed to 
pass, the research and design of the project continued undeterred.  
 
The team continued to research and refine the design. In 1967, Joseph Kersavage – 
Wachsmann’s doctoral student and primary assistant – authored a “Final Structural 
Feasibility Analysis.”223 The report explicitly demonstrates that the project was not at all 
fantastical, but, as the report concluded, “totally feasible.” While Mendelsohn continued 
to market the project as an unfunded fantasy that would place California City on the 
cultural map, the Institute for Building Research demonstrated its feasibility. In 1968, a 
new structural engineer was recruited, Jamshid Pajuhesh, who developed special 
computer software to test the cable structure. Digital simulations displaced material 
ones.224 A flow diagram of the research and analysis parallels the feedback loop 
                                               
222 “Civic Center to have ‘Floating Roof’,” California City Sun 1, no. 12 (1966). 
 
223 Joseph Kersavage, “Final Structural Feasibility Analysis” (unpublished manuscript, 1967). Konrad 
Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
 
224 In a report published in 1968, Pajuhesh outlined his research and software. “This report includes: 
computer program for cable analysis which considers cables simultaneously and includes the effects of 
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designed by Wachsmann as the means to bring about a new kind of democratic 
leadership and guidance.225 While the design purported to organize and facilitate a 
potential loop of information circulating between the development company, the local 
government, California City residents, and existing and potential investors, it was itself 
the product of a feedback loop encompassing design and testing. Following each 
design task, diamond-enclosed testing was just as likely to send the process backward 
as forward, creating a potentially endless loop of research. Under the guise of testing 
the specificities of the design, the Institute for Building Research funded emerging 
computer technology as it related to the built environment.  
 
As the project continued to be refined, Joseph Kersavage authored an erection guide in 
1968, expanding beyond the problems of design to the problems of construction.226 This 
detailed document walked through the erection of the cable structure on site. Following 
the construction of the major structural infrastructure, a mobile crane would be used to 
thread the cable system. Temporary scaffolding was to be erected in sections between 
the concrete buttresses, allowing the cables to be looped over, before being tensioned, 
calibrated, and tested on site. Even in the midst of construction, the feedback loop of 
                                               
axial elongation on later deformations; seismic analysis of the cable system using lumped-mass method 
and using an Eigen-vale computer program to evaluate natural frequencies and mode shapes…” See, 
Jamshid Pajuhesh, “Structural Study” (unpublished manuscript, 1968). Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, 
Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
 
225 The feedback loop of testing illustrates how Wachsmann contributed architectural intelligence more so 
than the design of a building, in the vein of Erich Mendelsohn at Dugway, a project that also involved 
Wachsmann. See, Enrique Ramirez, “Erich Mendelsohn at War,” Perspecta 41, (2008): 83-91. 
 
226 Joseph Kersavage, “Proposed Building Erection Scheme” (unpublished manuscript, 1968). Konrad 
Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. See also, Konrad Wachsmann to The City Council of 
California City, March15, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
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testing continued. In many ways, the same process Wachsmann started with, testing 
tension through small-scale simulation, was to be replicated at full-scale on site, to 
respond to unknown environmental conditions.227  
 
Like the simulation model and full-scale mock-ups, the continued work on the project 
shows that the project, disconnected from realization, moved down a rabbit hole of 
research and design deep within academe while eschewing the idea of architecture as 
image for the idea of architecture as evidence. The project moved further away from 
actually resulting in a physical building while delivering a decontextualized proof-of-
concept that made physical building unnecessary. If, according to Reinhold Martin, “the 
further inside you go, the further outside you get,” then Wachsmann’s project for 
California City suggests that the more speculative you go, the more real you get. The 
project illustrates an inverse relationship between speculation and the real. The project 
began as a fantastical floating roof. As the project became less and less likely to be 
realized, a reality recognized by both the developer and the architect, the architectural 
production became more and more real. Analog simulations and architectural drawings 
were superseded with custom-built software, digital simulations, and construction plans. 
                                               
227 In 1969, the developer made another plea to the town to raise money for construction, to no avail. The 
town and development company were then acquired at the start of 1970 by Great Western United. 
Despite early support, the new CEO ultimately turned away from Wachsmann and the city hall project to 
hire Venturi and Scott Brown to produce a design for a new city hall, along with a number of other 
buildings and a new master plan. The project was effectively dead, with absolutely no chance of being 
realized. And yet, research on the project continued until 1972, even after Great Western United, headed 
toward bankruptcy as a result of poor land sales, cut ties with Venturi and Scott Brown. 
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The spectrum that runs from the imaginary to the real is not linear, but circular; the real 
building was displaced by evidence of a building that did not exist.228 
 
Research and its Financing 
Wachsmann and Mendelsohn had been friends and colleagues for twenty years prior to 
the incorporation of California City.229 As such, it was hardly coincidence that 
Wachsmann was handed such a substantial project just a couple months after he 
returned to Los Angeles to take up a position at the University of Southern California.230 
At USC, Wachsmann resurrected the Building Research Institute from his time at the 
                                               
228 This informal, patron/researcher arrangement remained until 1969, when it was announced that the 
California City Development Company would be absorbed by the newly formed national conglomerate, 
Great Western United. 
 
229 Wachsmann may have seemed like a puzzling choice in 1966, given his almost complete lack of 
physical building up until that point and his strong ties to academia and interest in architecture primarily 
as research. Further, typologically Wachsmann had really only engaged in prefabricated housing and 
speculative hangar design for the military. Wachsmann and Mendelsohn were first acquainted through 
the General Panel Corporation of California that was established in 1946. While Wachsmann served as 
president, Mendelsohn served on the board of directors as treasurer. Soon after, their relationship 
extended beyond the corporation through Albert Wohlstetter, Mendelsohn’s former colleague at the 
National Housing Agency who would go on to join Mendelsohn and Wachsmann as a vice-president at 
the General Panel Corporation. The two proceeded to collaborate on the conversion of Camp Anza, after 
which Wachsmann left Los Angeles to take up a position at the Illinois Institute of Technology. The 
development, renamed Arlanza Village, was soon after absorbed into the city of Riverside. Over the next 
fifteen years, although Wachsmann traveled across the United States and Europe, Mendelsohn 
maintained contact. After California City was founded in 1958, Mendelsohn sent each issue of the local 
newspaper, the California City Sun. A nearly complete set of issues of the California City Sun is in the 
Konrad Wachsmann Archiv. Issues were addressed to Wachsmann at his home in Chicago, Berlin, and 
Genoa. Edited, printed, and distributed by the development company, the newspaper documented the 
progress of the town and became the primary platform to highlight the plans and future development of 
the town. Issued monthly, the newspaper followed Wachsmann from Chicago to Berlin to Genoa and 
back again. A friendship was sustained through the newspaper, which kept Wachsmann abreast of the 
exciting venture. As such, it was not coincidence that Wachsmann and Mendelsohn reconnected through 
the city hall project at California City just months after Wachsmann returned to Los Angeles. Mendelsohn 
was seemingly waiting for the right moment to involve his longtime friend and former colleague. It would 
prove to be a mutually beneficial relationship. 
 
230 After a three-year stint in Genoa, Italy working for Italsider, Wachsmann returned to Los Angeles to 
take up a position in the architecture school at USC in the fall of 1965, just prior to the incorporation of 
California City. 
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Institute of Design, Illinois Institute of Technology. The city hall project became the first 
and most significant project undertaken by the renamed Institute for Building 
Research.231 The California City commission served as a project around which the 
Institute would focus its research efforts, and supplied funding to support graduate 
students and USC faculty for several years. A project between friends combined with an 
extremely vague program brief helped to shift architecture away from a building 
commission between an architect and a client; architecture instead became corporate-
sponsored research.232  
 
Incorporation 
On November 16th, 1965, California City residents went to the polls and voted to 
incorporate.233 Despite thousands of landowners, the city had just 339 registered 
                                               
231 Ken Breisch, “Professional and Educational Discourse,” in Overdrive: L.A. Constructs the Future, 
1940-1990, edited by Wim de Wit and Christopher Alexander (Los Angeles: Getty Publications, 2013). 
 
232 Research continued under this arrangement until 1969, when both Mendelsohn, and in particular, 
Wachsmann, realized the consequences of their informal relationship. In early 1970, the California City 
Development Company was absorbed by a national conglomerate with wide-ranging business interests, 
and Wachsmann immediately attempted to transform the project back into a building commission, 
believing that a national corporate enterprise was incapable of supporting such academic research. 
Nevertheless, Wachsmann continued to research and develop the project until 1972, even after 
Mendelsohn resigned and the new corporation cut off support for the project. 
 
233 In August 1965, a campaign to incorporate emerged with the aim of freeing the city from both the 
development company and the county through the democratic election of a local mayor and city council. 
A petition to incorporate was circulated to all current residents and absentee landowners, of which a 
majority signed in favor. The developer, Nat K. Mendelsohn, and the California City Development 
Company, strongly supported, campaigned for, and facilitated incorporation. Voicing support through the 
local paper, which it owned and operated, the company stated in an editorial: “The entire program of 
incorporation was undertaken in the belief that this transformation would add to and encourage the 
orderly growth of our city.” Mendelsohn hired a consulting company that reportedly spent months 
determining the feasibility of incorporation, concluding: “We are convinced that on November 16, 1965, 
California City will grow from childhood to adolescence.” The campaign culminated in a parade by the 
residents that stretched down the primary access road in the town, Randsburg Mojave Road (now called 
California City Boulevard). Cars, boats, and trailers draped with affirmative signs and the names of 
candidates moved slowly down the wide boulevard flanked by large parking lots and intermittent shops 
between patches of empty desert. See, Earl Buie, “City of Huge Area Planned in Desert,” San Bernardino 
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voters.234 The results were overwhelming positive.235 The names of the newly elected 
officials were released the next day: a mayor, four council members, a treasurer, and a 
clerk.236 On the surface, this decision would seem counterproductive to Mendelsohn’s 
project of overarching total design. Incorporation would seem to remove control from the 
development company and place it in the hands of the residents themselves.  
 
However, at the time of incorporation, Mendelsohn employed a majority of the residents 
of California City.237 The mayor and half of the city council were employees of the 
development company. A journalistic investigation in 1969 claimed: “The miniature city 
government [was] pretty well a rubber stamp for Mendelsohn.”238 The development 
company, in effect, retained control over the planning and operation of the 
development.239 The shift from unincorporated territory to township was hailed as a 
                                               
County Sun, August 01, 1965. Mendelsohn hired J.B. Hauauer & Company, Municipal Financial 
Consultants, to study the possibility of incorporation. Editorial, California City Sun 1, no. 9 (1965). 
 
234 Registration was restricted to those who had established residency in the town. 
 
235 252 votes were cast, with just thirty-two nay votes. 
 
236 “70% Voter Turnout For Election,” California City Sun 1, no. 9 (1965). “Pre-Planned for 1 Million: 
California City Incorporates,” Independent Star News (Pasadena, CA.), November 21, 1965. 
 
237 In fact, company salesmen were frequently the first and primary target market for land sales. New 
employees were strongly encouraged to begin their careers with the company by purchasing a plot for 
themselves, as a sign of support. Potential salesmen were provided with real estate classes and told “that 
in order to demonstrate the proper sales technique it is necessary to bring a relative or friend… The 
employee was “milked dry until he [ran] through all his available friends and relatives.” “Who Buys in 
California City?” Los Angeles Underground, 1 no. 13 (1969). 
 
238 The remaining members of the city council, while independent, were heavily influenced by 
Mendelsohn. “California City: Fantastic $80,000,000 Bunko Operation,” Los Angeles Underground, 1 no. 
13 (1969).  
 
239 The city was officially incorporated, and its officials sworn in, on December 10, 1965. Following 
inauguration, the new mayor, James Riley, officially gaveled the passing of the resolution removing 
control from the county and placing it in the hands of the new local government. The ceremony ended 
with a speech from the former governor of California, Goodwin J. Knight, under whose administration a 
quarter of the formerly public land was sold to the development company. The former governor would 
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victory that would free the community from restrictive ordinances and rules that were 
“made on the other side of the Tehachapi Mountains in Bakersfield and were intended 
to operate over an area of 7,000 square miles.”240 Incorporation was also hailed as a 
victory by the development company. As the developer of an unincorporated territory, 
Mendelsohn was responsible for the provision of public facilities and services. Up until 
the time of incorporation, Mendelsohn managed to partially circumvent this issue by 
setting up the non-profit California City Community Services District, whose primary 
reason for existence was the ownership and maintenance of the city’s water wells. Just 
as the non-profit district was able to issue bonds as a way to raise money for public 
services, the new township could issue public bonds that were now backed by a more 
secure and stable entity, the town and its residents.241 With Mendelsohn as primary 
landowner and behind-the-scenes leader of the local government, the development 
company was able to push the provision of public services, like roads, onto the town.  
 
                                               
later be sued by the taxpayers of California for allegedly selling more than 25,000 acres of public land to 
Nat Mendelsohn for a sum of only ten dollars. The sale occurred on September 4, 1956, while Knight was 
governor. The suit alleged that Knight acted beyond his authority to deed the land to a “dummy” company 
that proceeded to transfer the land to the Mojave Investment Company, that ultimately deeded the land to 
the California Realty Company, of which Mendelsohn was president. The suit was ultimately dismissed on 
a technicality. See, “We Are A City! Inauguration Ceremony Makes It Official,” California City Sun 1, no. 9 
(1965). “Knight Named in Land Suit,” Los Angeles Times, April 19, 1969. “Suit Over State Land Sale 
Ended,” Los Angeles Times, July 24, 1969.  
 
240 But more than just freeing the community from the county – allowing decisions and governance to be 
tailored to the interests of residents and property owners – property taxes were lowered. No longer were 
tax dollars sent into a county pool and redistributed. More tax dollars could remain within the town, 
ensuring the “most economical use of taxes.” Further, California City was now eligible for its share of state 
tax revenue from levies on gasoline, cars, etc. See, “What Incorporation Means to the Property Owner,” 
Editorial, California City Sun 1, no. 9 (1965). 
 
241 According to the journalist investigation, the bonded indebtedness of the city in January, 1968, with a 
population of under 1,200, stood at over $7.5 million. “California City: Huge Bunko Operation,” Los 
Angeles Underground 1, no. 13 (1969).  
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One of the first acts of the newly elected city council was to engage the services of 
Wachsmann, at the behest of Mendelsohn, to design a city hall to house the new 
government, and commemorate incorporation. Until then, the operation of the 
development had been located in the headquarters of the California City Development 
Company in Hollywood.242 The proposed geographic shift from development offices in 
Los Angeles and county government in Bakersfield was designed to signal the transfer 
of power to the residents of California City. The project brief was both ambitious and 
vague. There was no specification in terms of scope, population, scale, growth, budget, 
or program.243 While the last planning document created by CFP went into substantial 
detail on elements like transportation, recreation, shopping, and aesthetics of the built 
environment, it was conspicuously vague on details for government buildings.244 The 
only mention of government offices is a brief itemized list for a proposed “Governmental 
Interest Center” that includes “city offices, county offices, state offices, federal 
offices.”245 The lack of detail enabled architectural ambition. On February 24, 1966, 
                                               
242 Even Mendelsohn remained in Los Angeles, all the while encouraging his salesman to not just invest, 
but to move to California City. 
 
243 Wachsmann recalled that “this project was not based on any existing program since any projection for 
the future needed for this edifice could not be precisely made.” Konrad Wachsmann to Nat Mendelsohn, 
12 March 1970, Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. He continued a year later: “… 
the City Council of California City asked me to design a civic center for a growing community which at the 
time could not be precisely determined in scope, population and, particularly, in the speed of future 
development… Even if space requirements are easier to determine today, in all probability those 
requirements will change in a few years.” See, Konrad Wachsmann to The City Council of California City, 
15 March 1971, Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin.  
 
244 The development company had figures on, for example, the number of landowners, number of 
residents, and the size of the development. The town, and company, even had fairly clear plans for the 
future. Smith & Williams, as discussed in the previous chapter, had not only produced a detailed master 
plan as early as 1958, but were still working on projects and revising the master plan when Wachsmann 
was hired. Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980” (unpublished manuscript, undated). 
Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin.  
 
245 Community Facilities Planners, “California City 1980” (unpublished manuscript, undated). Konrad 
Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
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Wachsmann met with Mendelsohn and the California City mayor and city council. Mayor 
James Riley expressed his hope that Wachsmann’s design “symbolize a city of 
tomorrow – a city prepared for the twenty-first century.”246 Wachsmann was asked not 
to design a reasonable city hall for a new small town; rather, he was asked to design, in 
his words, the “most progressive and advanced structure of our time.”247 The rhetoric 
culminated, Wachsmann later recalled, with the request: “Please Create an Eighth 
Wonder of the World.”248 It was made clear to Wachsmann by Mendelsohn and the 
mayor that he was to create a city hall for a “new city in a modern world in almost 
limitless perspective in scale, an urban development which can cover an area greater 
than that of the eleventh biggest city in the United States.”249 
 
Financing 
                                               
246 James Riley quoted in, N.K. Mendelsohn to The People of California City, 15 March 1971, Konrad 
Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. The phrasing parallels earlier rhetoric by Community 
Facilities Planners in 1961. See, “A Plan for the City of Tomorrow,” Los Angeles Examiner, January 22, 
1961. 
 
247 Konrad Wachsmann, “Mayor Riley Shares Letter With Readers of California City Sun,” California City 
Sun 1, no. 5 (1967). 
 
248 “Civic Center to Have ‘Floating Roof’,” California City Sun 1, no. 12 (1966). 
 
249 Konrad Wachsmann, “Mayor Riley Shares Letter With Readers of California City Sun,” California City 
Sun 1, no. 5 (1967). The already fantastical plans produced by Smith and Williams, and Community 
Facilities Planners, were made tame by this new mandate. An ambitious goal of taking a large swathe of 
empty desert from a non-existent population to a generous goal of 400,000 inhabitants was replaced just 
seven years later with the scale of “limitless” development. The first master plan developed by Community 
Facilities Planners projected six satellite towns with a population from 20-50,000 residents and a 
downtown with a population of 80-100,000 residents. See, “A Plan for the City of Tomorrow,” Los Angeles 
Examiner, January 22, 1961. 
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Wachsmann enthusiastically accepted the commission.250 The initial estimated budget 
for the project was $250,000-300,000.251 Wachsmann’s preliminary design presented to 
the city in 1967 was estimated at $450,000 to $500,000. Rather than have the proposed 
design scaled back to accommodate the initial budget estimate, in December 1967, the 
town attempted to issue a public bond to fund the construction of the city hall at 
$450,000 and a fire station at $95,000.252 The measure failed, in large part because the 
                                               
250 Wachsmann stated: “I had followed for years, with admiration, the farsighted planning of Nat 
Mendelsohn, the President of the California City Development Company. I am indeed impressed how the 
energetic spirit of one man has triumphed over nature and created in the Mojave Desert land for people to 
live on… and suddenly in the silence of virgin land, in its dramatic, gigantic scale – an extraordinary 
beauty of its own – there is now life.” As such, the project that unfolded over the next six years was not 
the product of fantastical architectural speculation run off the rails from a modest, restrained brief. The 
developer, the city, and Wachsmann entered into agreement with the intent of engaging in the grandest of 
speculation. Restraint on all sides was eschewed in favor of surpassing the already fantastical plans of 
Smith & Williams less than a decade earlier. Mendelsohn, and the city government operating under his 
direction, chose not to consider existing development or the future plans already created, and instead 
envisioned the desert empty anew. See, Konrad Wachsmann, “Mayor Riley Shares Letter With Readers 
of California City Sun,” California City Sun 1, no. 5 (1967). 
 
251 Although Wachsmann was told that the funding was already available, a year into the research he 
learned that the funds did not, in fact, exist. Konrad Wachsmann to File, December 16, 1968. Konrad 
Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
 
252 A concurrent project with Wachsmann’s design puts the exorbitant price tag in perspective. While 
Wachsmann focused all his efforts on developing the floating city hall, a local architect Eugene V. Conroy 
was commissioned to design a new, and the first purpose-built, fire station. The two projects were 
frequently paired as a single effort, and located only a block apart. By comparison with the increasingly 
light and immaterial city hall, the fire station was thick and heavy. It was constructed largely of reinforced 
concrete and steel members. Instead of floor-to-ceiling glass panels, the design offered mostly solid 
walls, with typical punched windows. The only large openings were garage doors at the front and rear of 
the “apparatus room” where the trucks were maintained and stored. Resting atop the apparatus room, on 
bearing walls, were two thick slabs. A lower slab of nearly three feet in thickness, already thicker than the 
projected city hall roof, was topped with another slab of nearly the same thickness. The upper slab 
extended beyond the lower slab, drawing even more attention. In the same way Wachsmann made the 
roof the most prominent element of his city hall by making it as light and minimal as possible, the fire 
station roof was the most prominent through its size and weight. Flanking both sides of the apparatus 
room were lower height spaces housing offices, bathrooms, lockers, a dormitory, and a recreation room 
for the firefighters. At just over 4,000 square feet, the station was smaller than the proposed city hall, but 
did include plans for future expansion, including doubling the size of the rec room, and converting the 
dispatch and locker rooms into more dormitories. Expansion plans may have been premature, however. 
Even though the project was designed specifically as a fire station, the size combined with the small town 
meant the police department could also be housed within the same structure. Like the city hall was 
intended, the fire station was sited on land donated by the development company. The fire station was 
funded, also, through the issuance of bonds by the city council, relieving the development company from 
all financial burdens except for the cost of the land. The first attempt at a bond issue in 1967 was 
designed to support the construction of both the city hall and the fire station. When that bond failed to 
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town was already deep in debt.253 When the town was incorporated, it inherited the debt 
of the Community Services District that had been issuing bonds for years to support the 
construction of infrastructure like water, electricity, and roads. The town was thus 
created with nearly seven million dollars of debt.254 Over the next several years, 
Mendelsohn continued to fund the research on the project, with no financial support 
from the town. As research progressed and the design was refined and detailed down 
the smallest component, the cost estimate rose. By 1968, it was surpassed $800,000, at 
which point Mendelsohn pledged company resources to offset the cost of 
                                               
pass a vote by the town, the city hall project returned to the Institute for Building Research for extensive 
research, shifting from a simple building commission to a sponsored research project. However, the fire 
station was instead redesigned, and a new bond issue was brought to a vote by mid-1968. The bond 
issue of just $175,000 passed, and construction began on the station. Upon completion, the construction 
cost amounted to less than $100,000, a fifth of the initial estimate for Wachsmann’s city hall. As the fire 
station proceeded from design to construction to operation, the city hall design remained in the research 
and design phase. However, while Wachsmann’s project may never have been realized, that did not 
preclude it from being useful to either Mendelsohn or Wachsmann. See “California City Fire Station 
Ready in 1969,” California City Sun 12, no. 3 (1969). See also, “Fire Station Bond Election April 9,” 
California City Sun 11, no. 2 (1968). 
 
253 The ballot measure failed 119 to 109. Mendelsohn speculated that the residents of California City were 
worried about being responsible for guaranteeing the bond payments. N.K. Mendelsohn to The People of 
California City, 12 March 1971, Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. See also, 
“California City: Huge Bunko Operation,” Los Angeles Underground, 1 no. 13 (1969). 
 
254 When the editorial team of the Los Angeles Underground newspaper investigated California City in 
1969, they discovered the town, an independent and technically self-governing entity following 
incorporation, had issued and was responsible for more than $7,500,000 in general obligation bonds. It 
noted: “Many persons are unaware that bonds voted to finance developments in certain tracts are not just 
notes against those particular assessment districts but in reality revert to general obligation bonds if 
defaulting occurs.” See, “California City: Huge Bunko Operation,” Los Angeles Underground 1, no. 13 
(1969). 
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construction.255 And over time, it continued to rise. By 1972, the estimate reached 
upwards of $1,300,000.256 
 
Proto-Star Architect 
Despite the lack of physical building, and Wachsmann and Mendelsohn’s financial 
sacrifice in order to research and design the project, both benefitted in other ways. 
Wachsmann, aforementioned, received a timely open-ended design brief, research 
funding, and an agreeable client and friend. For years, the project served as a 
framework through which the research interests of the Institute for Building Research 
were pursued. On the other side, Mendelsohn received an architectural image by a 
preeminent architect to maintain the illusion of development at California City and drive 
millions in land sales.  
 
Wachsmann’s project constituted a new relationship between academic architectural 
research and late capitalist land speculation. Soon after Wachsmann was 
commissioned, Mendelsohn and the development company began touting the 
“imminent” project in their marketing material and the local newspaper. It quickly 
became a new sign of growth to which salesmen could point to bolster their case to 
                                               
255 While this gesture may have been generous, it was largely symbolic. Mendelsohn committed the 
resources of his development company to covering the cost of construction only in excess of the original 
bond measure. Only if the town was willing to double-down on their already substantial debt would the 
company commit the funds necessary to realize the project. Despite this generous offer, the town failed to 
issue any bond to fund the project. N.K. Mendelsohn to The People of California City, 12 March 1971, 
Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
 
256 California City Development Company to City of California City, April 4, 1969. Konrad Wachsmann 
Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. See also, N.K. Mendelsohn to City of California City, October 19, 
1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
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potential buyers.257 And specifically, the author of the design was highlighted in the 
advertising campaign as much as the proposed design. For Mendelsohn, the city hall 
project didn’t represent growth only in the simple terms of development, but growth in 
terms of fame and prominence. When Wachsmnn’s name was mentioned, it was 
accompanied by a description and often a full biography discussing his prominence in 
the architectural world.258  
 
In brochures, newspaper advertisements and articles, and plot plans, a rendering of the 
proposed city hall indicated activity and future growth in the desert development. Just a 
couple months after Wachsmann was commissioned by Mendelsohn, the local 
newspaper published an article on the schematic design under the title, “Eighth Wonder 
Here”.259 The hype in the article derived from a lecture in which Wachsmann showed 
the preliminary design.260 The development company was quick not only to claim the 
                                               
257 In 1969, two years after the project failed to receive funding, “Mr. and Mrs. Loomis were shown a 
picture of a modernistic city hall building and told this was to be erected at a site prominently marked 
along the main road. Records show this proposal was defeated at the last election when it failed to 
achieve a two-thirds vote. The picture is carried in the company brochure and is referred to as California 
City City Hall.” See, “California City: Huge Bunko Operation,” Los Angeles Underground 1, no. 13 (1969). 
 
258 A November 1967 issue of the California City Sun committed four pages to discussing the history of 
Wachsmann from his birth all the way to the current project. Securing Wachsmann and building one of his 
designs, of which very few were ever built, was touted; it would place California City on the proverbial 
map, establish the city’s presence despite its mostly non-site status – a large piece of land that because 
of its lack of development existed primarily on paper in the form of deeds and maps that demarcated one 
part of empty desert from the rest. See, Frank Davis, “A City Hall Becomes Famous Even Before It Is 
Built,” California City Sun 1, no. 5 (1967). See also, “Professor Wachsmann Outstanding Architect,” 
California City Sun, February, 1969. 
 
259 The project was not yet built, not even really designed; however, the title of the article implies not only 
that the project would become famous worldwide, but that it, in fact, already existed. “Eighth Wonder 
Here!” California City Sun 1, no. 12 (1966). 
 
260 In fact, the basis for the article is Wachsmann’s lecture. “Addressing a gathering at the University of 
Southern California where he heads the post-graduate Department of Architecture, world renowned Dr. 
Konrad Wachsmann unfolded his preliminary plan for the proposed Civic Center to be erected in 
California City.” See, “Civic Center to Have Floating Roof,” California City Sun 1, no. 12 (1966). 
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importance of this moment, but to capitalize on it with landowners and potential 
investors. It would still be a few months before Wachsmann even presented the project 
publicly to Mendelsohn and the city council (fig. 2.01).261  
 
By the end of 1967, the design had reached its near final form, and the newspaper 
again published an article on the project. This time the article expanded beyond the 
project itself to discuss Wachsmann, including an extensive, multi-page biography and 
details about his current position at USC. The title explicitly recognizes the power of 
speculative design to assist in the land sale operation: “A City Hall Becomes Famous 
Even Before It Is Built.” In the extensive interview with Wachsmann, the article states:  
“… asked if he knew of any other examples of outstanding design 
appearing on the modern scene. He replied, yes, he could think of two. 
One the Chapel of Ronchamp, a small, remote village in France near the 
Alsace-Lorraine border, with a population of less than a thousand. 
Remote, that is, until ten years ago. Then the great architect, Le 
Corbusier, designed and built its chapel which had a most powerful 
influence on modern architecture, and put Ronchamp on the map. Each 
year thousands of visitors come to the village just to see the chapel.”262  
                                               
261 Mendelsohn, in effect, supported a project whose first audience was students, scholars and fellow 
architects. Only later was the same material used to present the project to Mendelsohn, the development 
company, and the city council. 
 
262 Frank Davis, “A City Hall Becomes Famous Even Before It Is Built,” California City Sun 1, no. 5 (1967). 
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Wachsmnn drew an explicit parallel between the small town of Ronchamp and 
California City, both of which had at the time a population of approximately 1,000.263 
The message was clear: Wachsmann’s city hall, when built, would elevate California 
City to the status of architectural mecca, transforming the desert development into an 
international attraction that would undoubtedly spark a rise in the value of land. The 
article continued: “The other, Wachsmann said, is in Plano, Illinois, just outside 
Chicago. For two hundred years no one heard of Plano. Then the famous Mies Van der 
Rohe built a weekend house of glass on the river there for Dr. Edith Farnsworth. This 
has attracted tens of thousands to the town, many of whom have decided to stay and 
build themselves.”264 The first reference implied the potential positive financial effects of 
a piece of innovative architecture authored by a well-known architect, by attracting a 
large contingent of tourists. The second reference went further, explicitly equating 
prominent architecture with not only increased land sales but increased population. 
Wachsmann positioned architecture as a cultural product to be mobilized for capitalist 
gain.265  
 
At the same time, the architectural references reveal a more complicated audience than 
simply the lay public looking for a quick and profitable investment opportunity. This 
becomes particularly evident in 1971, when Mendelsohn evokes R. Buckminster Fuller 
                                               
263 However, they varied significantly in their geographic size, with Ronchamp encompassing less than 
ten square miles, about 5% of the size of California City. 
 
264 Frank Davis, “A City Hall Becomes Famous Even Before It Is Built,” California City Sun 1, no. 5 (1967). 
 
265 Wachsmann suggested first that his town hall would rival two of the most famous pieces of 20th 
century architecture, and second that if the project were to be realized it would generate increased land 
value, sales, and inhabitants. 
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as a way to encourage support of the project. In an open letter to the town, he wrote: “R. 
Buckminster Fuller famous for his geodesic domes told me he considers the 
Wachsmann design for California City one of the most imaginative and creative projects 
in recent decades.”266 Prior to the rise of the star-architect, it is unlikely that the public at 
large would even know who Wachsmann, Mies van der Rohe, Le Corbusier, or 
Buckminster Fuller were, let alone allow their financial investment strategies to be 
affected by them. In particular, while Mies van der Rohe and Le Corbusier had realized 
numerous projects, Wachsmann and Fuller, though prolific in architectural circles, had 
built very little. The references suggest perhaps that the intended audience was not only 
the lay public, but the architectural community as well. The marketing of specific 
architectural references constitutes the elision of a public investment community and a 
largely academic architectural community. Land speculation merged with cultural 
production through the financing, location, and audience of Wachsmann’s drawings, 
models, and mock-ups. The familiar narrative of capitalist co-optation of speculative 
architecture is not without an infiltration of the architectural discourse into the ephemera 
through which real estate operates, in this case promotional material and the local 
developer-run newspaper. This is evidenced first in the puzzling selection of 
Wachsmann, an architect working primarily through academia with little built work, and 
second through the use of other architects known primarily in architectural circles and 
not the broader public as a way to bolster the selection of Wachsmann. The problem of 
the lack of building was reframed as a benefit; Mendelsohn pointed specifically to the 
                                               
266 N.K. Mendelsohn to The People of California City, 12 March 1971, Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, 
Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
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significance of building something by an architect whose career included so few built 
projects.  
 
With the university as a foil, Wachsmann and Mendelsohn, operating through the city 
council, aligned to push architecture away from a physical building. But while both 
suffered financially, both benefitted in other ways. More than that, the benefit to 
Wachsmann and Mendelsohn occurred at the expense of the existing community of 
residents and landowners. The public was to be saddled with the high cost of 
construction while the architect and developer were freed from financial and design 
constraints. But further, the architect and developer were freed from the need to profit 
directly off the building. Wachsmann was already profiting off the fame of the project 
even while it was being designed, and Mendelsohn mobilized the compelling imagery to 
sell even more land at an increased price. The small, pioneering desert community – for 
which architecture as the provision of real space would have greatly benefitted – was 
abandoned by both architect and developer for the architectural community and global 
investment community. California City residents were slated to be on the hook for a 
project they could never afford. All the while, Wachsmann acquired more fame, the 
Institute for Building Research more funding, and Mendelsohn more profit. 
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3: DENISE SCOTT BROWN, ROBERT VENTURI: ARCHITECTURE AS 
CORPORATION 
 
 
 
The redefinition of architecture as the deferment of judgment, and by extension design, 
to engage in the analysis and imaging of the built environment, facilitated a new 
alignment between the architect and the corporation. Planning methods developed by 
Denise Scott Brown were transposed from the academy to the corporation. The image, 
as data/information rather than idea, assumed the form of value. By extension, Scott 
Brown’s approach to planning as the collecting, sifting, and arranging of images of the 
environment ultimately led to the organization of information flow as an employee within 
the corporate structure. Architecture as image, rather than sign, was output in a 
combination of publications and sponsored exhibitions that blurred the line between 
cultural product and corporate advertising.  
 
In 1969, the California City Development Company, and California City with it, was 
acquired by a national conglomerate, Great Western United. Purchased as part of a 
diversification strategy, the development company was renamed Great Western Cities, 
Inc. The CEO, William White, Jr., retained Mendelsohn as head of the new division, 
however, he proceeded to hire Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and John Rauch.267 
In the span of a year, from the fall of 1970 to the fall of 1971, VRSB conceived a new 
                                               
267 VRSB were fresh off their fateful trip to Las Vegas, and had yet to publish the results of their study. 
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master plan and designs for several buildings – a shopping center, a post office, a 
cemetery, a new company headquarters, a series of billboards, and a new civic center – 
none of which were realized.268  
 
The first commission following their trip to Las Vegas – where they described what they 
perceived to be a false distinction between theory and practice, research and design, 
the university and the corporation, and ultimately, ideas and money – California City 
seemed to offer ideal conditions for reconciliation: a largely blank desert site, a young, 
amenable developer, and a mandate to reconceive the city from urban planning to 
graphic design. It is all the more interesting then, that no physical development 
occurred. Rather than collapse academic theory with commercial development, not only 
were VRSB subject to it, they reinforced it. The separation of sign from shed, and 
emphasis on the photograph, produced the creation of, and engagement in, an image 
world that aligned with, and mediated a speculative market floating above the desert 
surface. VRSB designed everything from garden cities and modernist monuments to 
billboards. Ultimately, they abandoned Modernist forms of production, i.e. buildings, in 
favor of the production and circulation of images.269 The shift in the nature of 
architectural practice redefined the financial and organizational relationship between the 
architect and the corporation, the form of the output, and the ethics of competition. 
VRSB were absorbed into the corporation as de facto employees. Their output 
                                               
268 Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour. Learning from Las Vegas. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1972. 
 
269 Martino Stierli, Las Vegas in the Rearview Mirror: The City in Theory, Photography, and Film (Los 
Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2013). 
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consisted of architectural journal articles and two distinct, but related, exhibitions. 
Finally, VRSB’s work and its circulation yielded mixed responses and ethical 
accusations by the previous architects and designers involved in California City.   
 
Shifting Practice: Design, Research, Management  
The acquisition of the regionally-based development company, and the ultimate 
dismissal of its founder, by a national conglomerate created multiple kinds of distance 
that contributed to a shift in practice. Beyond the geographic distance of the new owner, 
the distance between development and speculation widened to the point that 
development was almost entirely abandoned. Early commitments to build proposed 
projects like Wachsmann’s city hall were quickly walked back by White; Great Western 
United viewed California City as a site for marketing, not development.270 The 
speculative market floating above the surface was materialized by VRSB as a collection 
of images representing garden cities, monuments, image-makers, and billboards. 
Rather than through building, it was through images that the natural environment, its 
resources, and even the corporation, were mediated and managed. However, the focus 
on images enabling wide-ranging design responses, foreclosed the possibility of 
physical development. Which is to say, the alignment of post-modern capital and post-
modern architecture was premised on the abandonment of building, and the embrace of 
speculative dollars.  
 
                                               
270 Nathan Mendelsohn to City of California City, October 19, 1971. See also, Nathan Mendelsohn to 
Darwin Dennis, October 22, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. Also, 
“William White, Jr. Compound Interests,” Businessweek, July 25, 1970. 
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The primary modes used to represent most of the projects, elevation and eye-level 
perspective, reveal that the emphasis on the photographic image as a means of 
researching, analyzing, and representing the city, translated to just more images (fig. 
3.04, 3.14). Their California City projects show that imaging the city led not to sign-
based architecture but to image-based architecture. Images of the extant city, in the 
form of photographs, intermingled with speculative images, in the form of drawings. 
Their image-based approach to researching the city became their approach to design in 
form, but more importantly, in representation. According to Venturi, “[t]he architect has a 
responsibility toward the landscape, which he can subtly enhance or impair, for we see 
in perceptual wholes and the introduction of any new building will change the character 
of all the other elements in a scene.”271 If we understand landscape to be an image of 
the land, then Venturi and Scott Brown’s images short-circuit alterations to the 
“perceptual wholes.” The shift in practice from the design of buildings to the research of 
the urban environment that the firm began in Las Vegas shifted ultimately to the 
proliferation and management of images as information, bringing the environment and 
the cvorporation into a new alignment.272  
 
City Hall 
Unlike Wachsmann’s city hall proposal, VRSB’s design did not attempt to disappear into 
the horizon. In fact, it aimed to be seen. Elevated on a plinth above the surface of the 
                                               
271 Robert Venturi, “The Campidoglio: A Case Study,” The Architectural Review 113, no. 677 (1953): 333-
334. 
 
272 Sylvia Lavin writes of the shift in images from their association with “ideas, caprices, fancies, and other 
made-up things” to their association with their actual materiality as paper documents. Sylvia Lavin, “Oh 
My Aching Antenna: The Fall and Rise of Postmodern Creativity,” Log, no. 37 (2016). 
  121 
desert, the shell and core design included seven stories and a roof garden, clad in 
golden-tinted reflective glass (fig. 3.01). Sited in the center of a new superblock of 
desert and parking lots, the project ensured maximum visual presence (fig. 3.02). 
Stretching across two facades, letters etched into the spandrel panels between the 
second and third floors spelled: CALIFORNIA CITY CIVIC CENTER (fig. 3.03-3.04). 
 
Reflecting on the American desert, Reyner Banham claimed it to be the quintessential 
environment for “Modern Man,” writing: “The desert measurably offers immeasurable 
space.” The flat, empty desert, for Banham, was an infinitely stretching plane of the kind 
articulated and attempted by the likes of Mondrian, Mies van der Rohe, and 
Giacometti.273 While California City had been founded more than a decade ago, and 
thousands of plots of land had been sold, the population dwindled around 1,000, 
presenting a scene similar to that described by Banham. The Randsburg-Mojave Road, 
on which the project was to be sited, was home to the small extant commercial and 
institutional developments in town.274 However, VRSB eschewed the commercial spine, 
designing a large superblock encompassing Wachsmann’s original site. Instead of the 
approximately six acres given to Wachsmann, Venturi’s site was more than 200 acres 
(fig. 3.02). The project was sited in the center of the block, more than 1,500 feet from 
any street edge or existing development, rejecting both strip and sprawl. Removed from 
the street and the extant development, the project was visually in line with the 20 Mule 
Team Parkway, the primary access road extending diagonally through the entire 
                                               
273 Reyner Banham, Scenes from America Deserta (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). 
 
274 Since renamed the California City Boulevard. 
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development. The view from the road driving from the outskirts of the city into downtown 
would thus be dominated by the visual presence of the project, a symbol of the city 
center materialized in architectural form (fig. 3.05).275  
 
The design iterations reveal complications in VRSB’s otherwise well-rehearsed and 
straightforward rhetoric. But further, they reveal the final design as neither a duck nor a 
decorated shed, but an environmental manager. Early iterations illustrate a simple cubic 
structure reminiscent of Le Corbusier, with a free plan set atop piloti, a thick façade with 
small punched openings, and a roof garden (fig. 3.06-3.07).276 The façade was 
designed to combat the harsh sun and high temperatures of the desert. Registered in 
concrete, it served as a combination trombe wall and brise-soleil. The roof garden, and 
separation from the ground, went further in stabilizing the interior from the wild 
temperature swings in the desert. The five points were mobilized toward the 
conditioning of the desert environment. The modernist design was then topped with a 
symbol: a replica of Smith and Williams’ reverse scalloped roof design used on their 
lakeside pavilion and congregational church.  
 
The final design saw three major changes from the early Modernist-like monument. The 
Smith & Williams roof symbol was deleted, leaving behind a simple flat roof garden (fig. 
                                               
275 However, the 20 Mule Team Parkway veers left on the way into town before connecting to the 
Randsburg-Mojave Road; as such, the view from the parkway to the proposed civic center would have 
been nearly two miles away. A new access road running from the southwest corner of the site directly to 
the project was also designed. 
 
276 These early, undoubtedly Le Corbusier-influenced, iterations were transformed in VRSB’s later 
explanation of the project as a copy of the Eiffel Tower that reinforced their claim of engaging architecture 
as pure symbol. 
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3.08). The thick concrete façade was replaced with a thin curtain wall of mirror glass. 
And, the project was lowered onto the ground, although a large open-air public corridor 
was maintained (fig. 3.09). Following a number of sketches employing the Smith & 
Williams roof element as a symbolic antenna, VRSB ultimately scrapped the “sign” 
altogether.277 Focus shifted instead to the form itself conceived as a simple, abstract 
monument. The elimination of symbols can be explained in part through a minor 
interaction between the firm and scientist-turned-sculptor E.H. Mercer. After discovering 
California City, Mercer contacted Great Western United to offer his services in designing 
and fabricating a number of “environmental sculptures” that would “emphasize key 
features of the plan of the city,” “enhance the beauty of already established precincts,” 
and “capture and impress the visitor.”278 Acting on behalf of the corporation, VRSB 
declined the offer, claiming that the “symbolic task” had already been accomplished by 
Smith & Williams, specifically with their lakeside pavilion. The firm’s focus, they claimed, 
was elsewhere.279  
 
Addressing the strong effects of solar radiation in the desert, VRSB suggested the use 
of mirror glass over concrete.280 Material form was abandoned for a chemical surface. 
                                               
277 The idea of a symbolic antenna, without function, undoubtedly came from the Guild House, as 
discussed by Sylvia Lavin. Sylvia Lavin, “Oh My Aching Antenna: The Fall and Rise of Postmodern 
Creativity,” Log, no. 37 (2016). 
 
278 E.H. Mercer to C.E. Julian, May 9, 1970. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the 
gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
279 John Rauch to E.H. Mercer, July 2, 1970. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by 
the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
280  “Kinney 20 gL.”, a metallic one-way mirror glass, was determined to be marginally more expensive 
than plate glass and likely cheaper than “architectural sun shading”. “Preliminary study for Cal City Civic 
Center,” 225.1.A.7013.4, The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. It’s important to understand that the overall estimated cost for 
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The change transformed the heavy concrete form into a box projecting light across the 
desert, reflected by day, emitted by night – a beacon marking California City in an 
otherwise infinitely expansive desert (fig. 3.10).281 Finally, the design was lowered onto 
a new plinth with an open-air corridor. With steps on one side and a ramp on the other, 
the corridor not only provided access, but also a shaded public space to escape the 
desert sun, complete with fountain.282 The thirty-foot-wide plinth wrapping the project 
was to be planted with local desert flowers (fig. 3.11). The flower beds and public shade 
areas made the design a desert oasis; at the same time, unbuilt and represented only 
with colored elevations and sketch perspectives, the design constituted a mirage.  
 
Spreading out from the flower moat, VRSB designed a set of concentric rings for 
possible future development (fig. 3.12). The civic center was in fact only the first stage 
in the development of a micro garden city. Despite the fact that the shape of California 
City was largely narrow and linear, connecting Mojave to Randsburg, VRSB understood 
the development radially with downtown at the Southwestern tip. The design of the site 
reinforced the radial organization, with the civic center located not just in the center of 
the city, but in the center of the superblock. Alongside proposed tree-lined access roads 
and linear parks, VRSB also designed rings of buildings, parks, and circulation (fig. 
                                               
development was just shy of $3,000,000. “California City Civic Center Program and Space Analysis,” May 
3, 1971, 225.11.A.7013.13, The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
281 The design simultaneously evoked Étienne-Louis Boullée’s 18th century platonic forms and 
contemporaneous experiments in light by Los Angeles artists including Larry Bell. Sylvia Lavin, 
Everything Loose Will Land: 1970s Art and Architecture in Los Angeles (New York: D.A.P., 2013). 
 
282 Venturi called the fountain and shade “amenities”. “Preliminary study for Cal City Civic Center,” 
225.1.A.7013.4, The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and 
Denise Scott Brown. 
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3.13).283 The proposed city hall sat at the physical and symbolic center of the site, 
followed by related public and cultural institutions, then commercial enterprise, and 
finally residential neighborhoods just beyond the boundaries of the site. The radial 
organization eschewed both strip and sprawl in favor of a series of individual objects 
within a set of concentric rings. The size, placement, and surrounding road network of 
the proposed building suggest that it would become a new monumental ground zero 
around which the entire development would be reoriented. 
 
VRSB’s new master plan paralleled the city hall superblock at the urban scale. Three 
phases outline development and densification, starting with the identification and 
promotion of two centers: downtown California City in which the proposed city hall was 
to be located, and a secondary center at Galileo Hill located along the 20 Mule Team 
Parkway (fig. 3.14). A larger amoeba-like zone surrounds the two centers (fig. 3.15). 
Initially slated for “spontaneous growth”, later phases reveal its conversion into planned 
development with the reinforcement and creation of new commercial spines and 
intermediate areas of urban density (fig. 3.16). Even within the proposed urban centers 
and the suburban “spontaneous growth” area, the master plan limited the development 
of architecture; rather, it advocated for the development of nature. At the scale of the 
street, VRSB called for the use of trees rather than walls or fences, like the tree-lined 
access roads to the proposed city hall, all provided gratis by the development 
                                               
283 The site sketch reveals a circle of parking around the building, followed by a roundabout, then a band 
of civic and institutional buildings, another roundabout, and finally a band of institutional and commercial 
buildings. VRSB sketched out primitive forms to populate the civic/institutional band, all floating in the 
center of their respective plots. The overall plan recalls the Garden City plans of Ebenezer Howard from 
the turn of the century. 
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company.284 The master plan redefined architecture away from physical development 
and toward the provision and management of natural resources.  
 
In addition to articulating growth, the master plan also established limits. The overall 
development strategy, within which phases of development were planned, articulated 
“fronts of suggested zero growth” (fig. 3.14). Sweeping indiscriminately over the desert, 
in and out of city limits, the growth limits proposed to return large swathes of previously 
master planned property back to the desert. The use of the term “zero growth” suggests 
the master plan was based on equilibrium. Given the limited natural resources, namely 
water, and the promotion of the existing desert environment elsewhere in VRSB’s 
designs, the master plan articulated the establishment of an ecological balance between 
the existing resource-starved environment and physical development.285  
 
                                               
284 Citing aesthetic issues, Venturi advised against the use of walls or fences as property divisions, saying 
they would require significant maintenance and encourage dumping. “We feel [walls] would be an 
invitation to the very dumping and poor maintenance we are hoping to avoid, and that the untidy private 
sides of these walls with their abandoned refrigerators and weed gardens would be visible from even 
slight curves in the main road, and, of course, from adjoining properties… We feel that the mandatory 
planting of trees would be seen by developers and owners as less coercive than the mandatory building 
of walls and fences, but nevertheless as an added incentive the trees should be provided gratis… We feel 
owners should be encouraged to plant trees before they start construction but should be required to do so 
when construction begins.” Robert Venturi to Tim Wirth, August 3, 1971. See also, Tim Wirth to Memo to 
the Files, September 23, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
285 The various strategies of environmental management were meant to be supplemented, confirmed, or 
altered by the input of an ecological consultant. Part of the overall project scope laid out by VRSB 
included the hiring of a consultant to investigate the local desert ecology and create appropriate design 
and development strategies. Unfortunately, the ecological work was suspended before it started due to 
the unavailability of the selected ecologist. Minutes of Meeting California City, August 28, 1970, 
225.11.A.7013.01, The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. See also, Schedule and Budget California City, July 9, 1970, 225.11.A.7013.01, 
The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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Shopping Center 
The plaza proposed by VRSB was to be located in the heart of downtown, opposite 
Central Park.286 Its siting and design visually wedded the green, oasis-like park and 
artificial lake with one of the few natural aberrations in the area, a pair of buttes located 
between the city and Edwards Air Force Base to the south (fig. 3.17). While the design 
was a rather straightforward decorated shed – low-slung boxes with oversized 
billboards attached to the front – a combination of non-commercial signage and 
architectural framing constituted environmental management. In between two 
commercial sheds, an image of a green New England landscape was designed to 
satisfy residents’ desire for greenery (fig. 3.18).287 At the same time, it framed a view of 
the natural desert landscape. Elsewhere, VRSB’s designs primarily cultivated the 
natural beauty of the desert; in the design for the shopping center, however, VRSB 
proposed to image a green landscape to dissuade residents from attempting to remake 
the desert.  
 
At the southeast corner of Randsburg-Mojave Boulevard and the 20 Mule Team 
Parkway, VRSB proposed a new twenty-four-acre commercial center that would 
become the new MERBISC MART (The Most Extraordinary Recreation Bargain in 
Southern California) (fig. 3.19).288 The linear form paralleled the earlier commercial strip 
                                               
286 The first, and only, commercial plaza designed by Smith and Williams was located at the Western 
edge of the proposed downtown loop, to greet visitors coming from across Southern California. 
 
287 Denise Scott Brown to Allan Boyar, July 17, 1970. The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
288 At the time of design, the mart was located in a smaller lakeside building designed by Smith and 
Williams, since demolished. 
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plaza designed by Smith and Williams, located two miles to the east. Like the extant 
shopping plaza, VRSB’s design was pulled back from the street to allow abundant 
surface parking. Further, the design incorporated an arcade as a transition from the sea 
of parking to the single-story structures. The design even copied the combination 
trellis/fascia that served both to provide shade and signage, leaving the architecture 
clear (fig. 3.20).289 A series of sketches show VRSB experimenting with a generic copy 
of Smith and Williams elevation by proposing different non-commercial, large-scale 
billboards on the roof. Many featured “MERBISC MART”, and all depicted the local 
desert landscape or its mythology: a horizon, a local desert flower, a wagon and mule 
team (fig. 3.21-3.23). Most notable, however, might be the third iteration that proposed a 
billboard depicting the desert landscape directly behind the structure. The image shows 
a partly-cloudy sky above a desert horizon line that is interrupted by twin buttes. The 
design blocked the buttes from view, then imaged them on a billboard. As the scheme 
was refined, the roof-top billboards were eliminated. The strip was split and pushed 
apart to allow a view of the twin buttes.290 The view was further framed and highlighted 
by canting the building forms, pulling the eye to the center (fig. 3.24). The design 
visually linked the oasis-like park, the artificial landscape, to the desert buttes, the 
natural landscape.291 
                                               
289 Smith and Williams had already very deliberately separated sign from shed in their design for a 
commercial strip, in an effort to improve the aesthetics of both sign and shed. 
 
290 “With luck the twin buttes should be visible from Central Park directly underneath the painting through 
the central opening.” Denise Scott Brown to Allan Boyar, July 17, 1970. The Architectural Archives, 
University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
291 The rendered street elevation, one of four commissioned drawings, was crucial not just to depict the 
proposed signage, but the landscape framed by the architecture. 
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While the rooftop billboard disappeared from later versions in the design, it reappeared 
as a link between the separated buildings, creating a viewport for the desert beyond.292 
The curved top of the billboard was capped with the letters “MERBISC MART”. But most 
significant was its proposed content. Unlike the early sketches that recreated images of 
the desert landscape, the new billboard was a lush, green landscape. Titled “Sunday 
Morning in New England”, the image was designed to satisfy residents’ desire for such 
a landscape.293 The design essentially presented an image similar to the park just 
across the street where significant resources had been channeled to massively 
transform the desert into a lush oasis of greenery. Driving down the Randsburg-Mojave 
Boulevard would thus present two opposing fabrications of green: on the left, a green 
park; on the right, an image of it. The image constituted an overlay on the natural 
environment to manage residents’ relationship to it.294 
                                               
292 While picturing the twin buttes in the distance, the addition of the billboard brought with it a series of 
vertical supports that interrupted the view. 
 
293 Denise Scott Brown to Allan Boyar, July 17, 1970. The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
294 Returning to the buildings themselves, the two represented just the first phase in a much larger 
commercial center that would fill out the twenty-four-acre site (fig. 3.24). Totaling just over 5,000 square 
feet combined, the first phase of development was relatively small. Its size was visually inflated through 
the expansion of the signage-filled fascia that rose far above the roofline of the buildings. However, the 
final design was scaled back significantly. An earlier iteration appeared to present a nearly four-story 
commercial block (fig. 3.25). Only the section revealed the gigantic sign rising above a one-story structure 
(fig. 3.26). Nevertheless, the first phase of development was to be supplemented by at least two more 
phases that ultimately saw the creation of an internal open-air mall, and nearly 30,000 square feet of new 
development. Development would first extend the strip nearly all the way across the site, then doubling in 
thickness to create rear-facing shops with a rear parking lot. Later phases pushed the parking further 
back to allow for a rear mall and second commercial strip. The complete development consisted of two 
commercial strips with back to back shops (fig. 3.27). At the same time, the further developments to the 
rear maintained the frame of the desert vista. Phasing played a role in several of VRSB’s proposed 
designs. Both in the case of the commercial center, and the civic center, the initial developments 
proposed were relatively small in scale and scope. 
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Billboards 
Of the several projects VRSB designed for California City, a series of proposed 
billboards can most easily be understood through the predominant discourse connecting 
VRSB’s theory and practice leading to sign-based architecture. The design of seven 
billboards along the 20 Mule Team Parkway was based on the kind of billboards they 
witnessed and researched in Las Vegas.295 However, what appeared to be a 
commercially-driven advertisement mediating buyer and seller, mediated instead the 
social/building environment and the land.296 Beyond communicating information about 
the development, the billboards communed individuals and individual development 
around a shared appreciation for the natural beauty of the desert. As both architect and 
developer abandoned building in favor of the sign, the innocuous “pretty” and “non-
commercial” section of the sign redefined development not as the exploitation of 
resources and the environment but their conservation.297 
 
Between downtown California City and the proposed “second community” at Galileo Hill, 
VRSB designed seven billboards at strategic points along the 20 Mule Team Parkway 
                                               
295 Initial sketches explored the possibility of several different kinds of signs, including more conventional 
billboards, neighborhood entryways, and park signs (fig. 3.28-3.29). 
 
296 Neil Postman claimed that “human beings live in two different kinds of environments. One is the 
natural environment and consists of things like air, trees, rivers, and caterpillars. The other is the media 
environment, which consists of language, numbers, images, holograms, and all of the other symbols, 
techniques, and machinery that make us what we are.” See, Neil Postman, “The Humanism of Media 
Ecology,” Proceedings of the Media Ecology Association 1, (2000): 10-16. 
 
297 Denise Scott Brown to Allan Boyar, July 17, 1970. The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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(fig. 3.30).298 According to VRSB, each was placed to take advantage of either an 
appealing natural vista or proposed development.299 At fairly regular intervals, the 
billboard designs were each accompanied with a turnout (fig. 3.31).300 The oversized 
turnouts included parking for sixteen vehicles, picnic tables, and a small grove of trees. 
According to both VRSB and White, the project was designed primarily as an aid to 
company salesmen. 301 The company regularly chartered buses and planes to bring 
potential buyers to California City, where they were provided with a free room in the 
newly built Holiday Inn, access to all the recreation facilities like the artificial lake and 
golf course, and a tour of the available tracts.302 
 
                                               
298 In the urban-scaled site plan, featuring a nine-mile stretch of the road, the billboards are identified as 
zones, rather than points, of interest. 
 
299 “Criteria for stop locations: 1), Even spacing along Twenty Mule Team Parkway, 2) Placement on land 
owned by Great Western Cities, 3) Placement on straight sections of road for safety, 4) Priority to 
placement on right hand side of the road for easy access on trip toward Galileo Hill, 5) Relationship to 
historic Twenty Mule Team Parkway.” Denise Scott Brown to Allan Boyar, July 17, 1970. The 
Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
300 The parking areas created a series of bulges in the otherwise narrow straight parkway. 
 
301 A series of sketches depict the specific spatial and visual organization of the billboards to the intended 
audience. From the point of view of the backseat, VRSB produced a triptych of approach (fig. 3.32-3.34). 
Starting miles away, the billboard is only a silhouette. Standing at a height of eighteen to twenty-two feet, 
the billboards towered over the small grove of trees, competing only with the strip of electrical poles 
running along the opposite side of the road, and Galileo Hill in the distance. Moving closer, the outline of 
the billboard following the edge of the flower image and its content come into focus. Closer still, from 
behind the windshield, the flower disappears from view. However, a sign located lower on the stem of the 
billboard can now be registered. Unlike the flower topping the billboard, the lower sign served up text-
based cues for salesmen, describing the history of the area, particularly as a path for the transport of 
borax, and future development. 
 
302 “… customers arriving by buses and more distant parts and customers in the Vacation Program. 
These latter come for a two to three day period while they stay free of charge at the Holiday Inn.” Venturi 
and Rauch, Architects and Planners. Program for: Sales Office Building for Great Western Cities, Inc., 
California City, California. August 1, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the 
gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. Max Derbes encapsulated the kind of operation occurring: 
“Free barbeques, gaudy advertising, and the ‘Hollywood-type’ build-up get the people out, and the 
promoter does the rest.” See, Max Derbes, “Use, Development, or Speculation of Real Estate,” The 
Appraisal Journal 32, no. 2 (1964): 219-229. 
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The dual-sign billboards were modeled on the kind that VRSB found and analyzed in 
Las Vegas. The “high-reader” sign was designed to be highly graphic to catch the eye 
from a distance, while the “low-reader” sign was designed to be informational (fig. 
3.35).303 The use of desert flower imagery for the high-reader of the billboard emerged 
early in the design process, and quickly displaced the possibility of depicting recent and 
future developments, like the recently completed Holiday Inn (fig. 3.37).304 According to 
VRSB, the use of local desert flowers was chosen for its innocuous and popular 
appeal.305 VRSB noted that the high-reader should be “non-commercial”: “We think 
everyone likes flowers (like motherhood) – even us.”306 
 
                                               
303 This overall design emerged early in the design process, however the details of the design evolved in 
not insignificant ways. The first issue involved the directionality of the billboard. Aforementioned, the 
billboards were located only on the side of the road leaving downtown California City heading further into 
the empty desert. They broadcast information only on the way out of town, indicating perhaps that sales 
may have been closed even before the return trip to downtown and the sales office. Bill White suggested 
early on that perhaps the rear side of the billboards should be deliberately left blank, with the structure 
exposed to make potential buyers more curious to see the front. Although VRSB eventually dissuaded 
White of this design, and ultimately replicated the desert flower image on both sides, an early sketch 
illustrates how VRSB played with the idea of calling attention to the fact that they were appropriating 
commercial tactics. On the back of a paper placemat from the restaurant in the local Holiday Inn, VRSB 
sketched the backside of a billboard with the text “Don’t Go Home” (fig. 3.36). The awkward disconnect 
between the edge of the rear oval sign and the jagged front sign were ultimately reconciled by replicating 
the same image on both sides. See, William White, Jr. to Tim Wirth, August 3, 1971. The Architectural 
Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
304 “For the Twenty Mule Team Parkway signs: as many illustrations as you can find in your files, in 
promotional literature, in postcards, and taken by your own camera, of each of the following: the Holiday 
Inn, the Merbisc domed building, theme pavilion, new golf club, the waterfall, the apartments and the City 
Building there; the garden center, the shopping center, air views of the town and any other elements in 
the landscape that look impressive. Also the airport? Also Galileo Hill buildings.” Robert Venturi to Phil 
Gray, July 30, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
305 VRSB chose local flowers from a book recommended by a local California City resident, Vera 
Bullington (fig. 3.38). Robert Lemmon and Charles Johnson, Wildflowers of North America (New York: 
Hanover House, 1961). 
 
306 Denise Scott Brown to Allan Boyar, July 17, 1970. The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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The use of local desert flowers for the upper sign on the billboards promoted the natural 
desert environment. The outline of the sign followed the edge of the flower graphic, 
making the final iteration appear like a gigantic artificial flower.307 The design highlighted 
the beauty of the desert, shifting the popular image of the desert as an empty wasteland 
by focusing on naturally occurring growth. Directed at current investors and residents, 
the billboards promoted the existing desert environment in an attempt to dissuade 
residents from trying to remake the desert into a lush suburban landscape. The billboard 
project wasn’t merely an abandonment of the shed for the sign. The large flower signs 
mediated the social/built environment and the land. They communed a social order 
centered on the beauty and conservation of the desert environment that would influence 
physical development by current and future landowners.308  
 
James Carey articulated an alternative definition of communication as the making of 
community. Drawing on the work of John Dewey, Carey asserted that there is a second, 
older, and lesser-known, definition of communication. Communication as defined is not 
linked to terms like “transmitting” or “sending” but to terms like “sharing” and 
“fellowship”. “A ritual view of communication is directed not toward the extension of 
                                               
307 Early versions depicted images on circular disks (fig. 3.39). 
 
308 While Mendelsohn, and continued by White, saw California City as the next Los Angeles, that would 
attract city-dwellers after Los Angeles reached capacity, Venturi recognized that California City had 
actually been attracting those residents who were overwhelmed by Los Angeles and wanted a more open 
and more free environment. The assessment of the individualist types moving to California City underpins 
VRSB’s own designs operating as a media environment to commune a collective social environment 
centered on the conservation of the desert environment. Venturi: “A en juger par leurs maisons et leur 
paysage, ses habitants sont des individualists et non de ces jeunes citadins dans le vent…” “Venturi and 
Rauch,” L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, no. 159 (1971-1972): 84-104. “… the individual and his needs 
should be emphasized over that of the group in California City…” Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown 
to GWC and Cal City Planning Commission, June 11, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of 
imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs.”309 Where the dominant 
view of communication involves spreading information, this minor view of 
communication involves communal gathering. Unlike the early attempts to cultivate 
community by Smith and Williams through the fabrication of communal and civic 
facilities, VRSB’s designs, and specifically the billboard project, can be understood as 
proposing to cultivate community through the shared appreciation and conservation of 
the natural beauty of the desert environment.  
 
Aforementioned, the primary, high reader signs on the billboards shifted early on from 
images of current and future development to images of local desert flowers. What 
appeared to be an eye-catching graphic was actually a representation around which the 
investors and residents of California City could commune, a shared belief in the desert’s 
beauty and conservation. “This projection of community ideals and their embodiment in 
material form – dance, plays, architecture, news stories, strings of speech – creates an 
artificial though nonetheless real symbolic order that operates to provide not information 
but confirmation… to represent an underlying order of things… to manifest an ongoing 
and fragile social process.”310 The abandonment of representation of future architectural 
development in favor of the existing natural environment constitutes exactly that which 
Carey described; the billboard did not provide information so much as promote an 
existing, but unseen, order around which community could coalesce. The billboards 
                                               
309 James Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (New York: Routledge, 1989). 
 
310 James Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (New York: Routledge, 1989). 
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proposed a collectivizing discourse of desert beauty and conservation, mediating 
between development and the land.  
 
The billboards, however, did more than just mediate and represent the natural 
environment, they created the natural environment. Contrary to “common sense and 
scientific realism,” Carey claims, there is not “first, a real world of objects, events, and 
processes” and second, the “language and symbols that name these events in the real 
world and create more or less adequate descriptions of them.”311 Carey articulated that 
reality is not given, but constructed by “terministic systems” that highlight, or promote, 
certain aspects or pieces of the extant environment. The flower billboards proposed to 
simplify and clarify the desert, displacing the narrative of the desert as a vacuous 
wasteland to be transformed through architecture; instead, architecture was mobilized 
to highlight and conserve the existing desert environment. By bringing local flowers to 
the foreground, the billboards proposed not merely to represent, but constitute a new 
reality. With the billboard project, architecture mediated the social and the natural 
through the rhetoric of conservation. What brings the natural and the social together is 
the idea that they can both be managed through and by architecture.  
 
Beyond the form, the primary representation of the billboards demonstrates that design 
itself, like research, became a shuffling, compiling, and testing of images. Collaging cut-
out photographs of flowers onto their drawings, Venturi and Scott Brown effectively blur 
the image of the desert with the image of speculative architecture (fig. 3.35). The 
                                               
311 James Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (New York: Routledge, 1989). 
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distinction between the photographic view down the road and the drawn perspective 
down the road was bridged.  
 
“General Planning”312 
Although the relationship between VRSB and Great Western United lasted a total of just 
fifteen months, the architects’ role quickly shifted beyond design, beyond even master 
planning, to information management and corporate restructuring.313 Scott Brown 
advocated early on for the planner operating alongside the architect. Specifically, she 
argued for a new deadpan approach to planning. Judgment, and by extension design, 
was to be deferred in favor of the documentation and analysis of the “pattern in the 
sprawl, [the] order in the chaos.”314 Redefining planning as data collection and 
management may have foreclosed physical development, but broadened the scope of 
architect. The methods of generating knowledge and data about the built environment 
developed in the academy were translated to the corporation, exemplifying Lyotard’s 
assertion that postmodern knowledge will increasingly assume the form of value.315 But 
                                               
312 Denise Scott Brown to Cal City Planning Commission, June 11, 1971. The Architectural Archives, 
University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
313 “This proposal would emphasize middle-range planning as a basis for day-to-day decision making but 
would include such long term planning as seems advisable in the context of the Planning Commission’s 
desire to update the General Plan; also recommendations for consultant services and discussion of 
design controls.” Robert Venturi to William White, Jr., May 24, 1971. The Architectural Archives, 
University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
314 Denise Scott Brown, “On Pop Art, Permissiveness, and Planning,” Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners 35, no. 3 (1969): 184-186. 
 
315 “The relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is 
now tending, and will increasingly tend, to assume the form already taken by the relationship of 
commodity producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume – that is, the form 
of value.” Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984). 
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beyond the idea that knowledge enters into commodity exchange, Scott Brown’s 
approach to planning at California City recognized the central concern of postmodern 
knowledge, the “capacity to actualize the relevant data… and to organize that data into 
an efficient strategy.”316 As outlined by Scott Brown in a report to Great Western Cities 
and the California City Planning Commission, general planning included development 
and financial strategies, the allocation of resources, the hiring of consultants, and the 
organization of the planning process. Scott Brown summarized it concisely as “planning 
the planning”.317 The report reiterated the need for better information flow that had been 
first expressed several months beforehand and explained the need for such flow. As 
early as February, Rauch wrote to Allan Boyar, a senior executive in the corporation 
close to White:  
“We feel, however, an increasing difficulty in checking the validity of that 
scheme, and therefore of our advice based upon it, in the absence of a 
more comprehensive and regular flow of information. We need to know 
more about day to day developments in California City… If an ongoing 
information flow could be established and maintained we would feel much 
closer to your overall thinking, as it is re-shaped by feed-backs from your 
actions.”318  
                                               
316 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984). 
 
317 Denise Scott Brown to Cal City Planning Commission, June 11, 1971. The Architectural Archives, 
University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
318 John Rauch to Allan Boyar, February 23, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania 
by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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The report, in the context of Rauch’s letter, signaled two things: first, the abandonment 
of the design of buildings in favor of a larger planning role that involved the oversight 
and review of design, development, and implementation; and second, a focus on the 
flow of information within the organization and their position within it. Ultimately, VRSB 
attempted to leverage their position to manage and change the corporation.319  
 
The importance of information flow was explicit in Scott Brown’s report. After defining 
general planning, she outlined the need for coordination “between California City, 
Denver and Philadelphia.” Under the headline of “Data and Planning Information,” Scott 
Brown wrote:  
“Eventually California City will need the extensive data that are found in 
the files of any city planning agency: information on regional demographic 
trends, census analyses, highway department statistics, plans of 
neighboring communities, information on governmental programs, 
industrial and economic survey, hydrological and soil reports, as well as 
the plans and reports of its own staff and their consultants – maintained in 
a usable way, some acquired first hand through surveys or the hiring of 
consultants, the rest through previously published sources.”320  
                                               
319 “Denise asked me to remind you of two items, previously requested, which would be helpful to us 
when they are available. These are a graphic planning organization chart including the Design Team, the 
City and the Development Company and a timed implementation chart.” John Rauch to Tim Wirth, August 
13, 1971. 
 
320 Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown to GWC and Cal City Planning Commission, June 11, 1971. 
The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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Venturi articulated some of the additional surveys suggested by Scott Brown that VRSB 
had already written into their budget and were ready to perform: “Transportation, 
marketing and ecological studies are important components of middle-range planning… 
We would need an extensive photographic survey of urban design elements as they are 
in California City today” (fig. 3.40-3.44).321 
 
Scott Brown went on to suggest the need for a new “director for planning,” whose 
description fairly transparently matched herself: “Given the organizational spread of 
planning activities and data for the city, it might be desirable… to choose one whose 
strength lies in the data gathering and analytical aspects of urban planning, who could 
bring together a city information system.”322 Behind building design, behind urban 
design, behind even planning, lay the organization of information. Recalling Lyotard’s 
conception of a world of perfect information, Scott Brown admitted that most, if not all of 
the information already existed, yet remained isolated and disparate, on desks or in 
minds. Scott Brown focused instead on the relationship between the agents in the 
corporation and their counterparts in the city, in order that information might flow and 
synthesize to enable city planning, urban design, and ultimately buildings. According to 
Lyotard, postmodern knowledge involves “arranging the data in a new way… This new 
arrangement is usually achieved by connecting together series of data that were 
previously held to be independent. This capacity to articulate what used to be separate 
                                               
321 Robert Venturi to Tim Wirth, August 11, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania 
by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
322 Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown to GWC and Cal City Planning Commission, June 11, 1971. 
The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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can be called imagination.”323 Imagination, as opposed to creativity, “is the means by 
which images/ideas are arranged and classified.”324 Redefining architecture not as a 
creative act, but as an act of imagination, while Venturi imaged the environment, Scott 
Brown consolidated and arranged those, and other extant images. It is not surprising 
then that as Scott Brown focused on information flow, the possibility of a building as a 
creative product moved out of reach.325 The “city information system” to which Scott 
Brown referred, recalls the idea of a “media ecosystem.” Transposing the concept from 
biology, Robert Logan defined it as a “system consisting of human beings and the 
communications media and technology through which they interact and communicate 
with each other.”326 At California City, architecture shifted from design to research to 
information management. While the lasting legacy may be their “learning from” modus 
operandi, VRSB’s work with Great Western United was not merely the interest and/or 
resignation to research but an attempt to control and optimize the flow of information, 
the corporation’s operations, and ultimately physical development.327 
                                               
323 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984). 
 
324 Sylvia Lavin discusses Quatremère de Quincy’s definition of imagination. See, Sylvia Lavin, “Oh My 
Aching Antenna: The Fall and Rise of Postmodern Creativity,” Log, no. 37 (2016). 
 
325 It is not without irony that while Scott Brown engaged in information management, Venturi publicly 
remarked that California City did not need research or management, but built architecture: “Il s’agit là 
d’une énorme surcapacité pour la population actuelle… Deborah Sussman a desiné un ensemble 
d’affiches miniatures qui, à l’entrée du centre commercial, ploclament: ‘California City: Observez notre 
croissance’. Un grand panneau illustré, dessiné par Konrad Wachsmann est installé sur l’emplacement 
du future centre civique, remplace practiquement ce centre. La plupart de ces panneaux ont été conçus 
avec verve et talent, mais conduit le nouveau propriétaire à faire appel à nous, pour aider à transformer 
ces panneaux en réalité.” “Venturi and Rauch,” L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, no. 159 (1971-1972): 84-104. 
 
326 Robert Logan, Understanding New Media: Extending Marshall McLuhan (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 2010). 
 
327 Beatriz Colomina, “Mourning the Suburbs: Learning from Levittown,” Public: Art, Culture, Ideas, no. 43 
(2011): 86-97.  
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Conglomerates and the Acquisition Model 
The shift in architectural practice from design to information management paralleled a 
shift in the relationship between VSRB and White.328 In less than a year, VRSB were 
absorbed into the corporate structure as employees of a new Department of Planning 
and Design. VRSB became part of the corporate headquarters, under the direct 
supervision of White, and began to operate beyond their original charge.   
 
Born in 1940, William White, Jr. was the fourth generation of a prominent Midwestern 
banking family. The meteoric rise of Bill White as CEO and business tycoon, however, 
began in 1965 when he leveraged $100,000 of his own money to take control of the 
Colorado Milling and Elevator company.329 He proceeded to acquire the Great Western 
Sugar Company, and by 1968, at the age of twenty-eight, formed the conglomerate 
Great Western United, a holding company with increasingly diversified interests. White 
transitioned the company away from the production of raw commodities toward 
consumer-oriented businesses with the acquisition of Shakey’s Pizza. White remarked 
in 1969: “We are now a marketing company with emphasis on creating new products 
and services to sell in new ways.”330 By the end of 1968, the company recorded nearly a 
                                               
328 Even as Rauch sought out California licensure. “I have requested the necessary application forms 
through NCARB for California registration; I hope the process can be completed quickly.” John Rauch to 
Allan Boyar, June 29, 1970. “Rauch Reported that he will be in Los Angeles on September 25 for an oral 
interview with the Registration Board.” Minutes of Meeting California City, August 28, 1970, 
225.11.A.7013.01, The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
329 He also took out close to $700,000 in loans. “A High Flier Comes Back With a Thud.” Businessweek, 
July 25, 1970. 
 
330 “Great Western United.” Investor’s Reader 52, no. 12 (1969): 14-18. 
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quarter of a billion dollars in revenue, but the energetic and rarely satisfied White 
continued to search for other high-growth areas.331 Following the acquisition of an 
artificial Christmas tree company, White turned toward the California City Development 
Company.332  
 
It is not insignificant that White looked to a real estate development company to aid the 
transition of Great Western United from commodities to marketing; but more 
importantly, it implied that White approached California City not as a development 
operation, but a marketing operation. Unlike flour, sugar or pizza, land is not produced, 
distributed, and consumed. White understood California City Development Company as 
engaging in the creation of a market for desert land.333 The emphasis on marketing, and 
the abandonment of physical development, was reiterated by White in articulating the 
kind of dollar they were interested in attracting. “Our unified plan of action is to 
concentrate in areas dealing with the consumer’s discretionary dollar.”334 White’s 
approach to the acquired land holdings at California City was to package and sell it as a 
                                               
331 “The temper of those times was captures in a brief exchange in late 1968 between Mr. White and Max 
Ehrlich, then secretary of Great Western United. Mr. Ehrlich had drafted an interim report to shareholders 
in which he noted that the company, after its fast-paced acquisition spree, looked forward to a period of 
‘more disciplined growth.’ Mr. Ehrlich says he showed the draft to Mr. White for the latter’s approval, and 
the young executive asked, ‘What the hell does that mean?’” Eric Morgenthaler, “Sic Transit Gloria: Life 
as a Tycoon Was Exciting for Bill White – As Long as it Lasted.” Wall Street Journal, September 18, 1972. 
 
332 While Venturi, Scott Brown, and thirteen graduate students journeyed across the country to investigate 
Las Vegas, White was performing his own investigation of the California City Development Company. The 
architects would gather material for the basis of their seminal book, Learning from Las Vegas. The CEO 
would acquire the real estate company and its three developments. 
 
333 While Nathan Mendelsohn may have also been interested in selling land, he encouraged and engaged 
in physical development at the same time as a means to realize the speculative value of the otherwise 
valueless desert with little to no resources. 
 
334 “Great Western United.” Investor’s Reader 52, no. 12 (1969): 14-18. 
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discretionary investment.335 It is not inconceivable that VRSB’s recent analysis of Las 
Vegas, a city built upon the discretionary dollar, attracted White to the firm.  
 
The acquisition of the California City Development Company by Great Western United 
prompted changes not just to the operation on the ground in California City, but also to 
the structure and management of the corporation. Although conglomerates with wide-
ranging business interests are so common as to be ubiquitous today, Great Western 
United constituted one of the earliest examples.336 The shift from a singular business to 
multiple subsidiaries facilitated, even necessitated, a new type of management. 
Specifically, family management was replaced with free-form management. The former 
is characterized by vertical integration with an “indispensable man” at the top whose 
singular vision drives the company. Control is centralized, and as a result, 
communication is largely private, limited, and unidirectional. Family management 
describes the operation of the California City Development Company under its founder, 
Nat Mendelsohn.337 Comparatively, free-form management is characterized by 
horizontal integration; hierarchy is largely eschewed. Control is dispersed, giving greater 
freedom to the managers of different divisions and subsidiaries within the corporation 
with the understanding that the President or CEO has, at best, limited knowledge of 
                                               
335 The financial industry had already arrived at the idea of speculative land as discretionary. 
“Economically, speculative land is a luxury commodity. When economic conditions are not optimistic, 
speculative buying becomes dormant.” Max Derbes, “Use, Development, or Speculation of Real Estate,” 
The Appraisal Journal 32, no. 2 (1964): 219-229.  
 
336 Alongside companies including Boise Cascade and Litton Industries. Harold Koontz, Cyril O’Donnell, 
Heinz Weihrich. Eighth Edition Management (London: McGraw-Hill International Book Company, 1984). 
 
337 However much the scale of the operation under Mendelsohn involved hundreds of employees spread 
across the world, it was largely on Mendelsohn himself that the company flourished, as evidenced by his 
presence in the town as much as in the advertising. 
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each of the businesses.338 White advocated for and practiced free-form management, 
giving those below him tremendous latitude while growing the company much more 
quickly through acquisition.339 In terms of profitability, the California City Development 
Company experienced a much higher rate of return than the commodities businesses 
that made up the core of Great Western United, further explaining White’s interest in the 
company.340 
 
Despite being hired to work on California City under the new Great Western United 
subsidiary, Great Western Cities, Inc., VRSB had direct access to White, a result of the 
flattened organization of the firm. Although their relationship might be described initially 
as that of architect and client, it quickly became more complex and integrated. Evidence 
of VRSB’s absorption and expanded role in the corporation came just a few months 
after they were initially hired, when plans for a new commercial development emerged, 
the Aspen Mall. The designer was William Rudolph, a Pasadena-based architect. It was 
being developed by Great Western Cities, despite hiring VRSB several months earlier. 
Venturi noted to himself in preparation for a meeting with Great Western Cities in 
October: “Why aren’t we doing the new comm area? Seems that GWC is still the 
                                               
338 A profile on White articulated his approach to his company, “giving opportunity and responsibility to 
young, creative people and letting them ‘do their own thing.’” “William White, Jr. Compound Interests,” 
Businessweek, July 25, 1970. 
 
339 John J. Pascucci, “The Emergence of Free-Form Management.” Personnel Administration 31, (1968): 
33-41.  
 
340 For the fiscal year of 1968, just before Great Western United acquired the California City Development 
Company and renamed it Great Western Cities, Inc., profits from California City were approximately six 
million on revenue of just thirty million. By comparison, profits for Great Western United were 
approximately eight million on revenue of more than 250 million. See, “Great Western United Agrees to 
Buy Concern That Builds ‘New Cities’.” Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1968. 
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developer. Main corner of Randsburg-Mojave will have a gas station on it. Is this good? 
Is it good if we’re not the architect controlling it?” Aside from his concern about not 
being the architect of a project being developed by Great Western Cities, despite 
already being commissioned to design an unspecified number of projects, Venturi was 
dismayed by the possibility of poor design. But more interesting, and an indication of his 
and Scott Brown’s shifting role in the corporation, is what he noted next: “Should there 
be a lease arrangement for that site rather than a sale because of its future value?”341 
Moving beyond the possibility of poor design, Venturi focused on how architecture 
contributed to the inflation of value. And while Venturi was speculating about the 
financial strategies, Scott Brown was meeting with Bill Wheaton, the dean of the 
Berkeley School of Environmental Design, to learn how to generate immediate cash 
flow on land while allowing for its long-term reversion.342 The shift from design to 
investment strategies marked a new expanded role for VRSB that would become more 
explicit a few months later.  
 
California City began as a highly centralized operation, both organizationally and 
geographically, confined primarily to Nat Mendelsohn and the boundaries of his desert 
property. The spread of sales offices across the country anticipated its eventual 
absorption into a national conglomerate, with power wielded from corporate 
headquarters in Denver and architects/planners in Philadelphia. Shifts in geography 
                                               
341 Notes for Great Western Cities, October19, 1970, 225.11.A.7013.13, The Architectural Archives, 
University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
342 Notes, August 27, 1970, 225.11.A.7013.13, The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by 
the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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necessitated a new form of communication. In this way, Scott Brown responded, in part, 
to the “free-form” management style instituted by White. The horizontal organization of 
the company, and its preference to grow through acquisition, placed significant 
importance on channels of communication.343 Implicit in the acquisition mode of growth 
is not only a distribution of control but a distribution of knowledge. Isolated and unique 
knowledge bases are baked into the structure.344 
 
Simultaneous with VRSB’s report to the California City Planning Commission, Great 
Western Cities formed a new planning and design department. Although headed by Tim 
Wirth, an executive close to White, VRSB became de facto leaders, often coordinating 
directly with White.345 VRSB captured their position in the organization with a sketch of 
                                               
343 “Change comes faster through acquiring companies with special knowledge as a means of attaining 
profitability in a new field than in building from ‘scratch’.” John J. Pascucci, “The Emergence of Free-Form 
Management.” Personnel Administration 31, (1968): 33-41. 
 
344 In fact, the same acquisition model that allowed Great Western United to grow so rapidly was also the 
source of its eventual downfall, foreseen by Scott Brown in her report. Koontz, O’Donnell, and Weihrich, 
in their analysis of the emergence and short-life of free-form management wrote: “For example, during the 
1960s, the top managers of our fast-growing conglomerates… were looked on as developing a new kind 
of management that would change the world. But, as they ran into financial troubles in the 1970s, they 
found they had to retract much of the authority of the division and subsidiary operating managers and put 
tighter control in headquarters.” Great Western United suffered also, and in late 1971 consolidated all 
power in their corporate headquarters in Denver, in part a response to communication issues. Tim Wirth 
wrote: “Reflecting a variety of changes in the Company, with which you are familiar, and an increasingly 
competitive economic climate, earnings in the Company appear to be dropping off, over the short term.” 
Vice-president of finance for Great Western United in 1969 remarked that “White on many occasions 
asked the subsidiaries to limit their communications with the finance staff and repeatedly ignored our 
warnings that unless the company took positive steps to reduce its extravagant expenditures, profits 
would decline in fiscal 1970.” Harold Koontz, Cyril O’Donnell, Heinz Weihrich. Eighth Edition Management 
(London: McGraw-Hill International Book Company, 1984). Tim Wirth to Robert Venturi, October 8, 1971. 
The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. Richard Von Kaenel quoted in “A High Flier Comes Back With a Thud.” Businessweek, July 25, 
1970. 
 
345 Wirth outlined their role: “Denise and Bob Venturi are the leaders of the California City Design Team… 
Denise will work with the city council on the California City Master Plan and will work on the planning for 
Galileo Hill… Bob Venturi will do the architectural design for new structures.” Other members of the new 
planning and design department included Anthony Goldschmidt and Jack Chandler. Tim Wirth to Robert 
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the corporate structure (fig. 3.45). The department of planning and design was situated 
directly under White, alongside the departments of organization and planning, finance, 
sales, and development. The three real estate developments of California City, 
Colorado City, and Cochiti Lake in New Mexico, were below this upper-tier, illustrating 
how VRSB’s role was redefined and expanded beyond design and their original sites in 
California City. As employees in a new department directly under the CEO, Venturi and 
Scott Brown embraced their corporate role. Venturi’s confusion about a new 
development by Rudolph was counterbalanced by Scott Brown advising White about 
the hiring of new architects for a potential project in one of the company’s other 
developments, Colorado City, Colorado, including Robert Stern, Charles Moore & Tim 
Vreeland, Mark Ueland & Tony Junker, Lee Copeland & Ibrahim Jammal, and Allan 
Greenberg, Frank Schlesinger, and Louis Sauer.346 Venturi was explicit in his ambitions 
for his role: “… from setting up there new depts., we’re reorg the corp.”347  
 
The Sponsored Exhibition 
VSRB’s rise in the development company foreclosed the possibility of physical 
development. They were subject to, and reinforced, the very distinction between the 
university and the corporation they professed to collapse. What began as the potential 
                                               
Venturi, June 25, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
346 In a phone conversation, White even asked Scott Brown to consult on the selection of an architect for 
a possible development in Colorado City. “He doesn’t think Stern is a good idea, too small, new, 
inexperienced… I didn’t suggest us. He’s mad at Stern for suggesting himself. So I was glad I didn’t 
suggest us.” Telephone Message Report, July 29, 1971, 225.11.A.7013.01, The Architectural Archives, 
University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
347 Notes, July 26, 1971, 225.11.A.7013.13, The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the 
gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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of realizing several projects ranging in size from billboards to superblocks ended in an 
almost pre-determined cultural product, an exhibition, that yielded co-extensive, but 
distinct roles for the corporation and the architects, for money and for ideas.  
 
After more than a year producing designs, budgets, and phased planning for several 
projects and the town itself, no buildings were realized. The primary output became two 
exhibitions, first in California City, then in New York.348 Both were sponsored, the first in 
whole, the second in part, by the corporation. The divide they professed to bridge and 
collapse between theory and practice, not only remained but was reinforced. VRSB and 
GWU aligned in their mutual focus on images over physical building, leading perhaps 
inevitably to the insightful and apt title for a comprehensive article on VRSB’s designs 
for California City published in Architectural Record: “Images for a New California 
City”.349 The article and particularly the exhibitions became a culmination and 
representation of a narrow and delimited relationship between VRSB and GWU that 
maintained a distinction between the former as cultural producer and the latter as 
corporate patron.350  
 
                                               
348 “Venturi and Rauch,” L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, no. 159 (1971-1972): 84-104. 
 
349 Robert Jensen, “Images for a New California City,” Architectural Record 149, no. 7 (1971): 117-120. 
 
350 When the corporation cut ties with VRSB, they implied that the funding was akin to patronage. “… we 
have been in a significant period of belt-tightening, with hard review directed in particular at all expense 
items for the current fiscal year which cannot be capitalized or spread over the cost of sales.” Tim Wirth to 
Robert Venturi, October 8, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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The fallout between Mendelsohn and White, combined with new geographic distance, 
had implications for the relationship between the development company and the town. 
Under Mendelsohn, there had remained a relatively blurry distinction, following 
incorporation, between the democratically-elected mayor and city council and the 
development company, where interests largely aligned. There was, however, increasing 
strain on that relationship, as Mendelsohn pushed for more public bonds to support 
development efforts, particularly after the California City Development Company was 
absorbed into Great Western United. Beyond the financial circumstances and the town’s 
growing debt, White represented an outsider in relation to Mendelsohn who, despite 
living in Los Angeles, was highly present in the town. White, by contrast, represented a 
national conglomerate based in Colorado. Contributing even more to the outsider image 
of Great Western United was the replacement of locally-based architects including both 
Smith and Williams, Wachsmann, and Deborah Sussman, with Philadelphia-based 
VRSB. All that is to say, California City residents began to assert their power as an 
incorporated town.  
 
Acutely aware of the strained relationship with the town, the corporation asked VRSB to 
design and install an exhibition of their work in the lobby of the local Holiday Inn.351 
Targeting the existing residents of the town, the promotional and informational exhibition 
included biographical information and images of VRSB, images of their past work, and 
                                               
351 Prior to the Holiday Inn installation, Great Western Cities also asked VRSB to provide work images 
and biographical information on the firm to publish an article in the California City Sun. Ralph Taylor to 
Venturi & Rauch, July 6, 1970. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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images of their proposed designs for California City.352 The inclusion of previous work 
and biographical information redefined the exhibition as a public relations campaign. 
That tactic failed, and ultimately Great Western United was forced to cut ties with VRSB. 
In a letter to the firm, Tim Wirth wrote, “it is increasingly clear that the fit between 
Venturi and Rauch and California City simply is not there… For some reason, the 
problem, which we as a company have tried to solve in any number of ways, simply 
seems to be their perception of an Eastern firm, and their feeling that this firm is 
somehow alien to their community and their way of life.”353 
 
However, prior to cutting ties, as one his last acts as CEO, White sponsored an 
exhibition of VRSB at the Whitney Museum of American Art.354 Exhibited just two 
months after their Holiday Inn installation, the retrospective show at the Whitney closely 
paralleled the earlier version.355 The three-sided triangular billboard installed in the 
Whitney was celebrated by White (fig. 3.46). He expressed his disappointment in the 
                                               
352 “As I requested, I would like you to supply me with some colour photographs and biographical 
information on yourself, Bob Venturi and John Rauch. I would also like some colour photographs and 
information on projects each of you has worked on elsewhere in the past – possibly what you may 
consider to be your most important works. In addition, I would appreciate receiving any architectural 
renderings or photographs of models which you have designed for California City, and maybe a 
statement from you about your work.” Maureen Harris-Taylor to Denise Scott Brown, August 13, 1971. 
The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
 
353 Tim Wirth to Robert Venturi, October 8, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania 
by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
354 White’s last act as client for VRSB was also his last act as CEO of Great Western United. At the age of 
32, just four years after his meteoric rise, White was ousted by his own board for his extravagant 
expenditures and his over-leveraging of the corporation in acquiring companies that didn’t return on the 
investment, including the California City Development Company. 
 
355 No documentation of the installation at California City exists, save for a description of its intended 
content. 
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end of their business relationship and his satisfaction in the exhibition: “I share in full 
measure your disappointment at the necessity of winding down our California City 
activities… I am enormously pleased and gratified with the show at the Whitney, 
particularly as it has apparently brought you deserved recognition.”356 In fact, White may 
have done more than just sponsor the exhibition at the Whitney. As a member of the 
board of directors, for which he provided “youth”, White may have been responsible for 
the exhibition. An article published in 1969 on prominent New York museum boards, 
including the Whitney, revealed the compromised autonomy of curators and directors in 
the face of strong-willed trustees. Summed up by one curator at the Metropolitan 
Museum: “A good trustee is one who asks, ‘What do you need?’ and then goes out and 
finds it. All the trustees I’ve ever met say, ‘Here’s what I’ve got. Do you want it?’”357 
White’s forceful hand is revealed in part in a letter he received from the director, who 
was surprised to learn that the exhibition would include designs for California City.358 
And even more explicitly in a letter from Venturi to White: “And again, our thanks for 
your crucial help in making the Whitney Exhibit possible.”359 
 
                                               
356 William White, Jr. to Robert Venturi, November 2, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
357 Sophy Burnham, “The Manhattan Arrangement of Art and Money,” New York Magazine, December 8, 
1969. 
 
358 “I understand that the exhibition will include the California City designs, which should be of great 
interest to people in the East. Again my best thanks for your own help in making this exciting exhibition 
possible.” Director to White, May 10, 1971. 
 
359 Robert Venturi to William White, Jr., October 20, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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The successive exhibitions of material about the firm, their work, and their designs for 
California City, funded by the same individual, but destined for two very different 
locations and institutional contexts, reveals the interdependency of architectural 
speculation by architects firmly installed in the academy and its use in a massive 
marketing operation for a national conglomerate to generate millions in speculative 
capital. But further, implicit in White’s gratification of VRSB’s recognition in the cultural 
realm through their museum installation, is the understanding that White was operating 
as a cultural patron. The financial generosity of supporting VRSB, and VRSB’s own 
interest in signs and learning from commercial enterprise, resulted in the definition of 
their production as images installed in the gallery for cultural consumption. The project 
ended with exhibition, not building. 
 
The Ethics of Competition 
The hiring of VRSB following the purchase of the California City Development Company 
by Great Western United, and their combination of planning, architecture, and graphic 
design, produced mixed responses from all the previous design figures involved: Smith 
and Williams, Wachsmann, and Sussman, a graphic designer briefly employed in 1970. 
The news of VRSB’s involvement and designs circulated primarily through articles in 
popular magazines coincident with their exhibitions.360 It marked a change in the 
audience, function, and circulation of the imagery. Speculative designs by local figures, 
published in the local newspapers for the purposes of generating increased land sales 
became speculative designs by national figures, published in national magazines, 
                                               
360 Robert Jensen, “Images for a New California City,” Architectural Record 149, no. 7 (1971): 117-120. 
Cliff Ursula, “Are the Venturis Putting Us on?” Design and Environment, (1971): 52-59. 
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addressing the discipline. As VRSB attempted to collapse architectural theory with 
practice, the distinction between print outlets illustrates their continued separation. But 
beyond that, Wachsmann, who was still working on his own design for a new city hall 
with Mendelsohn when VRSB was hired by White to, knowingly, produce a design for 
the same project, went so far as to use the American Institute of Architects to allege an 
ethical breach. The situation reveals the ambiguous function and aim of VRSB’s design 
work in relation to Wachsmann’s work. What appeared to be an ethical breach, or 
confusion around the change in ownership, reflected a change in the nature of 
architectural practice that made advertising and the management of information more 
important than physical development.  
 
In 1969, the California City Development Company, along with all three of its 
developments – California City, Colorado City, and Cochiti Lake in New Mexico – was 
acquired by the emerging conglomerate, Great Western United (GWU), based out of 
Denver, Colorado. Mendelsohn became president of the new subsidiary, Great Western 
Cities. However, William White, Jr., the CEO of GWU, seeking to reinvigorate 
languishing sales at California City, reached out to Venturi and Rauch, Architects and 
Planners, to develop a new master plan and designs for several new buildings, 
including a new city hall. This came as news to Wachsmann in the summer of 1971, 
who was still working on his own city hall design and under the impression that it would 
be built. Browsing the latest issue of Design and Environment, Wachsmann found 
himself reading about a new city hall project for California City. The only problem, it 
wasn’t his design or his name on the project. Instead, the caption below a rendering of a 
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glimmering, “golden mirrored cube” credited Venturi and Rauch, Architects and 
Planners. Wachsmann immediately reached out to the mayor and city council of 
California City. The City Administrator stated that the “California City City Council has 
never retained the Venturi & Rauch firm in any capacity.”361 And further, the mayor 
relayed pieces from the meeting he had with both Great Western Cities and VRSB, 
where Venturi reportedly stated his design was a “much better proposal” and that the 
city should “ditch [Wachsmann’s] desert ship.”362  
 
In a letter to the mayor of California City, Wachsmann expressed his concern and 
dismay that his design had been supplanted. Asking for clarification and a letter of 
support from the mayor, Wachsmann moved to straighten the record for two possible 
outcomes: the possibility that his project may never be realized, and the possibility that 
VRSB’s design might be. He wrote: “… I have to consider the possibility that Venturi 
may not stop informing the public, in the form of exhibitions or lectures, about his work 
concerning his design for the California City Civic Center.” He only later addressed the 
possibility that the city might build another design instead of his, writing that Venturi, 
commissioned by Bill White, “attempted to sabotage my project by influencing citizens 
and Council Members of California to accept instead his design.”363  
 
                                               
361 Darwin M. Dennis (City Administrator) to Konrad Wachsmann, August 31, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann 
Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin.  
 
362 Konrad Wachsmann to James A. Riley, August 25, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der 
Künste, Berlin. 
 
363 Konrad Wachsmann to James A. Riley, August 25, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der 
Künste, Berlin. 
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Darwin Dennis, the city administrator, provided the clarification sought by Wachsmann. 
In a brief reply, Dennis stated that indeed an error had been made. After reviewing the 
magazine article, he confirmed that the city had not retained the services of VRSB.364 
The nature of Wachsmann’s outrage, however, is revealing of a shift in the role of the 
architect and the medium of architecture in the transition from Modernism to 
Postmodernism. The success of a new medium, writes Lisa Gitelman, relies on 
“blindness to the media technologies themselves in favor of attention to the phenomena, 
the content.”365 The reality of California City, utterly oblivious to Wachsmann as a 
professional architect committed to the Modernist ideology, was that architecture in the 
form of a building was not only unnecessary but irrelevant. For this development, 
perpetrated internationally through magazines and newspapers, architecture need only 
visualize the speculative investment as a fantastical image. That’s not to say that 
Wachsmann’s design didn’t circulate in print media, or that he was unaware of that fact. 
However, that his design circulated locally – primarily in the California City Sun – 
reinforced the understanding that his designs were being promoted as a means to 
generate funding for construction. Mendelsohn repeatedly affirmed this agenda, often 
pairing architectural representations with requests for support and funding. Wachsmann 
struggled with the coincident substitution of his design for VSB’s design with a shift from 
the local newspaper to national publications, self-consciously attentive to the change in 
medium and the implication that design was now circulated to generate not funding for 
                                               
364 Dennis wrote that the article “implied the California City City Council had retained the services of the 
Architectural Firm (sic) Venturi & Rauch to design a civic center – this is not correct. The California City 
City Council has never retained the Venturi & Rauch firm in any capacity.” Darwin Dennis to Konrad 
Wachsmann, August 31, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin. 
 
365 Lisa Gitelman, Always Already New: Media, History, and the Data of Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2006). 
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construction but wealth for the corporation. Wachsmann’s epistemological issue was 
lost on Venturi and Scott Brown, who blissfully overlooked, and even reinforced, the 
new format and its circulation. The separation of sign from shed facilitated production of 
premium content for architecture’s new relevance in corporate financial speculation. 
Further, where Wachsmann dedicated years in design development, producing 
meticulous drawings, full-scale mock-ups, machined parts, and construction 
specifications, Venturi and Scott Brown churned out schematic, rendered elevations and 
plans in a matter of weeks. But while Venturi and Scott Brown understood this new role 
of the architect as a kind of media consultant, they still believed it would lead to building, 
failing to grasp the implication that Wachsmann feared; physical development was no 
longer within reach. Wachsmann asked for a letter of support from the city that he might 
use “to protect [his] professional integrity against such an extraordinary unethical 
attempt to destroy my work.”366 Despite the fact that the building had still not been 
constructed, Wachsmann’s comments imply that the primary form of the building was as 
print and that to destroy the work was not to tear it down, or even to build something 
else, but to displace the speculative design with another, co-opting the title of “California 
City Civic Center.” 
 
Armed with his letter to the mayor, and the response from the city administrator, 
Wachsmann wrote to the editor of Design and Environment, demanding a retraction and 
                                               
366 Konrad Wachsmann to James A. Riley, August 25, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der 
Künste, Berlin. 
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correction in the next issue.367 Ann Ferebee, editor at Design & Environment, 
apologized and agreed to publish a correction that the “Venturis designed a California 
City office building with civic functions.”368 At the same time, however, he went one step 
further. In a letter addressed to Robertson Ward, FAIA, Wachsmann asked the AIA take 
action against Venturi for breaking AIA Document J330, “The Standards of Ethical 
Practice.”369 He included a copy of the code, highlighting three ethical responsibilities 
that he believed VRSB had breached:  
“An architect may make contributions of service or anything of value to 
those endeavors which he deems worthy, but not for the purpose of 
securing a commission or influencing his engagement or employment; An 
architect shall not attempt to obtain, offer to undertake or accept a 
commission for which he knows another legally qualified individual firm 
has been selected or employed, until he has evidence that the latter’s 
agreement has been terminated and he gives the latter written notice that 
he is so doing; An architect shall not offer his services in a design 
competition except as provided in the Competition Code of The American 
Institute of Architects.”370  
                                               
367 Konrad Wachsmann to Martin Fox (VP & Editorial Director, Design & Environment), September 3, 
1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, Berlin.  
 
368 Ann Ferebee to Konrad Wachsmann, September 21, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der 
Künste, Berlin. 
 
369 Konrad Wachsmann to Robertson Ward, September 3, 1971. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie 
der Künste, Berlin.  
 
370 American Institute of Architects, AIA Document J330: The Standards of Ethical Practice (Washington, 
D.C.: American Institute of Architects, 1970). 
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The article and the flurry of reactions point to the complex conditions that enabled both 
VRSB to ethically design a project already under development and Wachsmann to 
allege an ethical breach. A shift in architectural practice, around which the professional 
code of ethics was framed, produced unforeseen ramifications. The code of ethics as 
written were unclear for a situation in which services could be rendered and 
employment gained, but without yielding physical development. Further, for 
Wachsmann, the code of ethics was inadequate for protecting architecture destined to 
remain unbuilt.  
 
While the acquisition of the California City Development Company by a national 
conglomerate did not initially impact the city or Mendelsohn’s plans for it, it precipitated 
an internal struggle in which the image of architecture was both a visible manifestation 
of the struggle and a weapon wielded by both sides. The hiring of VRSB directly by 
White while Mendelsohn continued to exercise control and work with Wachsmann from 
within Great Western Cities, now a division of Great Western United, led perhaps 
inevitably to confusion and conflict. For a brief period in the fall of 1970, both 
Wachsmann and VRSB were commissioned for the same project at the same location 
by the same corporation. Beyond the contractual grey area, though, differing 
development goals and corresponding design discourses explain the unique situation. 
The technical models and drawings produced by Wachsmann, along with calculated 
budgets, specifications, and erection plans, demonstrate the aspiration to build, and that 
the representations produced were primarily in the service of future physical 
development. The scant model photographs, for public consumption, that did represent 
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the project as built rather than assist in its construction were used to secure funding. 
The fact that Wachsmann did not publish images of his project in architectural journals 
or magazines, and that Mendelsohn published images only in the locally circulated 
newspaper, the California City Sun, demonstrate that the images were not directed at 
the architectural community but primarily to current land owners and residents of 
California City. Over the course of design development, images were frequently 
contextualized with the need to issue a public bond to realize Wachsmann’s design.  
 
By contrast, the images generated by VRSB were conceptual and picturesque rather 
than technical, and published primarily in magazines directed toward the architecture 
and design community.371 Meanwhile, White walked back Mendelsohn’s earlier financial 
commitment, and even abandoned the campaign to convince the city to issue public 
bonds.372 In fact, while White ultimately refused to commit company resources to realize 
                                               
371 Even while Venturi noted that Denise was more interested in being published in Time Magazine or Life 
Magazine, the ultimate outlet for most of their work was through architectural journals primarily targeting 
architects. “A new comm[ercial development] must have places for mistakes to be made. Not over 
designed. Few ego of the middle ground Denise is seeking. As an architect getting one’s plaudits than 
getting in Time, Life is better than in Forum. Don’t care about archi[tects] but about the public.” Notes, 
July 26, 1971, 225.11.A.7013.13, The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
372 Wachsmann was immediately apprehensive about his new client. Unlike Mendelsohn, whom 
Wachsmann saw as a committed visionary, community-builder, and friend, White represented a national 
conglomerate of wide-ranging business interests that included sugar production, elevator manufacturing, 
and a pizza chain. Wachsmann’s concern though was not so much that the project wouldn’t be realized, 
but that he would lose the total control over the design which he had enjoyed up until that point. Writing to 
Mendelsohn upon learning about the acquisition of the California City Development Company by Great 
Western United, Wachsmann expressed his concern: “Since I am dealing now with a new organization, 
with which I essentially have no personal contact, I would appreciate it if on this proposed basis a legal 
contract could be drafted which honors my request and also guarantees that no interference from any 
side in regard to structural mechanical, architectural, interior design, or landscaping may be interposed, 
and that, as has been the case in the past, after consultation with the client any final decision rests in my 
hands.” It was precisely the vague brief, and Mendelsohn’s uncritical support that had initially enabled the 
project to shift from building commission to research endeavor. In Wachsmann’s eyes, the possibility that 
White might impose functional, spatial, and financial requirements on the project promised to wrench the 
project back into a straightforward building commission. Alongside his concern about losing control over 
the project, Wachsmann seemed particularly concerned that the acquisition constituted a shift from an 
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buildings, he sponsored VRSB’s retrospective at the Whitney Museum of American Art. 
The design production and corresponding circulation reveals that perhaps both White 
and VRSB had little intention of realizing physical building, and instead were engaged in 
image production relating a corporate sponsor with academic speculation. As such, 
VRSB’s projects may not have been understood as incompatible with Wachsmann’s city 
hall design. The latter produced a design for physical development unfortunately left on 
                                               
individual to a corporation. He wrote: “… as long as I recognized you as the sole president and decision-
making force in the California City Development Company, I had no valid reason to change the condition 
under which I was willing to do the work. But, as you know, I became quite alarmed when you informed 
me more than a year ago that you intended to merge your company, your very own creation, with another 
industrial, commercial, or banking group. At that moment, the basic idea about my participation appeared 
to me to have become highly irrational since the project now became a legitimate professional venture 
like any other, and therefore a new condition arose which should be respected in some new agreement 
which you, as you said, are willing to make with me.” The potential loss of control combined with the 
change in ownership from a private corporation to a publicly-traded one produced, according to 
Wachsmann, the end of the project as research. With the perceived end of his corporate-sponsored 
research, he recalibrated his own approach to the project as a building commission. As a result, he 
insisted on being compensated professionally as the architect of the project in addition to being 
retroactively compensated for his time already spent on the project. He had, for years, eschewed 
professional profit from the project, rather seeing funds flow into the university to support the Institute for 
Building Research and his graduate students. Citing the established guidelines published by the 
American Institute of Architects, Wachsmann claimed his “professional fee as the designer, including 
research, development, design, specifications, supervision, etc., would be 12 percent of the total cost of 
the building.” Wachsmann’s move to professionalize his relationship with the corporation prompted a 
response in kind. Collegial research was replaced with contentious correspondence about the fee amount 
and schedule. After asking for professional compensation, Great Western United responded in kind. “I 
have no objection to do this Konrad, however, I think possibly, we might get together and discuss the 
ultimate fee. Attached is a chart showing the A.I.A. recommended fee schedule and comparing it to the 
fees you requested there is a difference, you will note of approximately $12,000.” See, “Great Western 
United Agrees to Buy Concern That Builds ‘New Cities’,” Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1968. 
“California City Firm to be Acquired,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 1969. “California City Land 
Acquires New Owner,” Bakersfield Californian, May 24, 1969. Ernest A. Schonberger, “Shakey’s Owner 
Plans New Venture: Cities,” Los Angeles Times, September 19, 1968. “White Pledges Great Western 
Resources to Growth of City,” California City Sun 12, no. 1 (1969). “White Brings Midas Touch to 
California City,” California City Sun, February, 1969. “Civic Center Given 1969 Priority,” California City 
Sun 12, no. 1 (1969). “Stepped-Up Building Schedule Assured by Mendelsohn, White,” California City 
Sun 12, no. 3 (1969). “Millions for City Growth, C. of C. Told,” California City Sun 14, no. 7 (1971). Eric 
Morgenthaler, “Life as a Tycoon Was Exciting for Bill White – As Long as it Lasted,” Wall Street Journal, 
September 18, 1972. “William White, Jr. Compound Interests,” Businessweek, July 25, 1970. Konrad 
Wachsmann to N.K. Mendelsohn, March 12, 1970. Konrad Wachmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, 
Berlin. “2000 Attend Cal City Awards Meeting,” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1968. N.K. 
Mendelsohn to Konrad Wachsmann, undated, 1970. Konrad Wachsmann Archiv, Akademie der Künste, 
Berlin. 
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the drawing board; the former produced a speculative design for cultural consumption, 
destined for the gallery. 
 
Wachsmann wasn’t the only one to learn about, and be impacted by, the involvement of 
Venturi, Scott Brown, and Rauch. While Wachsmann was reading the latest issue of 
Design and Environment, Deborah Sussman was reading the latest issue of 
Architectural Record, where she learned not only about new building designs by 
Venturi, Scott Brown, and Rauch, but about their design for a set of billboards.373 Early 
in 1970, Deborah Sussman was hired by Great Western Cities to develop new graphics 
and signage for California City. That work culminated in a mock-up of different signage 
strategies installed on a small island along Randsburg-Mojave Boulevard (fig. 3.47). 
The tight collection of signs advertised local businesses, the development company, 
and more broadly the future of the city. The dense collection of signs resembled the Las 
Vegas Strip in compact miniature.374 Brightly colored graphics advertised generic stores 
and services including an apothecary, pharmacy, food market, home goods store, bank, 
movie theater, ice cream shop, and bowling alley.375 Interspersed were generic signs for 
the city and its future: “Watch Us Grow” and “More to Come”. Lastly, a small windmill 
completed the collection of objects.376  
                                               
373 Robert Jensen, “Images for a New California City,” Architectural Record 149, no. 7 (1971): 117-120. 
 
374 The signs were oriented both parallel and perpendicular to the flow of traffic. Designed as billboards of 
varying heights, many of the signs were wrapped around, concealing the structure. Many of the 
advertisements resembled thick signs elevated on posts, rather than surfaces hung off vertical structures. 
 
375 Only one sign advertised a specific business, the local Shakey’s Pizza, another division of Great 
Western United that was opened immediately following the acquisition of the California City Development 
Company. “Shakey’s Pizza Parlor and Fun in 1969,” California City Sun 12, no. 1 (1969). 
 
376 The installation collapsed representation, mock-up, and physical reality. Advertising for generic stores 
mingled with advertising for existing businesses. The scale of the signs was ambiguous; it is difficult to 
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Sussman’s work was abruptly suspended in August of 1970, just a few months after 
Venturi, Scott Brown, and Rauch were hired.377 She inquired about possible future work 
to Scott Brown in a letter after seeing the article in Architectural Record: “My office had 
already done a great deal of preliminary work on signing. Our thinking and attitudes 
paralleled yours… So it is with complex feeling that I saw the article in the current issue 
of Architectural Record. I wish we could have, or still can, communicate among 
ourselves about the project.”378 Upon arrival in California City, VRSB were quick to 
understand and revise Wachsmann’s proposed building as a representation on a 
billboard, a reading that reinforced their own interest in images. However, they failed to 
account for the numerous billboards already implemented by Sussman. Fresh off their 
trip to Las Vegas and the refinement of a discourse that separated and then vaunted the 
sign over the building, VRSB landed in California City only to be presented with their 
project already anchored into the ground.379  
                                               
definitively claim the installation as a temporary scaled-down mock-up or full-scale permanent billboard. 
The dense collection suggests a mock-up of possible options that might later be dispersed at large scale 
across the city. However, the prominent location along the central spine of the development, combined 
with landscaping and the installation of spotlights suggest a certain level of permanence. The ambiguity 
between representation and the real might be also be understood as an ambiguity between future 
speculation and present reality. While some signs projected things to come, others advertised extant 
businesses. 
 
377 Tim Wirth to Deborah Sussman, August 11, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
378 Deborah Sussman to Denise Scott Brown, June 23, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown.  
 
379 Even Community Facilities Planners resurfaced at the time of VRSB’s hiring. The acquisition of the 
development company and hiring of Venturi, Scott Brown, and Rauch, displaced the original master 
planners, Community Facilities Planners, of which Garrett Eckbo was a part. After reading about Venturi, 
Scott Brown, and Rauch’s involvement in the summer of 1971, Eckbo reached out to Great Western 
Cities seeking to restart master planning services. In a letter addressed to Tim Wirth, the director of the 
new Department of Planning and Design in the corporation, Francis Dean, partner with Garrett Eckbo in 
his new firm of Eckbo Dean Austin & Williams, relayed his appreciation of continued promotional material 
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The ethical implications of VRSB’s splash into California City reflects a larger 
disconnect of the two things they purported to collapse: architecture as a cultural 
practice and architecture as a capitalist enterprise. Beyond the nuanced responses of 
each previous participant in the California City operation, the involvement of both GWU 
and VRSB transformed the local into the national. Although the California City 
Development Company, by the time of its acquisition, was national and even 
international, the orchestrators of development and design – Mendelsohn, Smith & 
Williams, Wachsmann, and Sussman – were all well-established and present in the 
Southern California region.380 White and VRSB, by comparison, weren’t just new figures 
in the California City landscape, they were also foreigners to it. Further, VRSB’s 
collapse of planning, architecture, and signage was coincident with a widening, and 
ultimately unbridgeable, gulf between architectural design and physical development. 
VRSB integrated the previously distinct disciplines as images for circulation. Further, a 
more interwoven and blurred relationship of support and service between architectural 
experimentation and development/speculation was replaced by a more clearly defined 
relationship of corporate sponsorship of a cultural product.  
 
                                               
that showcased, and credited, master planning that had been developed by Community Facilities 
Planners. Curiously, though, Dean’s gratification appears to be tied to the fact that use of their planning is 
“advantageous” to the promotion of the town and the sale of land by the corporation. In the following 
paragraph, he expresses his firm’s interest in providing new planning services as necessary. See, Francis 
Dean to Tim Wirth, August 6, 1971. The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
380 Both Mendelsohn and Smith and Williams had offices in California City, evidence of their presence not 
just in the region, but in the town itself. See, “Williams, Smith Open California City Offices,” Independent 
Star News, September 18, 1960. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
 
 
Investigative journalist Marc Reisner cynically described the American West as 
unconquerable. Rather, he wrote, “one inhabits it like an occupying army and makes, at 
best, an uneasy truce with it.”381 For more than fifteen years, Mendelsohn constituted 
that army, seeking to transform California City both literally and representationally into 
the capital of a new empire of development. While California City was imaged as a 
boundless, empty stage for Mendelsohn’s unrestricted speculative gambit and 
expansionist fantasies of a new Los Angeles, Mendelsohn himself was imaged as the 
agent of a new kind of empire. Anecdotes abound of Mendelsohn climbing to the top of 
the one significant aberration in his otherwise flat property, a hill which he named 
Galileo Hill, upon which he would survey his perceptually endless property and imagine 
its transformation. At over 3,000 feet, the peak of Galileo Hill provides a 360-degree 
view of the surrounding desert. The development company actively encouraged the 
comparison between development and imperialist thought. In a recurring sales column 
in the Los Angeles Times, Fred Beck, the company’s public relations figure, wrote of a 
new addition to the development team: “One might wonder why a West Point man 
would wind up in the real estate business. The explanation is that our Mr. McMartin 
doesn’t think of this as the real estate business. There isn’t much open these days in 
the way of empire building, a career that would appeal to McMartin, but building a city is 
                                               
381 Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and its Disappearing Water (New York: Viking 
Press, 1986). 
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the next best thing.”382 And, at various points, Fred Beck compared Mendelsohn to 
President John F. Kennedy and George Washington, and California City to the United 
States.383 
 
The targeted dream of developing a new, progressive “city of tomorrow” ultimately 
became merely the first iteration on the national level, and a new urban model with 
claims of international implications. The “city of tomorrow” devised by Community 
Facilities Planners became a model for planning that was transposed to Colorado in the 
form of Colorado City.384 By 1968, Mendelsohn, asserting some level of achievement at 
California City, went so far as to claim he would develop similar recreation-themed cities 
in “each of the Western states and possibly Hawaii.”385 Further, not only was it heralded 
as a progressive and successful model of city planning by CFP and Mendelsohn, even 
in the planning stages, it was recognized by the architectural community with an Award 
of Merit by Sunset Magazine in 1962, and later by the United States House of 
Representatives in 1966.386 Thomas M. Rees, of California’s 26th congressional district, 
pointed to California City as the solution to “problems of urban congestion, 
                                               
382 Fred Beck, “In California City with Fred Beck,” Los Angeles Times, January 13, 1960. 
 
383 Fred Beck, “Fred Beck Advertising California City,” Los Angeles Times, January 13, 1960. See also, 
Fred Beck, “Fred Beck in California City,” Los Angeles Times, July 17, 1962. 
 
384 Outside the scope of this project.  
 
385 “Mendelsohn Plans More Western Cities of Tomorrow,” California City Sun 11, no. 8 (September 
1968): 1. 
 
386 “This new community being developed in the Mojave Desert, offers a choice of several varieties of 
single-family and multiple dwellings. Center of the community is a large area built around a lake, and 
offering a park, fishing, boating, golf, and other recreation. There are several innovations in lot and street 
layout in the residential area.” “1961-1962 Western Home Awards,” Sunset Magazine, no. 126 (June, 
1962).  
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neighborhood decay, the rigidity, [and] the lack of openness of the big city.”387 
Community Facilities Planners went so far as to claim, “California City is doing things 
other planners still are just talking about. In California City the rare opportunity exists to 
design a dynamic environment – California City has international implications.”388  
 
Ultimately, a series of investigations and state and federal charges at the start of the 
1970s pulled back the curtain on the whole operation, revealing the unsolvable problem 
of developing the desert: the lack of water. In 1972, falling profits and rising deficits led 
to the ousting of White as CEO of Great Western United.389 That same year, the FTC 
alleged fraud and misrepresentation, and obtained a consent order against the 
company to agree not to use deceptive practices. The order also included $4 million in 
cash refunds for buyers. Nevertheless, in 1973, two class-action suits were brought by 
landowners against Great Western Cities in the Los Angeles Superior Court alleging 
fraud and misrepresentation, seeking damages of nearly $750 million. Soon after, 
California City filed suit against GWC for delinquent property taxes in excess of 
$700,000. After the barrage of lawsuits in the early 1970s, and the inability to profitably 
spin-off California City, Great Western United was eventually dissolved entirely.  
 
                                               
387 Thomas M. Rees, “California City’s MERBISC,” Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of 
the 89th Congress 112, no. 177 (1966). 
 
388 Wayne Williams quoted in Gilbert Simon, “Desert City’s Dream Realized,” Los Angeles Mirror, October 
14, 1960. 
 
389 Eric Morgenthaler, “Sic Transit Gloria: Life as a Tycoon Was Exciting for Bill White – As Long as it 
Lasted.” Wall Street Journal, September 18, 1972. 
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In 1974, Great Western United and its subsidiaries were acquired by the real estate 
holding company Hunt International Resources Corporation. Despite attempts to settle 
the outstanding suits, even more were filed. In 1983, the Hunt family, facing more than 
3,200 suits filed by California City landowners, liquidated the developments. Silver 
Saddle Development Company acquired 30,000 acres in the remote northeast area of 
California City to develop a ranch and recreation club.390 
 
All that is to say, while an endless barrage of lawsuits may have revealed Mendelsohn’s 
original vision for what it was, a fantasy, it only created a vacuum for new fantasies to 
emerge. The latest attempt to develop California City by the Silver Saddle Ranch 
reveals that the impossibility of growth is still outpaced by persistent speculation. For 
the generations of landowners of California City, the legacy of Mendelsohn is less a new 
metropolis in the desert and more an unrelenting fantasy that continues to infect 
generations of speculators and developers.  
 
The population of California City has hovered under 14,000 for the last twenty years. 
Although far short of the projected half million, it does represent a significant amount of 
growth from the measly 1,200 in 1971 when Venturi and Scott Brown were hired. Much 
of the growth occurred at the turn of the century, due in large part to the construction of 
the largest privately-operated prison in the country. The Corrections Corporation of 
America, now called CoreCivic, operates dozens of facilities in twenty states. The 
                                               
390 David Kinchen, “Expansion Planned by Getaway in the Wide Open Spaces: Silver Saddle Ranch in 
California City Touts Freedom to Pursue Recreation in the Outdoors,” Los Angeles Times, April 28, 1985. 
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California City Correctional Center has 2,500 beds, and is currently near capacity. 
When the facility came online, it became the city’s largest employer, and caused a small 
spike in the population. But debates about the existence of private prisons aside, that 
architecture was finally realized as large-scale development in the service of captivity is 
not accidental. From 1958 until the early 1970s, California City was the site of large-
scale financial captivity. While investors remained spread across the world, tens of 
millions of dollars were trapped in a kind of financial quicksand in the Mojave Desert 
with a few symbolic half-measures to prevent its total loss, like the plastic sheet lining 
the bottom of the artificial lake. In fact, California City was premised on ever more 
investment from landowners, with Mendelsohn mobilizing a community services district 
to generate even more funding. The city was over seven million dollars in debt when 
Great Western United acquired the development company spread across the global 
investment community. That an architecture of captivity was built, while speculative 
designs of almost every other kind remained on the drawing board, is not coincidental. It 
would seem that financial captivity could only, inevitably, lead to literal captivity.  
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Figure 1.01: Community Facilities Planners, Master Plan, California City, 1961. “A Plan for the 
City of Tomorrow,” Los Angeles Examiner, January 22, 1961. 
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Figure 1.02: Community Facilities Planners, California City: Recreation “Wonder Land”, Date 
Unknown. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, 
University of California, Santa Barbara. 
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Figure 1.03: California City Development Company, Advertisement, Date Unknown. Courtesy 
The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise 
Scott Brown. 
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Figure 1.04: Opening Day, California City, 1958. American Heritage new Pictorial Encyclopedic 
Guide to the United States. New York: Dell Publishing, Co., Inc., 1965. 
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Figure 1.05: Community Facilities Planners, Master Plan, California City, 1958. Courtesy 
Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, University of California, 
Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.06: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Inter-Intra Space Diagram, 
California City, 1968. Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, “California City: A Planning 
Approach,” (Pasadena: Smith and Williams, 1968). Courtesy Architecture and Design 
Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.07: Stan Repp for Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Future Rendering of 
California City, 1961. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture 
Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.08: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Traffic Diagram – City, California 
City, 1968. Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, “California City: A Planning 
Approach,” (Pasadena: Smith and Williams, 1968). Courtesy Architecture and Design 
Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.09: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Traffic Diagram – Community, 
California City, 1968. Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, “California City: A Planning 
Approach,” (Pasadena: Smith and Williams, 1968). Courtesy Architecture and Design 
Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.10: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, “California City: A Planning 
Approach,” (Pasadena: Smith and Williams, 1968). Courtesy Architecture and Design 
Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.11: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, California City Recreation Club, 
1959. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 1.12: “Our Map,” California City Sun, January 15, 1963. 
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Figure 1.13: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, California City Recreation Club, 
1959. Courtesy California City Public Library, California City, CA.  
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Figure 1.14: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, California City Shopping Center, 
1959. Courtesy California City Public Library, California City, CA. 
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Figure 1.15: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, California City Sales Office, Date 
Unknown. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 1.16: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, California City Administration 
Offices (top right), 1968. California City Development Company, “California City: A Success 
Story” (California City: California City Development Company, 1968). Courtesy California City 
Public Library, California City, CA. 
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Figure 1.17: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, California City Shopping Center, 
Date Unknown. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture 
Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.18: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Marquee-Sign Layouts, California 
City Shopping Center, 1961. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & 
Architecture Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.19: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, California City Shopping Center, 
Data Unknown. Courtesy California City Public Library, California City, CA. 
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Figure 1.20: Community Facilities Planners, California City Central Park, Date Unknown. 
Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 1.21: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Congregational Church, California 
City, 1962. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, 
University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.22: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Congregational Church, California 
City, 1962. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, 
University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.23: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Congregational Church, California 
City, 1961. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, 
University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.24: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Central Lake Pavilion, California 
City, Date Unknown. Photograph by Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners. Courtesy The 
Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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Figure 1.25: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Golf Clubhouse, California City, 
1970. Photograph by Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners. Courtesy The Architectural 
Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 1.26: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Sports Recreation Building, 
California City, 1968. Photograph by Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners. Courtesy The 
Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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Figure 1.27: Land Investors Map, 1967. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, 
Design & Architecture Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.28: Stan Repp for Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Future Rendering of 
California City, 1961. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture 
Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 1.29: Post Card, California City, Date Unknown. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, 
University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Fig. 1.30: “Central Park Opens with a Splash.” California City Sun 5, no. 4 (1962).  
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Fig. 1.31: “Water, Water, Everywhere! – And Plenty to Drink.” California City Sun 1, no. 8 
(1965): 1. 
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Fig. 1.32: Aerial View, California City, Date Unknown. Courtesy California City Public Library, 
California City, CA. 
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Fig. 1.33: Allan Sekula. Portraits of Salespeople (detail). 1973. 
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Fig. 1.34: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Schematic House Types, Date 
Unknown. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture Museum, 
University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Fig. 1.35: Smith and Williams, Architects and Engineers, Typical of Lake Front Apartment 
Living, Date Unknown. Courtesy Architecture and Design Collection, Art, Design & Architecture 
Museum, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA. 
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Figure 2.01: Presentation of California City City Hall to California City Mayor and City Council, 
1967. “Professor Wachsmann Reveals City Hall Plans,” California City Press, January 4, 1967. 
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Figure 3.01: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, View of California City Civic Center, 
1971. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.02: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, First Phase of California City Civic 
Center, 1971. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.03: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Southwest Elevation of California City 
Civic Center, 1971. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift 
of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.04: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Southeast Elevation of California City 
Civic Center, 1971. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift 
of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.05: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, View Down 20 Mule Team Parkway to 
California City Civic Center, 1971. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.06: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of California City 
Civic Center, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift 
of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.07: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of California City 
Civic Center, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift 
of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.08: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of California City 
Civic Center, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift 
of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.09: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Elevation of Office Building, 1971. 
Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.10: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Preliminary Study for California City 
Civic Center, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift 
of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.11: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Ground Floor Plan of California City 
Civic Center, 1971. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift 
of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.12: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Later Phase of California City Civic 
Center, 1971. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.13: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, View of California City Civic Center, 
1971. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.14: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Planning and Transportation (SK-1), 
1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.15: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Planning and Transportation (SK-2), 
1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.16: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Planning and Transportation (SK-5), 
1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.17: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, New Commercial Center (SK-2), 
1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.18: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Elevation of MERBISC Mart, 1970. 
Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.19: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Phase 1 – Sketch Elevation, New 
Commercial Center, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by 
the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.20: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch Section of New 
Commercial Center, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by 
the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.21: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of New Commercial 
Center (5), 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.22: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of New Commercial 
Center (6), 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.23: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of New Commercial 
Center (7), 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.24: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, New Commercial Center (Stage 1), 
1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.25: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Section of New Commercial 
Center, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.26: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Section of New Commercial 
Center, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.27: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, New Commercial Center (Possible 
Stage 4), 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.28: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of 20 Mule Team 
Parkway, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.29: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of 20 Mule Team 
Parkway, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.30: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, 20 Mule Team Parkway (SK-1), 1970. 
Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.31: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, 20 Mule Team Parkway (SK-2), 1970. 
Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.32: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, 20 Mule Team Parkway (SK-7), 1970. 
Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.33: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, 20 Mule Team Parkway (SK-8), 1970. 
Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.34: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, 20 Mule Team Parkway (SK-9), 1970. 
Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  239 
 
 
Figure 3.35: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Signs for 20 Mule Team Parkway, 
1971. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.36: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Sketch of 20 Mule Team Parkway, 
1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.37: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of 20 Mule Team 
Parkway, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.38: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Flowers in California City, 1970. 
Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi 
and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.39: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Concept Sketch of 20 Mule Team 
Parkway, 1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of 
Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.40: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, California City, 1970. Courtesy The 
Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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Figure 3.41: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, California City, 1970. Courtesy The 
Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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Figure 3.42: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, California City, 1970. Courtesy The 
Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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Figure 3.43: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, California City, 1970. Courtesy The 
Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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Figure 3.44: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, California City, 1970. Courtesy The 
Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott 
Brown. 
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Figure 3.45: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Sketch of Company Organization, 
1970. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert 
Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.46: Venturi and Rauch, Architects and Planners, Retrospective, Whitney Museum of 
American Art, 1972. Photograph by Steven Izenour. 225.IV.A.7020.01, The Architectural 
Archives, University of Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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Figure 3.47: Deborah Sussman, Signage for California City, 1970. Photograph by Venturi and 
Rauch, Architects and Planners. Courtesy The Architectural Archives, University of 
Pennsylvania by the gift of Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown. 
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